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Abstract
This dissertation consists of four chapters and an appendix. After an introductory
chapter with an extended literature overview, Chapter 2 is dedicated to the topic of
macroeconomic policy in a heterogeneous monetary union. Chapter 3 investigates
the macroeconomics of real estate, and Chapter 4 deals with a New Keynesian open
economy model versus the six major puzzles in International Macroeconomics. An ap-
pendix provides some derivations and mathematical details. In the following, I briefly
sketch the approach and main findings of Chapters 2 to 4.
Chapter 2 uses a two-country model with a central bank maximizing union-
wide welfare and two fiscal authorities minimizing comparable, but slightly different
country-wide losses. The rivalry between the three authorities is analyzed in seven
static games. Comparing a homogeneous with a heterogeneous monetary union, wel-
fare losses relative to the social optimum are found to be significantly larger in a het-
erogeneous union. The best-performing scenarios are cooperation between all author-
ities and monetary leadership. Cooperation between the fiscal authorities is harmful to
both the whole union’s and the country-specific welfare.
The goal of Chapter 3 is to investigate whether or not it is possible to explain the
house price to GDP ratio and the house price to stock price ratio as being generally
constant, deviating from its respective mean only because of shocks to productivity?
Building a two-sector RBC model for residential and non-residential capital with ad-
justment costs to capital in both sectors, it is shown that an anticipated future shock
to productivity growth in the non-residential sector leads to a large increase in house
prices in the present. This property of the model is used to explain the current house
price behavior in the U. S., the U. K., Japan and Germany.
In Chapter 4, the following question is posed: Can the New Keynesian Open Econ-
omy Model by Galí and Monacelli (2005b) explain “Six Major Puzzles in International
Macroeconomics”, as documented in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b)?
The model features a small open economy with complete markets, Calvo sticky prices
and monopolistic competition. As extensions, I explore the effects of an estimated
Taylor rule and additional trade costs. After translating the six puzzles into moment
conditions for the model, I estimate the five most effective parameters using simu-
lated method of moments (SMM) to fit the moment conditions implied by the data.
Given the simplicity of the model, its fit is surprisingly good: among other things, the
home bias puzzles can easily be replicated, the exchange rate volatility is formidably
increased and the exchange rate correlation pattern is relatively close to realistic val-
ues. Trade costs are one important ingredient for this finding.
Keywords:
macroeconomics, economic policy, DSGE models, currency union, monetary-fiscal
interactions, real estate economics, long run risk, New Keynesian models, small open
economy, simulated method of moments
Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Dissertation umfasst vier Kapitel und einen Anhang. Nach einem
einleitenden und einen Literaturüberblick bietenden ersten Kapitel zeigen Kapitel
zwei bis vier eigenständige und voneinander unabhängige Forschungsthemen.
In Kapitel zwei wird ein Zwei-Länder Modell einer Währungsunion betrachtet, in
dem die gemeinsame Zentralbank die Wohlfahrt der gesamten Währungsunion ma-
ximieren will, während die zwei fiskalpolitischen Akteure vergleichbare, aber mini-
mal abweichende länderspezifische Verlustfunktionen zu minimieren suchen. Das
Konkurrenzverhalten dieser drei Institutionen wird in sieben verschiedenen, stati-
schen spieltheoretischen Szenarien analysiert. Beim Vergleich einer homogenen mit
einer heterogenen Währungsunion lassen sich deutlich höhere Wohlfahrtsverluste re-
lativ zum sozialen Optimum für letztere feststellen. Die Szenarien mit den geringsten
Wohlfahrtsverlusten sind Kooperation aller drei Institutionen und eine Stackelberg-
Führerschaft der Zentralbank. Kooperation nur zwischen den fiskalpolitischen Akteu-
ren schadet der Wohlfahrt sowohl der Währungsunion insgesamt als auch der beiden
Länder.
Kapitel drei untersucht, inwieweit das Verhältnis von Immobilienpreise zum Brut-
toinlandsprodukt als langfristig konstant und nur auf Grund von Produktivitäts-
schocks von seinem Mittelwert abweichend angesehen werden kann. Hierzu wird ein
Zwei-Sektoren RBC-Modell für den Immobiliensektor und einen Konsumgütersektor
mit Kapitalanpassungskosten in beiden Sektoren erstellt. Es wird gezeigt, dass ein an-
tizipierter, zukünftiger Schock auf das Produktivitätswachstum im Konsumgütersektor
eine deutliche Erhöhung der Immobilienpreise relativ zum Bruttoinlandsprodukt zur
Folge hat. Diese Eigenschaft des Modells wird verwendet, um die Immobilienpreisent-
wicklungen in den USA, im Vereinigten Königreich, in Japan und in Deutschland zu
erklären.
In Kapitel vier wird gefragt, ob das Neukeynesianische Modell von Galí and Mo-
nacelli (2005b) die in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b) dokumentierten “sechs großen Rät-
sel der internationalen Makroökonomie” erklären kann. Als Erweiterungen des Mo-
dells werden die Wirkung einer geschätzten Taylorregel und zusätzliche Handelskosten
untersucht. Nachdem die sechs Rätsel in Bedingungen für erste und zweite Momen-
te übersetzt worden sind, werden fünf wesentliche Modellparameter mittels Simula-
ted Method of Moments (SMM) geschätzt. In Anbetracht der relativen Einfachheit des
Modells ist das Ergebnis erstaunlich gut: unter anderem können die empirischen Be-
obachtungen zur Heimatpräferenz widergegeben und die Schwankungsbreite des rea-
len Wechselkurses deutlich erhöht werden. Handelskosten sind für dieses Ergebnis ein
wesentlicher Faktor.
Schlagwörter:
Makroökonomie, Wirtschaftspolitik, Dynamische Allgemeine Gleichgewichtsmodelle,
Währungsunion, Wechselwirkungen von Geld- und Fiskalpolitik, Immobilienmarkt,
Langfristrisiken, Neukeynesianische Modelle, Kleine, offene Volkswirtschaft,
SMM-Schätzung
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1 Introduction
1.1 Objective of the Study
Macroeconomic theory has made progress during the last decades.
Dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models allow researchers to assess
sign and size of the effect that certain changes have on a model economy. As this
model economy is built up on the grounds of utility maximizing households and profit
maximizing firms, one can infer the reaction of each agent to these changes, be they
stochastic disturbances or policy switches.
Game theory, applied to macroeconomics, allows researchers to find out - among other
things – how a group of policy authorities interacts and how this affects macroeco-
nomic outcomes. Questions of coordination, timing of decisions and policy rules can
be answered in this context.
The microfounded nature of modern macroeconomic models allows researchers to
calculate welfare from a quadratic approximation of the household utility. Thus, wel-
fare effects of inflation and output variability can be examined. Given a set of assump-
tions, within a DSGE model researchers can calculate the welfare maximum and, if an
economic policy authority is included in the model, derive implications for economic
policy.
Economic policy has a direct influence on some important macroeconomic variables:
taxes, subsidies and government spending on the fiscal side, the short term interest
rate, money supply and refinancing conditions on the monetary side, and it has the
power to influence all economic agents.
As economic policy decisions are made for a maximization purpose, information on
the functioning of the economy has a positive value, and macroeconomic theory has
1
2the potential to provide this information. Hence, economic policy has and should have
an interest in the developments of macroeconomic theory.
The goal of this maximization does not matter in general, it is itself the object of eco-
nomic theory. Most probably it is maximization of utility, something between the util-
ity of those who decide about policy and the utility of all agents, i.e., welfare.
Macroeconomic theory claims to know something as promising as the “optimal policy”
that maximizes welfare.
It is thus well prepared to give advice. This advice should take into account both the
limitations of theory and the constraints of policy, and it should consider the conse-
quences that came about with these.
In this dissertation, I provide three examples of questions economic policy might have.
Three models are used that apply current macroeconomic theory to address these
questions. I give answers to the questions and analyze the scope of applicability of
model results to reality.
The first question to be addressed is: What are the welfare effects if there are conflicts
of interest between different policy authorities in a heterogeneous monetary union?
In light of the ongoing enlargement of the European Economic and Monetary Union
(EMU), the economic differences between old member countries and the accessing
middle and Eastern European countries come more into focus. The resulting hetero-
geneities between the member countries increase the probability that the respective
fiscal policy authorities differ in their interests. At the same time, the common mone-
tary policy authority continues to look at the monetary union as a whole.
In addressing the above question in joint work with Oliver Grimm, we make use of
two of the three aforementioned progresses in research, namely game theory applied
to macroeconomics and welfare derivation. We develop a model of two regions that
form a monetary union, but still afford regional fiscal policies. All three policy author-
ities, one monetary and two fiscal, use their policy instruments to influence output
and inflation in their respective desired direction. However, there are two crucial dif-
ferences between the policy authorities. First, while the monetary authority considers
aggregate union-wide variables, each fiscal authority considers merely the respective
regional variables. Second, the authorities do not agree on the maximization problem.
Specifically, we assume that monetary policy maximizes union-wide welfare, but fis-
cal policies deviate from maximizing the respective regional welfare. The result of this
setting is a game between the three policy authorities, and the outcomes of this game
3depend on the timing of action and the degree of cooperation between the authori-
ties. We explore what happens to the results when we deviate from the assumption of
symmetric regions. Beginning with the size of the regions, we investigate the effects of
heterogeneities in a set of model parameters on the economic outcomes in the regions
and the union, keeping a focus on welfare.
The second exemplary question that economic policy is eager to have answered be-
longs to the field of real estate. House price movements in the United States, the
United Kingdom and recently in Spain have found increasing attention by domestic
politicians, who wonder how to react to them and whether or not specific action is de-
manded. The research project here, carried out jointly with Harald Uhlig, was inspired
by a discussion forum on the recent developments in the real estate market at the Ger-
man Ministry of Economics and Technology. To find out to what extent current house
price developments can be explained by economic theory, we use a standard DSGE
model that incorporates the real estate market. We take this as our specific research
question: Is it possible to explain the house price to GDP ratio and the house price to
stock price ratio as being generally constant, deviating from its respective mean only
because of shocks to productivity? If so, economic policy may be little concerned about
current price fluctuations, but should strongly focus on the improvement of long-term
growth conditions. The DSGE model we build has two sectors, one for consumption
goods and one for real estate. Real estate is produced using capital and finite land; it
provides housing services that enter the household utility function. We specifically fo-
cus on trend productivity and productivity growth to examine to what extent expected
future productivity increases can explain current house price movements.
The third example of policy questions belongs to the field of monetary economics.
Personal discussions both at the Deutsche Bundesbank and at the Oesterreichische
Nationalbank confirmed that there is an interest in building a small scale state-of-the-
art New Keynesian DSGE model to be used for the conduct of monetary policy. The
New Keynesian paradigm is currently dominating the field of monetary economics; it
incorporates the Keynesian assumption of sticky prices (and/or wages) into the DSGE
framework with rational expectations that was earlier used mainly by Real Business Cy-
cle theorists. While the canonical New Keynesian model for a closed economy is well
documented, e. g. in Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) or Woodford (2003), the litera-
ture is not yet clear about a definitive New Keynesian open economy model. For the
case of a small open economy, the paper by Galí and Monacelli (2005b) is a potential
candidate.
Just like the canonical closed economy model, the Galí and Monacelli (2005b) model
4is of small to medium scale and reasonably simple. The restricted scale of the model is
often favored by economists in (and out of) central banks, because with a small-scale
model it is easier to get an intuition of what is happening and which are the driving
forces. The drawback of this is the lack of sufficient modeling features to replicate a
multitude of stylized facts that have been derived from the data. This is the old debate
between simplicity of a model and its proximity to reality. If one decides in favor of
simplicity, how much does it cost in terms of deviation from reality? If a model terribly
fails to replicate a certain list of stylized facts, these costs are high, and so is the prob-
ability that relying on this model alone will be misleading. In this research project, I
test the Galí and Monacelli (2005b) model for its closeness to reality with respect to six
stylized facts in international macroeconomics, as documented in Obstfeld and Rogoff
(2001). This is done by choosing a set of model parameters to minimize the distance
between certain moments of the model and those of the data. To simplify the task, I
first estimate a Taylor-type rule for the small open economy’s monetary policy instead
of using the strict targeting rules that are used in the original paper. In a second step, I
test the hypothesis of Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b) whether trade costs help to get the
model closer to the data.
In the next section, I review the literature that is relevant to each specific research prob-
lem.
1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 Policy Interactions in a Heterogeneous Monetary Union
Kydland and Prescott (1977) were the first to explore the drawbacks of discretionary
policy; Barro and Gordon (1983) followed on that topic. Both papers focused on one
policy authority, namely the central bank, surprising the agents by sudden inflation
which creates short-term benefits. These two papers form the basis of our research.
However, in two respects they differ strongly from our approach. First, they lack a
maximizing fiscal policy authority and thus cannot analyze the resulting interactions
between the two authorities. Second, the peculiarities of a monetary union are not
explored in these models.
The first paper that explicitly examines the interactions between maximizing monetary
and fiscal authorities in a closed economy and thus overcomes the first major differ-
ence to our approach is Alesina and Tabellini (1987). In this paper, both monetary and
5fiscal policies maximize a function in inflation, output and government expenditures
with respect to inflation and taxes, respectively. A similar model is presented in De-
belle and Fischer (1994). Here, the timing of action plays a prominent role: Nash and
Stackelberg games are considered.
The analysis of monetary and fiscal policies within the framework of a monetary union
appears first in a series of papers in the nineties. Banerjee (1997) is perhaps closest to
Barro and Gordon (1983). He includes the monetary union case into this framework,
but his emphasis is on the issue of rules versus discretion. Sibert (1992), Levine and
Brociner (1994) and Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) all consider monetary and fiscal
policies in a common currency area. Their fiscal policies are to provide public goods
and thus differ from our focus on inflation and output stabilization. They conclude
that discretionary policies lead to a bigger than optimal amount of public goods and
too high an inflation rate.
In the context of the analysis of fiscal policy in a monetary union, two topics have re-
ceived considerable attention. One is the desirability of fiscal constraints like the Sta-
bility and Growth Pact for the EMU. Chari and Kehoe (1998) and Dornbusch (1997) ar-
gue against fiscal constraints in a case where the common central bank can commit to
its policies. Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) and Beetsma and Uhlig (1999) take the op-
posite view; their models focus on the short-sightedness of fiscal policies with respect
to the external effects of a singular fiscal authority’s action on union-wide inflation.
Hence, they come to the conclusion that fiscal constraints are improving welfare.
The second important topic is that of the desirability of fiscal coordination in a mone-
tary union. Chari and Kehoe (1998) and Huber (1994) recommend coordination from a
welfare perspective, as it reduces excessive debt-taking. The opposite position is taken
by Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998). Their reasoning is based on a model in which fiscal
policy takes action ahead of monetary policy. There, short-sighted fiscal policy gets
more effective once it is coordinated, to the bad of welfare.
With his Alfred Marshall Lecture at the Annual Meeting of the European Economic As-
sociation in the year 2000, Avinash Dixit brought the issue of policy interactions in a
monetary union to a wide scientific public. Some of the topics sketched there have
been elaborated in research papers that form the starting point of Chapter 2 of this
dissertation. Dixit and Lambertini (2001) study an n-country monetary union with
maximizing fiscal and monetary policies. All n+1 policy authorities minimize a loss
function in union-wide inflation and country-wide output, except for the central bank,
which considers also union-wide output. Target levels for output and inflation as well
6as the relative weight of output in the loss function may vary between the policy au-
thorities, so there is room for conflicts. In a Barro and Gordon (1983) like manner, each
country-wide output is influenced by surprise inflation and all fiscal policies, whereas
overall inflation is linearly dependent on the actions of all n+1 policy authorities. The
authors analyze (a) a simultaneous game of all authorities against each other, i.e. a
Nash equilibrium, (b) the case where monetary policy acts first, i.e. monetary leader-
ship in a Stackelberg game, (c) fiscal leadership and (d) monetary commitment. With
the assumption of a conservative central bank that has lower output and inflation tar-
gets and a weight on output in the loss function that is not bigger than that of the fiscal
authorities, they conclude that (i) the Nash outcome is always suboptimal, (ii) the lead-
ership scenarios might be less suboptimal and (iii) monetary commitment proves of no
additional value in a world with fiscal discretion, as the outcome is the same as under
monetary leadership. The last result is also shown in Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) for
the case of a closed economy. This paper includes also the cases of fiscal and joint com-
mitment, and of nonstrategically chosen fiscal policy. Next to these, the paper gives a
simulation of results, adds a microfoundation of the model equations and calculates
welfare, as derived from a second-order approximation of household utility. Lamber-
tini (2006a) is a digression from Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) with respect to the goal
of fiscal policy: instead of providing a production subsidy, here fiscal policy collects
taxes for utility-providing government spending. Assuming fiscal policy to maximize
social welfare, she is able to rank equilibria accordingly. Dixit and Lambertini (2003b)
adds the microfoundation of Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) to the monetary union case.
It investigates in greater detail a situation in which all policy authorities agree upon
the target values for output and inflation. The authors show that in such a situation
of symbiosis, the policy targets can be achieved no matter what the order of action,
how the weights of the objectives, whether or not monetary commitment is feasible,
and whether or not fiscal authorities cooperate. The case of identical target values is
also analyzed in Cooper and Kempf (2000). Assuming that the budget constraints are
shared, the common central bank case is compared to the one with national central
banks. Lambertini (2004) adds a derivation of social welfare and elaborates on the is-
sues of fiscal cooperation. It turns out that fiscal cooperation typically worsens the
results in the Nash equilibrium. In contrast to this, Lombardo and Sutherland (2004)
come to the conclusion that fiscal cooperation leads to small, but not negligible wel-
fare gains. This is found in a two-country model where equilibrium government con-
sumption is positive, public goods provide utility and supply shocks are not perfectly
negatively correlated. Uhlig (2002) gives some remarks on the fiscal leadership equi-
librium in an stylized model of an n country monetary union. Among other things, he
7shows that there is a free-riding issue for fiscal policies which results in a higher inter-
est rate. This issue might be resolved if all fiscal authorities cooperate. EMU‘s Stability
and Growth Pact might be seen as a step towards resolving this free-riding issue.
The papers discussed so far all share one modeling feature: the time dimension is fairly
restricted. The static models used know only two situations, pre- and post-action.
Nonetheless, the timing of the actions itself may be quite delicate and elaborated.
The issue of policy interactions in a monetary union is also dealt with in dynamic mod-
els. Here, the literature can be divided into two strands. One strand uses highly styl-
ized models with ad hoc macroeconomic equations and without a proper derivation
of the relevant policy maximization problems. But these models typically include dy-
namic games, in particular open-loop Nash and cooperative equilibria. For example,
Engwerda, van Aarle, and Plasmans (2005) assume monetary policy to passively fix the
nominal interest rate and analyze Keynesian fiscal policies. They especially focus on
the effects of fiscal constraints like the Stability and Growth Pact and rate them possibly
harmful to the economy. They also evaluate the effects of fiscal transfer mechanisms
between the two countries of the model. van Aarle, Engwarda, and Plasmans (2002)
analyze dynamic games between three policy authorities, one monetary and two fis-
cal. They differentiate the Nash equilibrium from full cooperation and three variants
of partial cooperation. Varying the degree of symmetry between the two countries in
different respects (stabilization preferences, monetary policy transmission, bargain-
ing power in a coalition, sensitive to intra-union competitiveness), they come to the
following conclusions: First, it pays off for the fiscal authorities to cooperate, at least if
the countries are sufficiently symmetric. Second, the more asymmetric the countries
are, the more likely is the Nash equilibrium. Monetary policy does not profit from co-
operation. Third, cooperation between the fiscal authorities results in higher losses for
the central bank. Lastly, cooperation between the monetary and one fiscal authority
leads to suboptimal results.
The paper of Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2005) is located somewhat in between the
two strands of literature. These authors construct a partial equilibrium New Keynesian
model to look at the effects of inflation targeting monetary policy on different countries
within a monetary union.
The second strand uses the New Keynesian DSGE framework with second order welfare
approximation. However, these models typically incorporate less features of dynamic
game theory. Instead, they focus more on optimal policies in comparison to simple
policy rules.
8Within the context of a closed economy, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe have analyzed op-
timal policies in a series of papers. In Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004), e.g., they solve
the Ramsey problem of a benevolent joint policymaker for monetary as well as fiscal
policy. They compare this outcome to the outcomes in case either monetary or fis-
cal policy follows some simple rule, while the other remains to solve the now more
constrained Ramsey problem. They find that the simple rules assumed do not harm
welfare substantially. Similarly, Benigno and Woodford (2003) assume jointly optimal
monetary and fiscal policies. They derive optimal policy responses to shocks and op-
timal targeting rules. In solving a Ramsey problem, the authors of the two previously
mentioned papers assume that the policy authorities have commitment power. In a
similar model Adam and Billi (2006) analyze the case in which one or even both au-
thorities do not have access to a commitment device. They work out that the welfare
loss due to fiscal discretion is rather low. However, the welfare loss of monetary dis-
cretion turns out to be significant, yet can be overcome by making the central bank
sufficiently conservative with respect to the inflation target or the inflation weight in
the central bank‘s loss function.
The case of optimal monetary policy in a currency union is dealt with in Benigno
(2004). In this beautifully designed two-country model, an assumption is made re-
garding fiscal policy that can be seen in a multitude of New Open Economy Macroeco-
nomics models: fiscal policy is used to offset the distortion of monopolistic competi-
tion. Hence, fiscal policy is time invariant and not strategic by any means.
Ferrero (2005) extends the work of Benigno and Woodford (2003) to a monetary union.
Assuming that both fiscal and monetary policy care about union-wide welfare, he
solves the optimal policy problem and compares the results to simple rules, strict CPI
inflation targeting on the monetary side and constant debt on the fiscal side. Fer-
rero finds that the welfare loss of a constant debt rule is much higher than the welfare
loss due to strict CPI inflation targeting. In a similar way, Galí and Monacelli (2005b)
solve the social planner problem for a monetary union that consists of infinitely many
and infinitesimally small open economies. Fiscal policies are modeled by government
spending, financed by lump sum taxes. The authors find that in response to asymmet-
ric technology shocks fiscal policies should optimally increase the provision of public
goods. In a similar way, Beetsma and Jensen (2004) analyze benevolent optimal mone-
tary and fiscal policies in a monetary union. Fiscal policy in this paper also means pro-
viding public goods, financed by lump sum taxes or deficit. The authors also provide
a comparison between commitment and discretion of all authorities and find sizeable
gains of commitment. Lambertini (2006b) starts off with the assumption that mone-
9tary policy follows a Taylor rule, whereas the two fiscal authorities cooperate to solve
the Ramsey problem for the monetary union, as it is also done in Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2004). Fiscal policy means choosing a labor tax rate and a deficit to finance an
exogenously given stream of government spending. Lambertini then implements the
Stability and Growth Pact as an additional constraint to the Ramsey problem. As her
point of departure is the optimal fiscal policy, this additional constraint comes with a
cost in terms of welfare. Fortunately, this cost is small, as the constraint is rarely bind-
ing for the assumed optimal fiscal policy.
The objective of Chapter 2 of this dissertation is to analyze the interactions between
monetary and fiscal policies in a heterogeneous monetary union. We take the view that
commitment is not feasible and restrict ourselves to discretionary policies. Hence, we
have decided against a dynamic model setting. Obviously, the dynamic approach to
macroeconomic policies in a monetary union has its pros. Just to mention one point,
deficits and debt are of utmost importance to fiscal policy, and even more so in a mon-
etary union with its spill-over effects and the danger of free-riding. A static model
cannot account for this properly. On the other hand, the games that may be played
between different policy authorities in a monetary union have not yet been analyzed
in depth in a dynamic setting. If one assumes commitment to be infeasible, the DSGE
literature becomes quiet on the topic. Only the strand of literature with ad hoc macroe-
conomic equations provides some insights here. Thus, van Aarle et al. (2002) is a dy-
namic counterpart to our study. In the class of static models, our point of departure are
the models of Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2003a,) all of which we can replicate in our
model. However, we deviate from these in many respects to focus on heterogeneities
in a monetary union. First, instead of n countries our monetary union consists of two
countries of possibly different size. Thereby we are able to analyze differences within
a monetary union in the way of Benigno (2004) or Ferrero (2005) for EMU countries.
Second, we take the view fiscal policies care about inflation on the country level, not
union-wide. Among other things, this leads to terms of trade entering the model equa-
tions. Third, we investigate the effects of heterogeneities in the model parameters on
output, inflation and welfare, both for the union and each region separately. In doing
so, we can hint on the effects of heterogeneities and perhaps also on the desirability of
a fast expansion of the European Monetary Union.
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1.2.2 The Real Estate Market from a Macroeconomic Perspective
In general, macroeconomists are not too much concerned about the real estate market,
taking it as just one of many sub-markets that should function as good as others. But
from time to time and from country to country, this market shows some peculiarities
that attract more than usual attention among economists. The last half decade has
been such a time, and the U.S. and the U.K. – to name the biggest out of a longer list –
have been such countries.
Once economists take a special look at the real estate market, they try to single out
features that make this market special – hence worth considering – and allow for ex-
planation for the observed peculiarities.1 In the following, I review some of the leading
theories that investigate and try to explain peculiarities in the real estate market. While
my focus is on the explanation of house price movements, I also look at related works.
One line of research focuses on heterogeneous agents and how they are affected by
house prices. Iacoviello (2005) and Campbell and Cocco (2005) both take house prices
as given and ask how these affect households, especially their consumption paths.
Iacoviello (2005) relates a borrowing constraint to the borrower’s home value. Once
house prices fall, borrowing becomes restricted at least for some households, and con-
sumption behavior changes as a result of this. Campbell and Cocco (2005) show dif-
ferent effects of house price movements on consumption for different age groups and
build a heterogeneous agent model with borrowing constraints to replicate the stylized
facts. The paper of Piazzesi and Schneider (2008) combines heterogeneous agents with
another issue, so it shall be discussed below.
The role of credit market imperfections is also present in Stein (1995), who assumes
that heterogeneous households face a minimum down payment condition when buy-
ing a house. With this, the author addresses the correlation of house prices and trading
volume. Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006) build on the previous paper and have a closer
look at households’ decisions to buy a house. Assuming heterogeneous agents with
respect to income and utility of high quality housing, as well as mortgage restrictions,
the authors show how changes to these assumptions induce strong house price move-
ments and even overshooting. The upturn in house prices at the beginning of this
decade can thus be rationalized by lighter mortgage restrictions.
In another line of research, the effect of inflation on house prices is analyzed in a se-
1A noticeable exception is Poterba (1991), who tries to explain the nominal U.S. house price decline
at the end of the eighties by treating housing just like any other asset.
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ries of papers by Poterba (1984, 1991, 1992). The channel of inflation to house prices is
through an effective tax subsidy to owner occupied housing. A more recent approach
is taken by Piazzesi and Schneider (2008), who build a heterogeneous agent model in
which next to the tax channel heterogeneous inflation expectations increase the vol-
ume of credit and thus the price of the collateral. Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008)
analyzes the effect of inflation through money illusion: if agents assume nominal and
real interest rates move one-to-one, they wrongly identify a decrease in the inflation
rate as lower real interest rates. This makes them more willing to accept a mortgage
contract, so house prices increase. With this theory, they explain the house price in-
crease at the turn of the millennium by decreases in inflation rates.
Piazzesi, Schneider, and Tuzel (2007) see housing as an asset that pays of a consump-
tion good, namely housing services. These housing services provide utility that can
not be separated from consumption utility. Their goal is to show effects of housing on
asset prices and not to explain house price movements itself. With their endowment
economy with nonseparable utility of consumption and housing services they show
that the housing share in total consumption is useful for forecasting excess returns on
stocks.
Davis and Heathcote (2005) single out three distinctive features of housing or residen-
tial investment: its production makes use of different inputs shares, it is of different use
and it has different business cycle dynamics, all to nonresidential investment. They
model the production side as intermediate sectors for construction, manufacturing
and services and final sectors for consumption/investment and residential structures.
With this model at hand, they replicate the relatively high volatility of residential in-
vestment and its procyclicality, though not the lead-lag pattern of the data. Finally,
there have been attempts to explain house price movements by search and matching
models. Wheaton (1990) is a key reference here.2
Chapter three of this dissertation is an attempt to explain house price movements rel-
ative to the gross domestic product. Without relying on heterogeneous agents, credit
market imperfections or any nominal frictions, house prices are influenced only by
productivity shocks, both current and anticipated future shocks. Under the label of
“long-run risk”, the latter type of shocks has recently attracted attention, see Bansal
and Yaron (2004) and Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2005), though both do not look at the
real estate.
2See Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006) for further references.
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1.2.3 Confronting Small-Scale Open Economy Models to the Data
Since the path-breaking work of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995), DSGE models with price
rigidities are more and more used for open economy monetary policy analysis. This
paper may be seen as the beginning of the so-called New Keynesian or New Neoclassi-
cal Synthesis approach for the open economy. Nowadays, it has become the standard
in the field. The advances since then are well documented in the literature, first of all
Lane (2001). Textbook treatments of open economy models are are given in Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1996, ch. 10) and, more recently, Galí (2008, ch. 7). From a theoretical
point of view, open economy macroeconomic models are typically divided in models
with two (or more) countries of comparable size and models where one country is so
small that it is affected by, but itself cannot affect the rest of the world: the small open
economy setting. An early and particularly well known example of the latter is the
model of “Monetary Policy and Exchange Rate Volatility in a Small Open Economy”,
a paper by Jordi Galí and Tommaso Monacelli, first circulated in 1999 and published
2005 in the Review of Economic Studies.
With only one source of shocks (technology) and only two frictions (monopolistic com-
petition, sticky prices), the model is small of scale and fairly simple. Logically, it cannot
be an adequate model for every question in open economy macroeconomics. But as
researchers are always tempted to start off with simple and standard models to an-
swer their questions, the scope of applicability deserves some attention. A good way to
evaluate this scope of applicability is to check whether the model can replicate some
stylized facts in macroeconomics. The particular stylized facts that are used in Chap-
ter 4 of this dissertation as a benchmark are summarized in “The Six Major Puzzles in
International Macroeconomics: Is There a Common Cause?”, a paper by Maurice Ob-
stfeld and Kenneth Rogoff in the NBER Macro Annual 2000. In this literature review, I
will not discuss whether these “six puzzles‘” represent stylized facts. And I will also not
discuss whether this set of stylized facts is an appropriate one - this is always depen-
dent on the actual research question one wishes to focus on. Of course, any other set
of stylized facts might have been chosen here as well.
Instead, I will focus on methods to put current small to medium scale open economy
DSGE models to the data. In describing and distinguishing these methods, I rely on the
textbook by Canova (2007). A lucid and much more detailed description of the meth-
ods can be found there. There are two main avenues researchers have taken to put
open economy macro models to the data. One avenue is that of calibration, as pro-
posed by Kydland and Prescott (1982, 1991). The other avenue is estimation, and this
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avenue splits into four roads: (i) Vector autoregression (VAR), as first presented in Sims
(1980). The validation of a theoretical model with the help of a structural VAR is con-
nected to the work of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001). (ii) Maximum likeli-
hood (ML), a method used already for a long time. It starts from the assumption that
the model is a correct representation of the underlying data generating process, while
only the parameters have to be chosen so as to maximize the likelihood function. (iii)
Generalized method of moments (GMM) starts from the same assumption, but uses
less information about the model. The pioneering researchers are Hansen and Single-
ton (1982). Comparable to this method are simulation estimators. (iv) Bayesian meth-
ods have only recently been applied to DSGE models, following the lead of Geweke
(1999) and Schorfheide (2000).
In the following, I briefly describe each method and review some of the contributions
that have been made to the literature on confronting small scale open economy DSGE
models to the data.
Calibration
The calibration procedure can be described as follows:3 (1) Choose an economic ques-
tion to be addressed. (2) Select a model design which bears some relevance to the
question asked. (3) Choose functional forms for the primitives of the model and find
a solution for the endogenous variables in terms of the exogenous ones and of the pa-
rameters. (4) Select parameters and convenient specifications for the exogenous pro-
cesses and simulate paths for the endogenous variables. (5) Evaluate the quality of the
model by comparing its outcomes to a set of “stylized facts” of the actual data. (6) Pro-
pose an answer to the question, characterize the uncertainty surrounding the answer
and do policy analyses if required.
Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1995) ask whether “a two-country real business cycle
model can account simultaneously for domestic and international aspects of business
cycles.”4 Setting up their model, simulating it and comparing the thus obtained second
moments to those obtained from data for the U.S. and some European countries, they
find two major discrepancies. As their attempts to solve them do not succeed, they
name them the “quantity anomaly” and the “price anomaly”. The first refers to the
observation that relative to output, consumption is more internationally correlated in
theory, but less in the data. The second refers to the terms of trade. In the data, they
3Taken from Canova (2007, ch. 7).
4Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1991)
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are very volatile and persistent, while the model can replicate at most 20 percent of the
volatility of the terms of trade. Both anomalies are at the core of stylized facts I interna-
tional macroeconomics that models have a hard time to replicate. Under the headings
consumption correlation puzzle and exchange rate volatility puzzle, they also show up
in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) six major puzzles.
Kollmann (2001) focuses on the second anomaly. He uses the observation of Backus
et al. (1995) as a starting point and builds a small open economy DSGE model with
nominal rigidities in the line of Calvo (1983) to see whether this “would allow to capture
simultaneously the high volatility of exchange rates and the other key macroeconomic
facts considered”5 His model can explain about 50 percent of the volatility of the real
and nominal exchange rate.
Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) pursue an effort in the same direction: “Can Sticky
Price Models Generate Volatile and Persistent Real Exchange Rates?” Their baseline
model with prices set a year in advance, high risk aversion and linearly separable utility
of leisure is able to match the volatility most of the persistence of the real exchange
rate, but at the cost of a new anomaly: They find that their model implies a high and
positive correlation between real exchange rates and the ratio of consumptions across
countries, whereas the data shows no clear correlation. Among the means considered
to circumvent the anomalies, Chari et al. (2002) consider different parameter values,
different shocks and different model assumptions regarding preferences and monetary
policy. A noteworthy detail of their paper is the calibration of the interest elasticity. The
value for that is obtained from a single equation OLS regression on the model‘s money
demand equation, thus opening a door for estimation in a calibration paper.
This method is silent on the question of how to choose parameters to optimize the
model fit. It often seems to be a process of guess and verify. In a more dimensional
problem, this is perhaps not sufficient for every researcher.
Vector Autoregression
The vector autoregression (VAR) methodology plays a prominent role for the evalua-
tion of macroeconomic models since its beginning with Sims (1980).Evaluation is done
by comparing statistics of the DSGE model with those of a VAR model. If the further are
within certain probability bands of the latter, this is seen as confirmation of the DSGE
model’s quality. A summary of the algorithm according to Canova (2007, Section 4.7) is
5Kollmann (2001, p.260)
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given as follows: (1) Find qualitative, robust implications of a class of models. (2) Use
these implications to identify shocks in the actual data. (3) Evaluate the model qualita-
tively, e.g. by the sign or shape of impulse responses to shocks. (4) If there is more than
one model at hand, validate qualitatively across models. (5) If needed, compare model
and data quantitatively. (6) If needed, repeat steps (2) to (5) for other implications of
the model. (7) Proceed to policy analyses, or alter the model in case of mismatch. In
the literature, VAR models have been used to find out how economies react to shocks.
The results found using VARs are then compared to the respective responses of a DSGE
model. Clarida, Galí, and of Dallas (1994) as well as Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) both
look at the VAR evidence on the effect of monetary shocks on the real exchange rate.
They are able to find the same qualitative responses in their sticky price models. Betts
and Devereux (1996) also include the trade balance in their model and show that their
DSGE model with pricing to market improves on both the quantity anomaly and the
price anomaly. Another emphasis is put on the question whether monetary shocks af-
fect the current account. Lane (1998); Prasad (1999) and Lee and Chinn (1998) all find
a slight improvement in the current account after a positive monetary shock, though
their identification scheme of a monetary shock differs.
Ghironi, Iscan, and Rebucci (2003) uses the two-country model of Ghironi (2000) to see
whether differing discount factors and steady-state productivity levels help to explain
net foreign asset holdings and the quantity anomaly. After making identification as-
sumptions for the assumed productivity shocks, they estimate a VAR and compare the
responses of the model to those of the VAR. While asymmetries of the current account
can be well reproduced, the low consumption correlation of the data is not completely
replicated in the model.
Though the use of VARs is widespread, there are nonetheless certain dangers. The per-
haps most important one is model misspecification, either because of omitted vari-
ables or because shocks are misaggregated.6
Maximum Likelihood
The estimation of a model with maximum likelihood (ML) is grounded on the strong
assumption that the model is the true data generating process. Estimating the struc-
tural parameters using ML requires (1) writing the model in state space form and (2)
applying the Kalman filter to obtain optimal recursive estimates of the unobserved
state variables and minimum mean square error forecasts of the endogenous vari-
6See Canova (2007, Section 4.6) for examples.
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ables.7 A first attempt to apply ML to an open economy model is Ghironi (2000). He
builds a deterministic two-country model with population growth and price rigidities.
He estimates his model in two ways: First by single equation OLS, then by full infor-
mation maximum likelihood estimation of each the supply and the demand side of the
economy using data for Canada and the U.S.
Bergin (2003) uses the small open economy model of Kollmann (2001) to estimate
its log-linear approximation with the maximum likelihood procedure of Leeper and
Sims (1994). For the estimation process, he uses the seven time series current account,
nominal exchange rate, domestic and foreign price indices, output, money supply and
world interest rate. As small open economy he uses data of Canada, Australia and
the U.K. He finds that the model does a reasonably good job with respect to prices
and output, whereas exchange rate movements are badly matched. Bergin compares
the structural model estimates with VAR (1) estimates and with estimates of an unre-
stricted model in which the interrelations of parameters over the model equations are
not considered. He finds that the model outperforms the VAR for all three countries
and outperforms the unrestricted model for all countries analyzed except for the U.K.
Furthermore, he investigates whether Calvo (1983) price and/or wage stickiness is a
reasonable feature and whether pricing to market or producer currency pricing is the
better assumption. His estimates vote strongly in favor of nominal rigidities. Out of
them, price stickiness is more often supported than wage stickiness. Regarding the
currency denomination of exports, producer currency pricing fares a bit worse than
pricing to market, as the model outperforms the unrestricted model only in the case of
Australia.
Benigno (2004) is a similar exercise in a two-country model with a rich set of frictions.
The econometric method is the same as in Bergin (2003), but data is now for the U.S.
versus the remaining G7 countries. Among his findings are that a shock to the un-
covered interest parity condition has high explanatory power for the current account,
but not so for the exchange rate, which is more dependent on monetary policy shocks.
Overall, the model fits the data “reasonably well”.
A ML estimation of a typical real business cycle (RBC) DSGE model, augmented with
a VAR specification of the error terms, is provided in Ireland (2004).8 While confirm-
ing some of the standard findings for RBC models, he disappointingly finds that the
hypothesis of stable structural parameters of the sample period is rejected.
7See algorithm 6.1 in Canova (2007) for a description of the Kalman filter.
8Therein the interested reader will find also some good sources on other papers.
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Among the most prominent issues of ML estimation are9 unobservable variables in the
state vector, the number of series used in the estimation, the quality of the estimates,
given the assumption that the model is the true data generating process, and finally
the identifiability of parameters.
Generalized Method of Moments and Simulated Method of Moments
A generalized method of moment (GMM) estimator is chosen as to minimize the
weighted squared distances, mostly between sample and population orthogonality
conditions. In contrast to maximum likelihood, only limited information of the model
is used. Often, only single equations are estimated. Examples in the open economy
literature are Imrohoroglu (1994) for an estimation of currency substitution and Clar-
ida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) for monetary policy rules. The latter estimate Taylor type
rules for the U.S., Japan and the big four Western European countries. Among others,
they find that exchange rates and foreign interest rates have negligible effects on mone-
tary policies. A big issue for GMM estimation are the properties of the estimator when
obtained with a small sample. According to experiments, asymptotic theory applies
for sample sizes above 300 periods, which for quarterly data is more than 75 years.10
Another issue is the optimal choice and amount of instruments to be used: more in-
struments improve asymptotic efficiency, but also increase small sample bias.11
Bayesian estimation
When distinguishing Bayesian from classical econometrics, Sims (2002) uses the ex-
ample of how to use a testing device on an assembly line. “While all these classical
[econometric] procedures [of using the device] are associated with probability state-
ments about how the procedures behave across repeated measurements, independent
of the true state being measured, Bayesian inference aims instead at making proba-
bility statements about the true state of the world given a particular measurement or
set of measurements.”12 This example highlight two major aspects in which Bayesian
econometrics differs from classical econometrics, objectivity and randomness. Lan-
caster (2004) has given lucid explanations to both in his textbook, which shall be cited.
Bayesian inference is not “objective.” Some people, believing that sci-
9This list is collected from Canova (2007, Section 6.4).
10Canova (2007, p. 196).
11Ibid.
12Sims (2002, pp. 2f.).
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ence must be objective and its methods objectively justifiable, find this a
devastating criticism. Whatever the merit of this position it does not seem
to be the way applied econometrics is practiced. The typical seminar in
our subject appears to be an exercise in persuasion in which the speaker
announces her beliefs in the form of a model containing and accompa-
nied by a set of assumptions, these being additional (tentative) beliefs. She
attempts to persuade her audience of the reasonableness of these beliefs
by showing that some, at least, embody “rational” behavior by the agents
she is discussing and promising that other beliefs will, in fact, be shown by
evidence to be not inconsistent with the data. She then presents her results
and shows how some of her beliefs seem to be true and others false and in
need of change. The entire process appears to be subjective and personal.
All that a Bayesian can contribute to this is to ensure that the way in which
she revises her beliefs conforms to the laws of probability and, in particu-
lar, uses Bayes’ theorem.13
In the traditional literature we often find phrases such as “x is random”
or “we shall treat x as random” or even “we shall treat x as fixed, i.e. as
not random” where “random” means that the object in question will be as-
signed a probability distribution. In the Bayesian approach all objects ap-
pearing in a model are assigned probability distributions and are random
in this sense. The only distinction between objects is whether they will be-
come known for sure when the data are in, in which case they are data(1);
or whether they will not become known for sure, in which case they are
parameters. Generally, the words “random” and “fixed” do not figure in a
Bayesian analysis and should be avoided.14
This said, Lancaster describes the Bayesian algorithm:
1. Formulate your economic model as a collection of probability distribu-
tions conditional on different values for a model parameter θ ∈Θ.
2. Organize your beliefs about θ into a (prior) probability distribution over
Θ.
3. Collect the data and insert them into the family of distributions given in
step 1.
13Lancaster (2004, p. 8).
14Lancaster (2004, p. 9).
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4. Use Bayes’ theorem to calculate your new beliefs about θ.
5. Criticize your model.15
In recent years, Bayesian methods have attracted considerable attention for the pur-
pose of estimation of structural models. The landmark paper of Smets and Wouters
(2003) was a breakthrough for closed economy models of medium scale, and the first
open economy versions of thus estimated medium scale models started to circulate.
Examples are De Walque and Wouters (2004) and Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé, and Vil-
lani (2005). For the small scale models that are of interest here, Lubik and Schorfheide
(2007) is the first and prominent example using Bayesian techniques. Their model is
a simplified version of the Galí and Monacelli (2005b) model that plays a prominent
role in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. Their research question is very much comparable
to the one of Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998): do exchange rates play a role in mon-
etary policies of certain small open economies? Taking data from Australia, Canada,
New Zealand and the U.K., the authors find the nominal U.S. Dollar exchange rate to
be of importance for Canada and the U.K., but not important for the remaining two
countries. In a follow up paper, Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) apply Bayesian tech-
niques to a small-scale two country model, arguing that for theoretical questions two
country models are of higher importance than small open economy model, so that
there should be a two country model estimated with Bayesian techniques as well. In
the words of Lubik and Schorfheide (2005), “the Bayesian framework is rich enough to
cope with misspecification [as a result of the small scale of the model] and identifica-
tion problems [that arise in large-scale models with many shocks]”. Having said this,
the authors nonetheless find that having less restrictive priors leads to a better model
fit, which indicates that either the assumptions about the priors or the model have defi-
ciencies. Furthermore, they conclude that new open economy models “are still very far
away from offering a satisfactory explanation for exchange rate dynamics."16 Though
the Bayesian approach currently seems to be relatively attractive to researchers, here,
too, are critics. In particular, the procedure to choose prior distributions of certain
tightness sometimes looks as if it is result driven instead of knowledge driven. Another
critique is regarding the complexity of this method, which makes it easy to keep errors
unseen, just like it is much easier for a pianist to have a wrong key unnoticed when
playing Shostakovich instead of Brahms. But of course, this is more of an observa-
tion instead of a critique: both Shostakovich and Brahms have utmost beauty in their
works.
15Lancaster (2004, p. 9).
16Lubik and Schorfheide (2005, p. 30).
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The objective of Chapter 4 of this dissertation is to confront a specific, small scale,
small open economy model to specific observations from the data. When decid-
ing about the appropriate econometric procedure, the following considerations were
made. As a starting point, I have calibrated a set of parameters that seem to have agreed
upon values or that have proven to be of minor importance to my research question. As
Hansen and Heckman (1996) put it, “calibration is selecting parameter estimates with
an implicit loss function.”17 This procedure is seen throughout the literature, though
it seems to be that researchers are not particular proud about calibrated parameters in
an otherwise estimated model. As the observations consist only of first and second mo-
ments, I do not need the full apparatus of a VAR. Furthermore, as I have only one source
of shocks, misaggregation would be a possible issue here. As the model considered
is highly stylized, I refrain from assuming that the model is the true data generating
process. So maximum likelihood methods seem inappropriate. Generalized method
of moments is in danger of leading to biased estimates because of the small sample
size. Nonetheless, for a single equation estimation of a Taylor rule for the small open
economy I follow Clarida et al. (1998) in choosing GMM. For the remaining parame-
ters, I obtain estimates using simulated method of moments (SMM) estimation. This
method is comparable to GMM, but relies on matching moments of the data to those
obtained from simulation of the model economy. It is also comparable to the Bayesian
approach, as I use prior information before estimation. In this understanding, cali-
brating a subset of the parameters equals choosing fixed priors, while restricting the
range of possible values for the parameters to be estimated equals choosing a uniform
prior distribution on a specified domain. As Canova (2007) notes, the approach is easy
to implement and, as holds true for small scale models, its functioning is easy to under-
stand. With the procedure described, I check in how far the chosen small scale open
economy model can match a set of first and second moments of international data.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
This dissertation consists of four chapters and an appendix. After this introductory
chapter, Chapter 2 is dedicated to the topic of macroeconomic policy in a heteroge-
neous monetary union. Chapter 3 investigates the macroeconomics of real estate, and
Chapter 4 deals with a New Keynesian open economy model versus the six major puz-
zles in International Macroeconomics. An appendix provides some derivations and
17Hansen and Heckman (1996, p. 93).
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mathematical details. In the following, I briefly sketch the approach and main findings
of Chapters 2 to 4.
Chapter 2 uses a two-country model with a central bank maximizing union-wide wel-
fare and two fiscal authorities minimizing comparable, but slightly different country-
wide losses. The rivalry between the three authorities is analyzed in seven static games.
Comparing a homogeneous with a heterogeneous monetary union, welfare losses rel-
ative to the social optimum are found to be significantly larger in a heterogeneous
union. The best-performing scenarios are cooperation between all authorities and
monetary leadership. Cooperation between the fiscal authorities is harmful to both
the whole union’s and the country-specific welfare.
The goal of Chapter 3 is to investigate whether or not it is possible to explain the house
price to GDP ratio and the house price to stock price ratio as being generally constant,
deviating from its respective mean only because of shocks to productivity? Building
a two-sector RBC model for residential and non-residential capital with adjustment
costs to capital in both sectors, it is shown that an anticipated future shock to pro-
ductivity growth in the non-residential sector leads to a large increase in house prices
in the present. This property of the model is used to explain the current house price
behavior in the U. S., the U. K., Japan and Germany.
In Chapter 4, the following question is posed: Can the New Keynesian Open Econ-
omy Model by Galí and Monacelli (2005b) explain “Six Major Puzzles in International
Macroeconomics”, as documented in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b)?
The model features a small open economy with complete markets, Calvo sticky prices
and monopolistic competition. As extensions, I explore the effects of an estimated
Taylor rule and additional trade costs. After translating the six puzzles into moment
conditions for the model, I estimate the five most effective parameters using simu-
lated method of moments (SMM) to fit the moment conditions implied by the data.
Given the simplicity of the model, its fit is surprisingly good: among other things, the
home bias puzzles can easily be replicated, the exchange rate volatility is formidably
increased and the exchange rate correlation pattern is relatively close to realistic val-
ues. Trade costs are one important ingredient for this finding.
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2 Macroeconomic Policy in a
Heterogeneous Monetary Union
with Oliver Grimm
We use a two-country model with a central bank maximizing union-wide welfare and two fiscal
authorities minimizing comparable, but slightly different country-wide losses. We analyze the
rivalry between the three authorities in seven static games. Comparing a homogeneous with a
heterogeneous monetary union, we find welfare losses relative to the social optimum to be signifi-
cantly larger in the heterogeneous union. The best-performing scenarios are cooperation between
all authorities and monetary leadership. Cooperation between the fiscal authorities is harmful
to both the whole union’s and the country-specific welfare.
2.1 Introduction
A country participating in a currency union has to abstain from sovereign monetary
policy. A union-wide central bank conducts monetary policy for the whole currency
area and cannot pay individual attention to every specific country in its decision-
making. In contrast, national fiscal policies typically care about their single country
and not the union as a whole. This gives rise to a variety of possible strategic behav-
iors: National fiscal policies can help monetary policy to maximize union-wide welfare
(Benigno 2004; Galí and Monacelli 2002, 2005a), they can try to adjust the outcomes of
monetary policy to maximize nationwide welfare (Dixit 2001; Uhlig 2002), or they can
be used to maximize the probability of the current government staying in office after
the next elections (Beetsma and Uhlig 1999).
Here, a model is proposed that allows to incorporate all three possibilities. We consider
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a two-country model with a single currency and one monetary policy conducted by a
common central bank. Each country or region has its own fiscal policy authority that
maximizes its objective function with the arguments of output and inflation. The equa-
tions of the basic model and the loss functions are derived from microfoundation by
enhancing and modifying the approach of Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) and Dixit and
Lambertini (2003b). Our contribution is to accurately model the possibility of various
differences between two countries in a heterogeneous monetary union. After setting up
the completely symmetric benchmark results, the two regions of the monetary union
are allowed to differ from each other with respect to (a) size, (b) home bias, (c) price
rigidities and (d) fiscal policies. We take the view that national fiscal policy authorities
are concerned with national output and inflation targets, whereas they are not directly
concerned with output growth and price changes in other parts of the union unless
they decide to cooperate. A crucial assumption for our analysis is that fiscal authori-
ties have target rates for output and inflation that are higher than the welfare-optimal
rates. However, monetary policy is assumed to aim at union-wide optimal rates in
terms of welfare.
We analyze the fiscal policy makers’ and central bank’s losses in various scenarios: Poli-
cies can be conducted under discretion, simultaneously in the Nash scenario, or se-
quentially in Stackelberg leadership scenarios for each policy. Alternatively, policies
can be coordinated between some or all authorities. We investigate the implications
for output, inflation, and various policy loss functions in a numerical analysis, and
show that the ranking of the scenarios is relatively robust across different degrees of
heterogeneity.
We find that from the viewpoint of welfare maximization, joint cooperation between
all policy makers and monetary leadership produce the smallest losses. Increasing the
heterogeneities between the regions implies larger overall losses. Finally, we show that
the larger the heterogeneities, the higher the relative gains from a first mover advantage
of monetary policy.
The literature on monetary and fiscal policy in a monetary union is vast, so we only re-
fer to articles of special importance for our paper.1 Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) con-
sider monetary-fiscal policy interactions in a monetary union. They assume that the
participating regions and their policy goals are symmetric and in line with the common
central bank’s target. Accordingly, optimal output and inflation levels can be achieved
– even without coordination of the fiscal authorities and the common central bank
1We refer the reader to the textbook by De Grauwe (2003) for an overview of the field, as well as for
references to less recent literature.
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and without the need for monetary commitment. Dixit (2001),Dixit and Lambertini
(2003b) and Lambertini (2004, 2006a) check the implications of this model for the case
where monetary policy is conservative in the sense of Rogoff (1985). One of their major
findings is that fiscal discretion destroys the positive effect of monetary commitment,
while fiscal cooperation typically leads to less efficient outcomes than discretionary
fiscal policies.
Lombardo and Sutherland (2004) construct a symmetric, two-country model that fea-
tures government spending in the utility function. They find that the last result can
be overturned if the share of steady-state government spending in output is positive
and supply shocks are not perfectly negatively correlated. Nonetheless, for plausible
parameter values the welfare gains of fiscal cooperation are small.
Dixit and Lambertini (2001) allow for some heterogeneities by assuming that fiscal and
monetary authorities may have conflicting output and inflation goals. They show that
without commitment or leadership by either authority the ideal points of output and
inflation cannot be attained.
Chari and Kehoe (2004) take a closer look at the desirability of fiscal debt constraints.
They find that such constraints are undesirable if monetary commitment is possible,
whereas the opposite holds if the central bank cannot commit to its policy. The latter
is the result of a time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy, which leads to free-
riding behavior by the fiscal authorities.
In the very recent literature, the topic of monetary and fiscal interactions has also been
dealt with in dynamic, stochastic general-equilibrium models. However, the emphasis
in most of these papers is not so much on strategic behavior and game-theoretical sce-
narios. Gali and Monacelli (2005a) e.g. analyze optimal fiscal and monetary policies
in a monetary union where all policy agents care about union-wide variables, and Fer-
rero (2005) considers a two region model and compares the optimal policies to simple
policy rules, where all policy agents care about union-wide variables. Canzoneri et al.
(2005) study the interactions between monetary and fiscal policy in a monetary union
and compare the results of their New Keynesian model with the data. They also assess
the effects of regional asymmetries on welfare, but they assume that fiscal policy is
described by exogenously given processes for government spending and distortionary
taxes.2 Lambertini (2006b) attempts to combine the game theoretical approach of the
static models with features of dynamic models. To do so, she assumes that fiscal au-
2As alternative specifications they consider fiscal policy rules making movements in the budget
deficit lead to reactions either in government spending or in tax rates. In our model, by contrast, the
government budget is always balanced.
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thorities can commit to their policies. Also, she assumes that government spending is
exogenously given.
In a series of papers, van Aarle, Engwarda, Plasmans, and Weeren (2001); van Aarle
et al. (2002),Engwerda et al. (2005) and Garretsen, Moons, and van Aarle (2005) focus on
macroeconomic policy interactions of national fiscal policies and the monetary policy
of a common central bank by using a New Keynesian framework. Of these papers, van
Aarle et al. (2002) is the one most closely related to our model. They compare the out-
comes of different scenarios by distinguishing between non-cooperation, partial co-
operation, and full cooperation between monetary and fiscal policies. They find that
the stability of coalitions depends strongly on the policy makers’ preferences. When
the countries are very heterogeneous, non-cooperative behavior is the most likely out-
come.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the model,
Section 2.3 the various policy scenarios and Section 2.4 parameterization, evaluation
method, results, and the sensitivity analysis. The final section concludes.
2.2 Model
We consider a general-equilibrium monetary model with monopolistic distortions and
staggered prices. The model is closely related to Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) and
Benigno (2004). The economy is inhabited by a continuum of individual monopo-
listic producers. On the one hand, each producer uses his own labor to produce a
single differentiated good. On the other hand, each producer, henceforth referred to
as “producer-consumer”, derives utility from consuming a bundle of goods and from
holding real money balances. There exists a continuum of consumption goods over the
unit interval which are imperfect substitutes. There are two regions A and B , with the
population on the segment [0,n) belonging to region A and the remaining population
belonging to region B , with 0≤ n ≤ 1.3
3The two-country setting is taken from Benigno (2004). Other related models are Lombardo and
Sutherland (2004), Ferrero (2005), and Galí and Monacelli (2005b). In general, our model can be traced
back to the seminal work of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Chapter 10).
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2.2.1 The Problem of a Producer-Consumer
A producer-consumer j in region i ∈ {A,B} derives utility from aggregate consumption
C j , real money balances M ji /P
i and labor N ji according to the following function:
U ji =
(
C j
γ
)γ (M ji /P i
1−γ
)1−γ
− (N
j
i )
β
β
, γ ∈ (0,1), β≥ 1. (2.1)
Labor contributes negatively to the utility of agent j , with β−1 being the elasticity of
marginal disutility of labor. Individual production is assumed to be a function of labor
and stochastic productivity,
Y ji = Ai N
j
i . (2.2)
Using the production function to replace labor in the utility function, one obtains
U ji =
(
C j
γ
)γ (M ji /P i
1−γ
)1−γ
−
(
ξi
β
)
(Y ji )
β, (2.3)
where ξi = A−βi captures the fluctuations in region-specific total factor productivity.
Changes in this variable may be interpreted as changes in (regional) technology. The
total consumption of agent j – who for reasons of exposition is assumed to live in re-
gion A – is given by4
C j ≡ (C
j
A)
νA (C jB )
1−νA
(νA)νA (1−νA)1−νA , (2.4)
where νA is a preference shifter of at least the relative size of region a, given by the
fixed parameter n: n ≤ νA ≤ 1. Hence, νA > n captures a bias in consumption towards
domestic goods .
Consumption of goods from each region is given by
C jA =
[(
1
n
) 1
θ
∫ n
0
c j (a)
θ−1
θ d a
] θ
θ−1
, C jB =
[(
1
1−n
) 1
θ
∫ 1
n
c j (b)
θ−1
θ db
] θ
θ−1
, (2.5)
where a is a generic good produced in region A, b a generic good produced in region
B , and θ > 1 the elasticity of substitution between different goods in the same region.5
4For an agent j living in region B , total consumption is given by C j ≡ (C
j
B )
νB (C
j
A )
1−νB
(νB )νB (1−νB )1−νB for all j ∈ [n,1].
5The weights (1/n)(1/θ) and (1/(1−n))(1/θ) are a “normalization with the implication that an increase
in the number of products does not affect marginal utility after optimization". See Blanchard and Kiy-
otaki (1987, p. 649)
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The elasticity of substitution of the home and foreign bundles of goods equals one. The
corresponding consumer price indices – with subscripts denoting the place of produc-
tion and superscripts denoting variables specific to agent j or region i – are
P A ≡ (P AA )ν(P AB )1−ν and P B ≡ (P BB )ν(P BA )1−ν, (2.6)
where the respective elements are given by
P iA ≡
[
1
n
∫ n
0
p i (a)1−θd a
] 1
1−θ
and P iB ≡
[
1
1−n
∫ 1
n
p i (b)1−θdb
] 1
1−θ
(2.7)
and denote the market-price indices of goods consumed in region i and produced in
region A and B , respectively. The small letter prices p(a) and p(b) denote the price set
by a generic producer-consumer in region A and B , respectively. These prices are cho-
sen as to maximize the indirect utility function. When setting her price, the producer-
consumer is faced a certain type of price rigidity, such that only a fraction of prices
can be adjusted after shocks hit the economy. Details of price setting are presented in
appendix Section 5.1.2.
The price index P i is defined as the minimum expenditure necessary for purchasing
goods leading to a consumption index C j of size one, and the price indexes P iA and
P iB are defined as the minimum expenditure required to purchase goods resulting in
consumption indexes C jA and C
j
B , which equal one.
We assume goods-market arbitrage leads to identical prices across borders such that
P AA = P BA = P A and P AB = P BB = PB . This implies that the i superscripts on each left hand
side of Equation (2.7) can be dropped, and the incentive to set different prices across
regions because of the home bias in consumption bears no consequences.6 So the
price level of goods consumed in region i ∈ {A,B} – region i ’s consumer price level –
given in Equation (2.6) simplifies to
P i = (Pi )ν(P−i )1−ν, (2.8)
where −i denotes the opposite region than i . Again, a superscript refers to the place
of consumption and a subscript to the place of production. So Equation (2.8) states
that region i ’s CPI is a combination of the indexes of goods produced in region i and in
region −i . Denoting the output of producer-consumer j in region i by Y ji , the budget
6In our model, inflation differentials occur due to the home-bias effect, as the composition of the
consumption bundles differ in both regions. This assumption is somewhat critical when referring to the
Euro-zone, where significant price differences for the same product in different countries exist even for
tradeable goods.
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constraint for this agent is
∫ n
0
p i (a)c j (a)d a+
∫ 1
n
p i (b)c j (b)db+M ji = p i ( j )Y
j
i (1−τi )−Pi Ti + M¯
j
i ≡ I
j
i . (2.9)
The budget constraint guarantees that the sum of consumption expenditures plus
money demand equals nominal net income I ji , which is the sum of sale revenues from
the good produced and beginning-of-period money holdings minus net tax payments.
Macroeconomic policy consists of three elements. A common central bank chooses
the nominal money supply and in each of the two regions, a fiscal authority uses its tax
rate τi proportional to sales to subsidize production.7 The government is not allowed
to be indebted; its budget is balanced by lump-sum taxes Ti . For the two regional
government budget constraints we have∫ n
0
p A( j )y( j )τAd j +nP ATA = 0∫ 1
n
pB ( j )y( j )τB d j + (1−n)PB TB = 0 (2.10)
2.2.2 Terms of Trade and Equilibrium
As set out before, the law of one price holds in the economy considered, i.e. p A(a) =
pB (a) and p A(b) = pB (b). Nonetheless, agents appreciate consumption of domesti-
cally produced goods more. Hence, the (consumer) price index in region A, P A in-
cludes a larger share of domestic goods than the (consumer) price index in region B ,
P B . This has implications for the terms of trade, which we define as follows.
Definition 1. The terms of trade for region i , Si , are given by the price of imports relative
to the price of exports. Using “−i ” to denote “not i ”,
Si ≡
P i−i
P−ii
. (2.11)
Here, P i−i is the price level of goods produced in region −i and consumed in region i ,
i.e. imports, whereas P−ii is the price level of goods produced in region i and consumed
in region −i , i.e. exports. E. g., region A’s terms of trade are given by the price levels
7This assumption for fiscal policy is typically used in New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) models.
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of goods produced in region B and consumed in region A, divided by the price level of
goods produced in region A and consumed in region B .8 The following lemma applies.
Lemma 1. The terms of trade are equal to the ratio of producer price indices.
Si = P−i
Pi
. (2.12)
Proof. The equality holds as the rate of substitution between goods of region i is con-
stant in both economies, so that the basket of domestically produced goods has the same
composition in both economies, though not the same relative size. Therefore, a change
in the price index of goods produced in region i has the same impact on e.g. P−ii , the
price index of region i produced goods consumed in region −i , and on P ii , and we can
drop the superscript. ■
Using the definitions of the consumer price indices given in equation (2.8), we can
relate the terms of trade to the consumer price indices P A and P B and to the price
indices of goods produced in each region, P A and PB as follows:
P A
P A
= (S A)1−ν, P
A
PB
= 1
(S A)ν
,
P B
P A
= (S A)ν and P
B
PB
= 1
(S A)1−ν
. (2.13)
In the case of an identical home bias in both regions, which we are assuming here, the
ratios of the two measures of inflation are inversely related to each other:9 Si = 1/S−i .
Movements in the terms of trade imply movements in relative prices and, therefore,
shift demand across the border.
Definition 2. Given policy decisions for M and τi , an equilibrium is an allocation
{C , (Ci )i∈{A,B}, (C
j
i ) j∈[0,1],Y , (Yi )i∈{A,B}, (Y
j
i ) j∈[0,1]} and a price system
{P, (Pi )i∈{A,B}, (P i )i∈{A,B}, (p
j
i ) j∈[0,1]}, such that
1. the allocation maximizes the utility of the producer-consumer,
2. markets clear,
3. the policies are consistent with allocation and prices.
The equilibrium of the model is derived in the appendix, in Sections 5.1.1 to 5.1.3. To-
gether with the decisions of monetary and fiscal policies, it can be represented in two
8It follows that the terms of trade for region B , SB = P BA /P AB are the inverse of S A . Note that the usual
definition, see e. g. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, p. 242), is in line with ours from the viewpoint of region
B .
9See Galí and Monacelli (2002) for a similar treatment in a small open economy setting.
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equations, an equation relating output to real money holdings,10
YA = γM¯
P
γ
1−γ[ν+ (1−ν) 1−nn S A]
and YB = γM¯
P
1
1−γ[ν+ (1−ν) n1−n SB ]
, (2.14)
and a price rule for an individual producer-consumer,11
(
p(a)
P A
)
=
(
θξA
(θ−1)(1−τA)
Y β−1A
) 1
1+θ(β−1)
and
(
p(b)
PB
)
=
(
θξB
(θ−1)(1−τB )
Y β−1B
) 1
1+θ(β−1)
.
(2.15)
The variable M¯/P denotes aggregate beginning-of-period real money holdings which
are assumed to be identical across agents and regions. For detailed derivations of both
equations the reader is referred to the appendix.
2.2.3 Analysis
So far, the model’s time dimension is fairly simple. At the beginning of the period,
shocks did not yet occur and the economy is at its steady state. Then, the shocks oc-
cur and all adjustments take place. As we are interested in exactly these deviations
from steady state, we approximate our solution of the model around a steady state
with identical price levels. We denote the percentage deviation of a price level from its
steady state as inflation rate and use the small letters y and s to denote the percent-
age deviation of output and terms of trade from its respective steady state. A log-linear
approximation to the model equilibrium is given by the following two propositions.
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, inflation of region i is related to the change in money
supply and the deviations of the domestic and the foreign tax rate from their respective
steady states. It is also related to private expectations about the model variables and to
actual and expected stochastic technology, all subsumed in the variable ψi :
pii = d i mˆ+ c i τˆi + c−i τˆ−i +ψi , i ∈ {A,B}. (2.16)
Proof. See Section 5.1.5 in the appendix.
The formulation used here shows how all three policy authorities affect a regional
inflation rate. The central bank influences the policy variable mˆ, the change in the
beginning-of-period real money holdings. As one would expect, an expansionary mon-
10This is Equation (5.29) in the appendix.
11This is Equation (5.18) in the appendix, using Equation (5.26) to plug in regional output.
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etary policy, i.e., an increase in the real money supply ceteris paribus increases infla-
tion. In our calibration, the parameter d i is of positive sign.
The parameter c i refers to the influence of national fiscal policies on inflation, and c−i
measures the spill-over effect from foreign fiscal policy on region i ’s inflation. Both pa-
rameters are complex combinations of the model’s structural parameters and steady
state values, so we abstain from stating them here and refer the reader to Section 5.1.5
in the appendix. Both c i and c−i have typically negative signs: Dixit and Lambertini
(2003a) indicate that the sign of the parameters may become negative when tax cuts
and subsidies raise the supply of goods. The absolute value of c i is higher than that of
c−i , i. e., direct effects from fiscal policies are stronger than the resulting spill-over ef-
fects to the other region. The implied values for our benchmark structural parameters
are presented in Table 2.1.
Proposition 2. The deviation of region i ’s output from its steady state is related to
changes in the domestic as well as in the foreign tax rate, to domestic surprise inflation,
to the terms of trade and to changes in the productivity differential between the domestic
and the foreign region. It is given by
yi = ai τˆi +ai ,−i τˆ−i +bi (pii −piei )+κi si +φi , (2.17)
where ai ≡
(
1−θ
2[1+θ(β−1)] − 12(β−1)
)
τ¯i captures the effect of the home country’s fiscal policy
instrument and ai ,−i ≡−
(
1−θ
2[1+θ(β−1)] + 12(β−1)
)
τ¯−i the effect of foreign fiscal policy on do-
mestic output.
Proof. See Section 5.1.6 in the appendix.
Assuming that fiscal policies choose the steady-state level of taxes τ¯i optimal in order
to offset the monopolistic distortion, τ¯i will be negative. Therefore, an expansionary
fiscal policy is given if τi < τ¯i , i.e., if τˆi = τi−τ¯iτ¯i > 0. It is important to keep this in mind
to follow the fiscal policy description in Section 2.3. Additionally, fiscal policies have
positive spill-over effects onto the other region. Therefore, both ai and ai ,−i have a
positive sign.
The effect of domestic surprise inflation on output is captured by bi ≡ 2βρ(β−1)(1−ρ) , where
the parameter ρ ∈ {0,1} determines the degree of price stickiness, from flexible prices
(ρ = 0) of all goods to fixed prices of all goods for ρ = 1. In line with the landmark
papers by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), surprise inflation
generates an increase in the national output level, as bi has a positive sign. The private
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sector has rational expectations about inflation, i. e. the following condition holds:
piei = E(pii ). (2.18)
The terms of trade effect on regional output is captured by κi ≡ βρ(β−1)(1−ρ) > 0. Region
i ’s terms of trade si are given by the log-linear approximation of Equation (2.12):
si = (pi−i −pii ) . (2.19)
We know from empirical studies that the terms of trade effect also depends on the re-
gion’s size. This means that a smaller region typically has a higher κi , implying that
inflation differentials have a greater effect on output, something that is missing here.12
A higher inflation rate in region −i than in region i corresponds to a real depreciation
of region i and thus increases its net exports. This shift of consumption from foreign
goods (region −i ) to domestic goods (region i ) increases domestic income. As for the
inflation equation, Table 2.1 shows the implied values for our benchmark structural
parameters.
Finally, a random shock φi enters the output equation, which is an i.i.d. shock with
zero mean and a variance σ2φi . In the appendix we show that this shock is the weighted
difference of the deviations of the two regional (stationary) productivity processes from
their respective steady states, as given by
φi =
(
1−θ
2[1+θ(β−1)] −
1
2(β−1)
)
ξˆi −
(
1−θ
2[1+θ(β−1)] +
1
2(β−1)
)
ξˆ−i .
Henceforth, φi is denoted as the “region-specific” output shock. In the following sec-
tion we will focus attention on the equations given in Proposition 1 and 2, which sum-
marize the microeconomic model.
2.3 Policy Analysis
This section has two main goals. First, we state our assumptions on the maximiza-
tion problems of fiscal and monetary authorities. These assumptions are based on a
12Additionally, we assume that the intensity of trade inside the currency area is high enough for effects
from outside the union to be neglected. Another possibility for eliminating outside effects is to assume
that all regions within the monetary union have similar trade relations with the rest of the world, such
that these are negligible for our results.
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“quadratic loss function that represents a quadratic (second-order Taylor series) ap-
proximation to the level of expected utility of the representative household in the ra-
tional expectations equilibrium associated with a given policy.´´13 This method, devel-
oped and well described in Woodford (2001) and Woodford (2003, Chapter 6) is widely
used in the literature. In accordance with these sources, we assume that nonlinear
effects on welfare are negligible. If this were not the case, the validity of the method
would be restricted, as Woodford (2003, p. 386ff.) points out. Then, one could rely on
higher-order algorithms, as exemplified in Kim, Kim, Schaumburg, and Sims (2005). In
Sections 5.1.7 and 5.1.8 in the appendix we fully derive a second-order approximation
to welfare of one region and of the monetary union as a whole.
2.3.1 Suboptimal Target Functions of Fiscal Authorities
Fiscal authorities minimize a quadratic loss function that aims at national inflation and
national output. The functional form of the loss function is identical to that of regional
welfare, as derived in Section 5.1.7 in the appendix.
LF i =
1
2
[
(pii −piiF )2+θiF (yi − y iF )2
]
. (2.20)
Here, piiF is the fiscal policy’s inflation target in region i , and y
i
F is the desired out-
put level of the fiscal authority in region i . According to the utility-based welfare cri-
terion, these reference values should be equal to zero for inflation and to the flexi-
ble price output plus the steady state deviation from the efficient steady state in the
case of output.14 If both fiscal authorities and the monetary authority agree on these
welfare-maximizing targets, the first-best situation with the highest possible welfare
can be obtained, “despite disagreements about the weights of the objectives, despite ex
post monetary accommodation to fiscal profligacy, without fiscal coordination, with-
out monetary commitment, and for any order of moves": this is demonstrated in Dixit
and Lambertini (2003b). It corresponds to the joint cooperation case in our model,
discussed later.
However, EMU national governments and the ECB have often disagreed about the ap-
propriate strategy for their policies. And once there is a disagreement about optimal
target levels, policy interactions become more relevant – and much more interesting.
Therefore, we choose to model a discrepancy in the target levels between fiscal and
monetary authorities. In particular, we make the following assumption:
13Woodford (2003, p. 383).
14With some simplifying assumptions, the optimal target for output is also zero.
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Each fiscal policy authority does not maximize regional welfare, but instead chooses tar-
get values for output and inflation that are slightly above the socially optimal levels.
There may be various reasons for this assumption. It may be justified by the fiscal
policy makers’ desire to attain greater government size (cf. Fatás and Rose 2001), or
by their incentive to maximize reelection probability (cf. Beetsma and Uhlig 1999).
To illustrate the latter case, one can imagine that fiscal authorities are able to deceive
their voters about the socially optimal targets, particularly during election campaigns.
This would be especially true of a monetary union, where fiscal policy communicates
with the domestic society, while monetary policy is centralized and concerned with the
whole society of the monetary union. Accordingly, it communicates with the private
sector of each individual region from a greater distance. Finally, another possible ex-
planation for differences in the target values is a simple one-time mismeasurement.
Furthermore, we assume that the target values of fiscal policy authority in region A
may differ from the ones of the fiscal policy authority in region B . Economically intu-
itive reasons for considering different inflation targets on the part of the agents may
be given (i) by home-bias effects in the consumption of goods, (ii) by different elastic-
ities of substitution in the representative agents’ utility function across regions, or (iii)
by different proportions of tradeable and non-tradeable goods in both regions. In our
microeconomic model we have incorporated a home-bias effect in consumption and
considered region-specific productivity shocks, which represent possible reasons for
different fiscal targets in the two regions.
To obtain a microfoundation of the fiscal target function (2.20) with targets that are
suboptimal from a social welfare perspective, one could assume as mentioned before
that the government derives additional utility of government size. To be more precise,
government utility could be given as a weighted sum of the representative agent’s util-
ity and additional utility from a greater government size. The fiscal authority receives
this extra utility if Y i exceeds the social optimal level:
LiF =
Q
2
[
(pii − p¯ii )2+θi (yi − ¯¯y iF )2
]
+ 1−Q
2
(yi − ¯¯y iF + ι)2 , (2.21)
where ι > 0 and ¯¯y iF denotes the socially optimal output and p¯ii socially optimal infla-
tion, as derived in Equation (5.102) in Section 5.1.7 in the appendix. As soon as the
weight on this additional utility 0 < Q < 1 is nonzero and positive, the fiscal author-
ity will have different target values in its loss function. Then, this loss function can be
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rewritten as
LiF =
1
2
[
(pii −piiF )2+θiF (yi − y iF )2
]
, (2.22)
where y iF > ¯¯y iF and θiF > θi .
2.3.2 Optimal Target Function of the Common Central Bank
We assume the common central bank maximizes the union-wide social welfare func-
tion, as derived in Sections 5.1.7 and 5.1.8 in the appendix. Using a notation with the
index M to denote monetary policy, we have
LM =1
2
[
n
(
(piA−piAM )2+θAM (y A− y AM )2
)
+ (1−n)((piB −piBM )2+θBM (yB − yBM )2)] . (2.23)
In the case of excessive fiscal targets, as motivated above, we can state that the central
bank is relatively conservative in comparison to fiscal policies, given by piiM < piiF and
y iM < y iF for all i . Our model differs in that respect from the approach of Dixit and Lam-
bertini (2003b): They assume that fiscal policies act in a socially optimal manner and
the central bank is too conservative, whereas we claim that the central bank maximizes
union-wide welfare and fiscal policies act in too expansionary a way.
The different weights on output stabilization and the different output and inflation
targets of monetary and fiscal policies give rise to trade-offs among policy makers.
Whereas the fiscal authorities attach greater importance to output stabilization (and
to pushing output and inflation above their natural levels), the common central bank
sets a relatively higher weight on stabilization of inflation. These conflicting targets in-
duce strategic behavior among the policy makers, which is examined in the following.
2.3.3 Scenarios of Simultaneous Decision-Making
In this subsection, we consider the scenario in which both fiscal authorities and the
common central bank choose their optimal policies simultaneously. We evaluate the
outcomes of the scenarios numerically in Section 2.4.
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Nash Behavior
First, we consider the scenario of not cooperating fiscal and monetary policies. The
policy makers decide upon their optimal policies after having observed the realizations
of the region-specific shocks. Thus, they take the households’ expectations on inflation
as given. For better understanding, the sequence is depicted in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Time Structure for Simultaneous Decision-Making (with i = A,B)
-
pie,i τˆA, τˆB
mˆ
t
φi
Country A’s fiscal policy maker optimizes the loss function (2.20) with respect to τˆA,
while taking the decision of the other region’s fiscal policy, τˆB , and the policy choice of
the common central bank, mˆ, as given. Accordingly, country B optimizes (2.20) with
respect to τˆB , while taking the policy choices of fiscal policy in country A (τˆA) and that
of the common central bank (mˆ) as given.
Simultaneously, monetary policy optimizes the union-wide social loss function (2.20),
taking the fiscal policy actions and the expectations of the private sector as given.
Cooperation of Monetary and Fiscal Policies
According to many economists and politicians, cooperation between policies plays a
crucial role for heterogeneous agents. This is emphasized by the fact that regions and
international organizations create institutions like the Stability and Growth Pact and
aim at further common targets like tax harmonizations, which are only a few exam-
ples of a cooperative policy device. In this subsection, we analyze the scenario of
cooperation under discretion characterized by an agreement of the political author-
ities on common policy goals, i. e. piAF = piBF = piM = piJC , y AF = yBF = yM = y JC and
θAF = θBF = θM = θJC , where the subscript JC denotes the “joint cooperation" scenario.
The timing of political decision-making corresponds to the Nash scenario and is illus-
trated in Figure 2.1. We assume here, that the policy makers share a combined loss
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function of the following kind:
L JC =n 1
2
[(piA−piJC )2+θJC (y A− y JC )2] (2.24)
+ (1−n)1
2
[(piB −piJC )2+θJC (yB − y JC )2] .
The minimizing problem follows the same pattern as in the Nash scenario, the only
difference being that all authorities face the same loss function. We implicitly treat the
joint cooperation case as if the policy makers were committed to the socially optimal
targets, i.e. we assume that all policy makers aim at attaining the social optimum in this
scenario and that the private sector is aware of that when forming its expectations about
inflation. We do not incorporate possible deviations from this strategy, though this
could be an interesting enhancement of this model. Thus, the first-best optimum for
the private agents is attainable under joint cooperation. Dixit and Lambertini (2003b)
use the same assumption in their model. We return to this point in Section 2.4.
Independent Monetary Policy and Cooperation between Fiscal Policies
If fiscal policy makers decide to cooperate while monetary policy acts independently,
the fiscal authorities optimize a similar loss function as in the joint cooperation sce-
nario. The loss function differs in the target values of inflation and output above the
socially optimal levels. The fiscal objective function of both regions is given by
LFC =n 1
2
[
(piA−piAFC )2+θFC (y A− y AFC )2
]
(2.25)
+ (1−n)1
2
[
(piB −piBFC )2+θFC (yB − yBFC )2
]
,
where the subscript FC denotes “fiscal cooperation”. The monetary authority opti-
mizes the loss function (2.20). The solution is obtained analogously to the previous
cases.
2.3.4 Scenarios of Sequential Decision-Making
The policy choices made by monetary and fiscal authorities may possibly take place
at different times due to certain pre-scheduled rules, bureaucracy, or special intrinsic
features of the political institutions. Therefore, we focus here on interactions between
fiscal and monetary policies when both authorities act sequentially. The evaluation of
the different scenarios follows in Section 2.4.
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Stackelberg Leadership of Fiscal Policy
We begin with the scenario of fiscal leadership, i. e. fiscal policy makers have to decide
on their policy actions before monetary policy has been implemented and after having
observed the realization of the regional shocks φi . Thereby, they take the household’s
inflation expectation as given. Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) argue that fiscal leader-
ship seems to be more likely when monetary policy can be implemented and adjusted
more quickly than fiscal policy. This may be applicable when choices for taxes and
subsidies are accompanied by bureaucratic and legislative processes that provide the
fiscal authority with leadership over monetary policy. The sequence in that scenario is
depicted in Figure 2.2.
Figure 2.2: Time Structure for Sequential Decision-Making (Fisc. Leadership)
-
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τˆB
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pieA
t
The solution of the game is obtained by backward induction. Solving the monetary
policy’s optimization problem at the second stage of the game leads to the optimal
choice of mˆ while taking the fiscal policy variables τˆA and τˆB as given. In the first
stage, the fiscal policy maker of region i optimizes τˆi to react to the action taken by the
policy maker of region j , τˆ j , and subject to the monetary reaction function, which is
derived from the second stage of the game.
Stackelberg Leadership of Monetary Policy
In contrast to the previous case, monetary policy attains Stackelberg leadership over
fiscal policies if it only affects the economy with a lag of time exceeding the legislative
and bureaucratic time needed for fiscal policy decision-making. Another reason for
monetary leadership could be that monetary policy follows a certain rule. E.g., the
ECB pursues, but is not committed to achieve an inflation rate of close to, but below
two percent. The timing is shown in Figure 2.3. The solution is similar to the former
scenario of fiscal leadership. In the second stage, fiscal policy makers minimize the loss
function (2.20) analogously to the Nash scenario shown above, given the other region’s
fiscal policy and the monetary policy variable mˆ. The common central bank chooses
mˆ in the first stage, given the best responses of the fiscal policies τˆA and τˆB .
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Figure 2.3: Time Structure for Sequential Decision-Making (Mon. Leadership)
-
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Fiscal Cooperation and Sequential Policy Actions
Analogously to the fiscal corporation scenario where the policy makers choose their
optimal policies simultaneously, one can also assume cooperation between national
fiscal policies when the decision-making on monetary and fiscal policies takes place
at different stages. The motivation for cooperating fiscal policies in a sequential policy
game corresponds to that of fiscal cooperation in a simultaneous game. Accordingly,
we also analyze scenarios (i) fiscal cooperation when fiscal policy moves first and (ii)
fiscal cooperation when monetary policy moves first.
The time structure of scenario (i) corresponds to the one in Figure 2.2, while the time
structure of scenario (ii) corresponds to that in Figure 2.3. The optimization problem
under both scenarios follows the same pattern as in the corresponding sequential sce-
narios without cooperation and are, therefore, omitted in this section.
2.4 Results
In the following we derive numerical results for the seven scenarios of strategic behav-
ior between monetary and fiscal authorities introduced in the previous section.
We, first, describe the calibration of the model. Second, we show the evaluation meth-
ods used for the ranking of the different scenarios. Third, we run simulations for the
case of a homogeneous and a heterogeneous monetary union by using the structural
parameters from the microfounded model of Section 2.2. In this case, fiscal policy
aims at granting production subsidies and levying per-capita taxes to reduce the dis-
tortions caused by monopoly power. We use the results from the homogeneous mon-
etary union as a reference case and compare the rankings of different scenarios in the
heterogeneous case. Fourth, we strengthen our results by using a sensitivity analysis of
both the structural parameters and the policy targets.
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2.4.1 Calibration
We calibrate the structural parameters of the model in accordance with the standard
literature, as referred to in Dixit and Lambertini (2003a, Appendix F). The elasticity of
marginal disutility of labor is set at 0.45, a value proposed by Blanchard and Fischer
(1989).15 This implies that the disutility parameter β, which is one plus the inverse of
the elasticity of marginal disutility of labor, has the valueβ= 3.22. The Calvo-stickiness
parameters ΦH and ΦF are set at a moderate value of 0.5, implying an average price to
be fixed for three periods. The elasticity of substitution between goods of the same
region is set at θ = 11, as in Dixit and Lambertini (2003a). Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001)
discuss the literature that has found values between 1 and 20. Note that the elasticity
of substitution between goods of different regions is set to unity, as in Benigno (2004).
In setting the steady state of the technology parameter as ξ¯i = 1 and the subjective
discount factor as η= 0.98 we strictly follow Dixit and Lambertini (2003a). The steady-
state value for the fiscal policy instrument is assumed to be set optimally, i. e. to offset
monopolistic distortion. Via τ¯i = 1/(1−θ) we obtain a subsidy rate of ten percent for
both regions in the steady state.
We look here at two different cases. In the first case, both regions have the same size
(n = 1−n = 0.5) and are completely symmetric, with identical structural parameters,
identical fiscal policies, and no home bias (νH = νF = 0.5). In the second case, region
B accounts for only 30 percent of the union and displays more price rigidities. The
latter assumption is based on the findings of Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2004). They
estimate the price rigidity in five core EMU countries and identify substantial hetero-
geneities.16
In the second case we presume that there is also a considerable home bias in consump-
tion in both regions, thus following Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
Given the values stated above, we can calculate the various parameters ai , bi , c i , d i
and κi in the model equations. Also, we can infer the values in the policy loss functions
maximizing social welfare: In the symmetric case, these are target values for inflation
and output, both equal zero, and a weight on output of θAM = θBM = 0.00763. In the
15The authors discuss this parameter on page 341. Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) assume unit wage
elasticity and thus less curvature.
16The average price duration varies between around four quarters in the Netherlands and Germany
and up to 17 quarters in Spain, implying price rigidity parameters between 0.75 and 0.94. We will choose
numbers between 0.5 and 0.58, following the more conservative estimates of Bils and Klenow (2004).
For a closer look at European data, the reader is referred to Dhyne, Alvarez, Le Bihan, Veronese, Dias,
Hoffmann, Jonker, Lünnemann, Rumler, and Vilmunen (2005).
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asymmetric case, the output weight for region B rises to θBM = 0.01046, while all other
socially optimal target values remain the same.
As stated earlier, we assume that the common central bank sticks to these values, while
the fiscal policy authorities may deviate from them. There may be various reasons for
such deviation, for example systematic mismeasurement by the fiscal authorities or
the fiscal authorities maximizing a different objective function they are able to con-
ceal from the households. This was substantiated in Section 2.3. More particularly, we
assume that the fiscal policy authorities put equal weight on output and inflation of
unity. Furthermore, fiscal policies have higher target values for output y AF = yBF = 0.015
and inflation piAF = piBF = 0.02. In the asymmetric case, fiscal policy in region B even
puts a weight of θBF = 1.25 on output, sets its output target at yBF = 0.025 and its infla-
tion target at piBF = 0.03, which could be seen as the result of its self-perception as a
high-growth, catch-up region. Table 2.1 summarizes this calibration. As in Dixit and
Lambertini (2003a), the stochastic term is calibrated to match the variance of output
around its steady state as plus/minus six percent, as is the case for the U. S.
As set out in Section 2.3, we assume that the private sector has rational expectations
about inflation. In our analytical calculations, we treat pieA and pi
e
B as given. The infla-
tion expectations of the private agents in both countries are determined in our model
by iteration. In other words, we use an arbitrary starting value for the inflation expec-
tations in both countries and repeat the optimization calculations until the inflation
expectations differ from realized inflation by a value of less than 10−10 for both coun-
tries, while keeping the shock at its expected value of zero. This approach guarantees
that piei = E(pii ) holds for i = A,B . After inflation expectations are determined, we sim-
ulate our model by averaging over 100,000 random draws of the stochastic processes.
2.4.2 Evaluation Method
The main purpose of our numerical approach is to rank the different scenarios of
strategic behavior of monetary and fiscal policies for the losses they induce. We dis-
tinguish three approaches:
(i) Evaluation of the loss functions referring to the policy exercised by the fiscal
and monetary authorities. In each cooperation scenario, the corresponding loss
function is a compromise between the cooperating authorities.
(ii) Evaluation of the region-specific loss functions. In each cooperation scenario,
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Table 2.1: Calibration of the Baseline Model
Parameter Value∗ Alternative∗ Explanation
Structural parameters
n 0.50 0.70 Size of region A
ν 0.50 0.80 Parameter capturing preference for home goods
β 3.22 3.22 One plus one over the elasticity of marginal disutility
of labor
Φ 0.50 0.58 Fraction of firms that cannot adjust prices
θ 11.00 11.00 Elasticity of substitution between goods
ξi 1.00 1.00 Technology parameter
η 0.98 0.98 Subjective discount factor
τ¯i -0.10 -0.10 Steady state value of taxes
Implied macro parameters
ai 0.042 0.042 Fiscal policy effect on output
ai ,−i 0.003 0.003 Foreign fiscal policy effect on output
bi 8.473 13.098 Monetary policy effect on output
κi 4.236 6.549 Terms of trade effect on output
c i -0.001 0.005 Fiscal policy effect on inflation
c−i -0.000 -0.006 Foreign fiscal policy effect on inflation
d i 0.060 5.474 Monetary policy effect on inflation
Loss functions
θiM 0.00736 0.01046 Central bank’s weighting factor for output gap
piiM 0.00 0.00 Inflation target of the central bank
y iM 0.00 0.00 Output gap target of the central bank
θiF 1.00 1.25 Fiscal policy’s weighting factor for output gap
piiF 0.02 0.03 Inflation target of fiscal policy
y iF 0.015 0.025 Output gap target of fiscal policy
Remarks: The term “Value" denotes the value chosen for both regions in the symmetric case
and for region A in the asymmetric case. “Alternative" denotes the value chosen for region B in
the asymmetric case. i = A,B .
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these are the region-specific loss functions the policy authorities would mini-
mize if they were not cooperating. This approach allows us to infer whether
cooperation scenarios are preferable for each participating policy authority in-
dividually.
(iii) Evaluation of social welfare. For each region, we calculate the welfare loss that
arises due to deviations in output and inflation from the socially optimal values.
We show the losses involved in all three approaches in Table 2.2. In our discussion we
incorporate only the second and third approach. The reasoning behind this is as fol-
lows: In approach (i), the losses of the three policy authorities are based on the loss
functions used in the optimization calculations. If the policy makers decide to coop-
erate, they usually compromise on targets that differ from their own true preferences.
However, the “true losses” which the policy makers face are still based on their specific
preferences. Therefore, in approach (ii) we calculate the values of the policy makers’
loss functions given by equations (2.20) and (2.23), irrespective of the loss function
used for optimization in the relevant scenarios.17 One should also take these losses
into account, when exploring whether joint cooperation among all policy makers or
cooperation between fiscal policy makers can take place on a voluntary basis.
The region-specific social welfare losses of approach (iii) are given by18
L A = 1
2
((piA−piAM )2+θAM (y A− y AM )2)
LB = 1
2
((piB −piBM )2+θBM (yB − yBM )2).
Additionally, we express the region-specific social losses in terms of an equivalent re-
duction in region-specific consumption units, following the example of Lucas (2003).
A scenario “performs best” when it shows the lowest reduction of consumption units
compared to the consumption level in the social optimum. The calculation of the
consumption-equivalent losses follows the approach of Adam and Billi (2006).
From our welfare derivation we know that for region A
U A =−Y¯AuC L A (2.26)
17Note that by this definition the losses in case (ii) only differ from the losses in case (i) for the joint
cooperation scenario and the scenarios of fiscal cooperation.
18Recall from Section 2.3 that the central bank is assumed to optimize the union-wide social loss,
which is a region-sized weighted sum of the social losses of region A and B .
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holds. To derive a relation between a permanent reduction of consumption (given by
δAC percent) and the welfare loss, a second-order Taylor approximation of the utility
loss is generated by
U A ≈
(
−uC Y¯Aδ
A
C
100
+uCC
(
Y¯AδAC
100
)2)
=−uC Y¯A
(
δAC
100
− uCC Y¯A
uC
(
δAC
100
)2)
=−uC Y¯A
(
δAC
100
+ (1−γ)Y¯A
Y¯A
(
δAC
100
)2)
. (2.27)
Replacing U
A
uC Y¯A
by L A yields
L A =
(δAC )
2
1002
+ δ
A
C
100
. (2.28)
To calculate the reduction of consumption equivalent to the social loss for region A,
we solve for δAC to obtain
δAC = 100
−1+√1+4(1−γ)L A
2(1−γ) . (2.29)
The reduction of consumption equivalent to a certain welfare loss for region B can be
obtained analogously. We use this transformation in the following subsections to make
the welfare losses more tangible.
2.4.3 Evaluation of Policies in the Different Policy Games
In the following we examine the results of the simulations. The model calibration was
explained in Section 2.4.1 and is summarized in Table 2.1. A summary of the results is
given in Table 2.2.
Homogeneous Monetary Union
We begin with a comparison of the losses for the monetary and fiscal policy authorities
in the symmetric case. The first columns of Table 2.2 show that the fiscal authorities
of both regions face the highest region-specific policy losses under cooperation and in
the scenario where monetary policy moves first. The lowest fiscal losses occur when
fiscal policies have the greatest influence, i. e. under the scenarios of fiscal coopera-
tion when fiscal policies move first and under fiscal cooperation in the simultaneous
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scenario. The explanation is simple: Fiscal policies aim at higher inflation and higher
output than the central bank, which targets socially optimal levels. Due to the low
relative weight on output stabilization the central bank reacts strongly to offset infla-
tion deviating from the socially optimum level. Fiscal policies themselves engage in
a trade-off between inflation and output when fixing their own policy decisions. An
expansionary fiscal policy pushes output above the socially optimal level by granting
subsidies in order to lower production costs. Thus it decreases inflation at the same
time. Accordingly, output is higher than natural output and lower than the desired
fiscal targets. Inflation is below the fiscal target levels and slightly below the social op-
timum. Note, however, that the central bank reacts strongly to the downward pressure
of inflation with an expansionary monetary policy on account of the high weight on
inflation in the target function.
The loss in the Nash scenario is similar to that of the two scenarios where fiscal policies
move first.
In the scenarios where monetary policy takes lead (with or without coordination of
fiscal policies), fiscal policies internalize the fact that the central bank cannot offset a
fiscal policy that is too expansionary. Therefore, fiscal policies are less expansionary,
and output and inflation deviate from the fiscal targets to a higher degree than in the
previously analyzed scenarios. This implies higher losses for the fiscal policy authori-
ties. The highest losses occur when policy makers cooperate and agree on the socially
optimal targets: On average, the realized value for inflation is close to zero (but still de-
pendent on stochastics) and output is at its lowest compared to the desired levels. It is,
therefore, questionable whether overall cooperation aiming at socially optimal targets
can be implemented in this setting.
Our assumption of a welfare-maximizing monetary policy means that the rankings of
the central bank losses correspond to the rankings of the union-wide social losses. The
social losses, in turn, can be transformed into welfare equivalent consumption reduc-
tions relative to the social optimum. Accordingly, we consider only the consumption
losses of the private agents in the following.
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Table 2.2: Baseline Model – Analysis of Welfare and Policy Losses
Symmetric case Asymmetric case
Equivalent Equivalent
Consumption Consumption
Calculated Policy Losses Reduction, % Calculated Policy Losses Reduction, %
Policy LF A LF B LM C RA C RB LF A LF B LM C RA C RB
Nash 21.909 21.909 0.119 0.012 0.012 23.824 51.163 0.363 0.024 0.065
(0.033) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.054) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Stackelberg, fiscal leadership 21.911 21.911 0.116 0.012 0.012 23.803 51.170 0.350 0.024 0.062
(0.033) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.054) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Stackelberg, mon. leadership 23.639 23.639 0.0160 0.002 0.002 33.439 85.522 0.004 0.000 0.001
(0.032) (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.055) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cooperation 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
...region-specific policy losses 31.250 31.250 — — — 31.250 101.250 — — —
(0.125) (0.125) (0.063) (0.193)
Fiscal coop., simultaneous 21.909 21.909 0.119 0.012 0.012 32.026 32.026 0.363 0.024 0.065
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
...region-specific policy losses 21.909 21.909 — — — 23.825 51.162 — — —
(0.033) (0.033) (0.019) (0.054)
Fiscal coop., fiscal leadership 21.645 21.646 0.111 0.011 0.011 32.466 32.466 0.413 0.022 0.087
(0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.042) (0.042) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
...region-specific policy losses 21.646 21.646 — — — 23.347 53.744 — — —
(0.041) (0.026) (0.012) (0.146)
Fiscal coop., mon. leadership 31.241 31.241 0.000 0.000 0.000 52.225 52.225 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.377) (0.377) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.434) (0.434) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
...region-specific policy losses 31.241 31.241 — — — 31.237 101.195 — — —
(0.740) (0.740) (0.718) (1.745)
Remarks: LF i is fiscal loss in region i , LM loss of the common central bank, all multiplied by 105. C Ri denotes welfare loss measured in terms of
an equivalent permanent percent reduction in consumption in region i , relative to the pre-shock steady state. The numbers in parentheses denote
standard deviations.
48
We find that the ranking of the scenarios is quite different in comparison with the (fis-
cal) policy makers’ losses (see again Table 2.2). The first best can be attained in the
cooperation scenario.19 The consumption loss is also very low in both monetary lead-
ership scenarios, i.e. when fiscal policies do not cooperate and when fiscal policies
are coordinated. The highest social losses occur when fiscal policies are dominant in
the sense of being Stackelberg leaders, and in the Nash scenario. In line with the ex-
planation for the fiscal policy makers’ losses, inflation and output levels are closest to
the social optimum when monetary policy takes the lead (together, of course, with the
joint cooperation case).
Heterogeneous Monetary Union
In our analysis of a heterogeneous monetary union we assume that the fiscal policy
of region A follows the same strategy as in the homogeneous case, whereas the fiscal
policy of region B targets higher levels of both inflation and output. Furthermore, we
assume that region B is smaller than region A and is characterized by a slightly higher
degree of price-stickiness. The exact parameter values for region A are again depicted
in the second column of Table 2.1, while the “alternative" parameter values for region
B are summarized in the third column of this table. Results for the heterogeneous case
are shown in columns seven to eleven of Table 2.2.
Beginning with the losses for region A, we find that the values of the fiscal policy
maker’s losses are much higher for all scenarios in the heterogeneous case except one:
The cooperation scenario corresponds to the homogeneous case by definition, as all
policy makers agree on the socially optimal targets. The ranking of the scenarios with
respect to the region-specific fiscal policy makers’ losses is similar to that in the ho-
mogeneous case: The highest losses occur when monetary policy has the greatest in-
fluence (monetary leadership scenarios), the smallest losses occur in the scenarios in
which fiscal policies have the greatest influence (fiscal cooperation when fiscal pol-
icy takes leadership, fiscal cooperation and simultaneous decision-making, and fiscal
leadership when monetary policy is uncoordinated), and in the Nash scenario. The
fiscal policy maker again faces the highest loss in the joint cooperation scenario. We
observe almost the same ranking for region B , but the losses are higher compared to
region A.
We find that the losses of the common central bank and, hence, also the consumption
losses of the private agents show also a similar ranking as in the homogeneous mone-
19The (monetary) policy loss is slightly larger than zero because of the shock in our simulation.
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tary union: The lowest losses are attained when monetary policy moves first or when all
policy makers agree on the socially optimal targets (=first best). The highest losses oc-
cur when fiscal policies moves first (uncoordinated and coordinated) and when fiscal
policies are coordinated and monetary and fiscal policy decisions take place simulta-
neously. This result seems, at first glance, to be contrary to the findings of Lombardo
and Sutherland (2004), who state that fiscal cooperation is welfare-improving. But a
closer look reveals that our calibration of a unit elasticity of substitution between do-
mestic and foreign goods also implies in Lombardo and Sutherland (2004), according
to their Proposition 1, that fiscal cooperation is no longer welfare-improving.20
The welfare-equivalent consumption reductions under Nash, fiscal leadership, and the
two fiscal cooperation scenarios with simultaneous actions or with fiscal leadership are
about three times larger in the (smaller) region B . Also, the equivalent consumption
reductions are relatively higher in the heterogeneous case compared to the homoge-
neous case, by about 50 percent for region A and a factor of above four for region B .
This implies that a model of a homogeneous monetary union that does not properly
take into account heterogeneities possibly underestimates the welfare effects of cer-
tain policies. This finding also suggests that homogeneity is a desirable feature of the
currency area for all policy makers (fiscal and monetary authorities) and the private
agents.
2.4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Are the results of the previous section robust to changes in the structural parameters of
the model? To examine this, we vary the structural parameters within plausible ranges.
In Figure 2.4 we plot the parameter variations that show the highest sensitivity of re-
sults. The corresponding parameters are the elasticity of marginal disutility of labor
(emdl), price rigidity φi , and the elasticity of substitution θ. We plot their effects on
fiscal policy makers’ losses and social welfare, which is equivalent to the central bank
loss for both the symmetric and the asymmetric case.21 To see how the figure should be
read, we focus on column five. It shows the monetary losses in the asymmetric mone-
20Note also that Lombardo and Sutherland (2004) features government consumption in the utility
function.
21In the figures we use the following abbreviations to save space: For the policy scenarios, Nash =
Nash, Coop = cooperation, FCoop = fiscal cooperation, FLead = fiscal leadership, MLead = monetary
leadership, FCFL = fiscal cooperation with fiscal leadership, FCML = fiscal cooperation with monetary
leadership. The labels on the x-axis denote emdl = elasticity of marginal disutility of labor, Φ = Calvo
parameter, i.e. the percentage of firms that cannot adjust their prices, and θ = elasticity of substitution
between different goods produced in the same region.
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tary union for changes in the three parameters elasticity of marginal disutility of labor,
price stickiness and substitution elasticity. Given our assumption of monetary policy,
the monetary loss equals the socially optimal loss. The dashed green line in rows 1, 3
and 5 shows that the cooperation scenario leads to zero welfare losses for the whole
range of parameter values. In rows 2, 4 and 6 we see that the two monetary leadership
scenarios also result in small welfare losses. The welfare ranking of scenarios is robust
across changes in the parameter values. In the following we take a more detailed view
on each parameter variation.
Variation of the Elasticity of Marginal Disutility of Labor
We vary the elasticity of marginal disutility of labor (emdl) between zero and one,
where the lower bound is given in Blanchard and Fischer (1989), while the upper bound
is often used in New Keynesian models, see e. g. Galí and Monacelli (2005a). The ef-
fects of these variations on the policy losses in the three simultaneous scenarios are
depicted in the first row of Figure 2.4, while the second row shows the effects in the
four sequential scenarios.
Increasing elasticity of marginal disutility of labor leads to higher central bank losses.
This result is obvious as, given the other parameters, the same outcome is produced
at higher cost, meaning that the same effort in the production of goods leads now to a
higher reduction of utility than before.
Referring to the homogeneous case, we see that the rankings for both the fiscal au-
thorities’ losses and the central bank losses are stable: fiscal policies suffer from the
smallest losses in the Nash scenario and if they obtain fiscal leadership, as in compar-
ison with the other scenarios they are better able to pursue their inflation and output
targets (above the socially optimal levels). The central bank’s welfare function shows
the smallest losses in the joint cooperation case (which determines the first best) and
in the scenario where monetary policy takes leadership. In the latter scenario, the fiscal
policies are restrained, as too expansionary a fiscal policy would lead to low inflation,
which will not be corrected by the central bank afterwards. Therefore, monetary lead-
ership has a disciplining effect on supply-side-oriented fiscal policies. The fact that
joint cooperation leads to the first best from a welfare perspective comes as no sur-
prise as all policy makers agree upon the socially optimal targets, as mentioned in the
previous section.
In the heterogeneous case, the losses are higher for the fiscal policies of both regions,
51
Figure 2.4: Calculated Region-Specific Policy Losses for Parameter Variations in Region
A and B
Homogeneous mon. union Heterogeneous monetary union
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the one with the more conservative and the one with the more aggressive targets, and
also for the central bank. However, the rankings seem to be robust with two exceptions:
(i) When monetary policy moves first fiscal losses are strongly increasing for higher
values of the elasticity of disutility of labor. (ii) The losses in the fiscal cooperation fiscal
leadership cases increase a lot at a value of 0.4, which may be an indication that there
is no equilibrium to which rational inflation expectations could converge. It would be
interesting to take up this point in further research.
Variation of Price Rigidity
The third and fourth rows of Figure 2.4 examine the effect of varying price rigidities
on fiscal and monetary losses. The figure shows that the ranking of the scenarios is
stable in the homogeneous and heterogeneous case for almost the whole parameter
set, and it is in line with the results of Table 2.2: Fiscal policies incur the smallest loss
under fiscal leadership, whereas monetary policy suffers from the smallest losses when
it takes leadership and, of course, under the joint cooperation scenario. Again, the
fiscal cooperation fiscal leadership scenario leads to dramatically increasing losses for
more rigid prices, a factor that calls for an analysis in future research.22
Variation of the Elasticity of Substitution of Consumption Goods
In the fifth and sixth rows of Figure 2.4 we consider the effect of changes from the elas-
ticity of substitution of consumption goods, θ, on the losses over the range discussed
by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001). The figure confirms one intuitive result, i.e. that an
increasing θ leads to smaller fiscal policy and welfare losses: higher substitutability
between goods implies fewer distortions from monopoly power. There is again one in-
teresting exception. For a relatively small value of θ below 10 the losses become very
big, which again may conceivably induce indeterminacy of equilibria.
Summary of the Findings
For all parameter variations over the ranges used in the standard literature (see our cal-
ibration), we find that the rankings of the different scenarios illustrated by Table 2.2 are
22The variations of the intertemporal discount factor η, which determines the importance of “pseudo-
future” periods relative to the present period in the producer-consumers price-setting behavior, show
almost the same results as those indicated for variations of the price rigidity parameter. We, therefore,
abstain from depicting and discussing the figures for η.
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relatively robust. The sensitivity analysis has also confirmed that the losses in a hetero-
geneous monetary union tend to be higher. From the perspective of welfare maximiza-
tion, joint cooperation and monetary leadership are the best-performing scenarios.
Looking at the general picture, especially the equivalent consumption reductions re-
ported in able 2.2 are small in absolute value, even in the heterogeneous monetary
union. Therefore, one might be tempted to argue that heterogeneities are unimpor-
tant. We think this is misleading, for two reasons. First, we consider only four sources
of heterogeneities: regional size, home bias, price rigidities and differences in policy
targets. These alone already increase the consumption equivalent losses by a factor of
up to 8. If more heterogeneities were to be incorporated, the drawbacks of the rela-
tively worse performing scenarios might become non-negligible. Second, the current
economic downturn highlights many potential risks to the European monetary union.
All of these risks are related to country specific problems, so that the issue of hetero-
geneities in a monetary union receives renewed attention.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the interactions of fiscal and monetary policies in a
monetary union. One main focus was to derive a theoretical model that allows for
capturing heterogeneities among the different countries participating in a monetary
union, and for analyzing strategic interactions of fiscal and monetary authorities. Why
do heterogeneities matter? The answer is relatively simple. By adopting the Euro, the
participating countries abstain from a monetary policy of their own and fiscal policy
remains the only instrument for pursuing region-specific goals and stabilizing region-
specific shocks. The common central bank has to implement a monetary policy that is
most appropriate for the whole monetary union, and cannot respond to idiosyncratic
shocks and country-specific political targets. This makes the role of fiscal policies more
important and leaves room for strategic behavior in achieving national goals.
To examine these heterogeneities we have enhanced the model of Dixit and Lambertini
(2003b). From the microfoundation we have established that a region-specific produc-
tivity shock and terms of trade have an impact on regional output. In Section 2.3 we
introduced different possible scenarios for strategic interactions between fiscal and
monetary policies. In this context we assumed that fiscal policies deviate from opti-
mizing regional welfare, aiming instead at higher inflation and output compared to
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the union-wide central bank. By contrast, monetary policy is assumed to maximize
union-wide welfare.
We have used simulations to evaluate the different scenarios of strategic behavior for
supply-side fiscal policies in line with the micro-model. These aim at granting subsi-
dies to increase output financed by per-capita taxes. We have thus considered a het-
erogeneous monetary union comprising two different regions: a “conservative region”
and a “catch-up” region. We have assumed that the desired inflation and output targets
of the “conservative region” are relatively closer to the social optimum.
To evaluate the different policy games, we have used a calibration of our micro-model
drawing upon the parameters from the standard economic literature. We have shown
that the losses of fiscal policies are relatively small in the Nash scenario, in the fiscal
leadership scenario (for both cooperation of fiscal policies and independently acting
fiscal policies), and when fiscal policies cooperate and all policy makers move simul-
taneously. In these scenarios, fiscal policies achieve an output level closest to their
preferred levels, whereas inflation is stabilized close to the socially optimal level by the
common central bank.
The losses of monetary policy, which correspond to the welfare losses of the private
agents, are lowest when monetary policy moves first. The first-best situation is attained
when all policy makers agree upon the socially optimal levels. But as the central bank
and fiscal policy makers consider different scenarios optimal such, an agreement ap-
pears to be unrealistic on a voluntary basis.
In the EMU, fiscal policies appear primarily to track national interests. However, the
analysis has shown that fiscal policies in a heterogeneous monetary union can con-
tribute to high welfare losses. From a welfare perspective, monetary leadership or co-
operation would then be a desirable scenario for both types of fiscal policy.
To summarize the main findings, we state that if the authorities’ preferences do not
coincide, or are at least relatively far apart, worse outcomes are likely to occur. In such
a case, designing the institutions so that monetary policy plays a lead role generates the
smallest losses for the agents living in both regions, even with existing heterogeneities.
The European Central Bank aggressively pursues the price-stability goal, meaning that
the inflation rate should not exceed 2%. Accordingly, it appears to act as a first mover,
which is beneficial for welfare. At the same time, fiscal policies are restricted in their
actions by the Stability and Growth Pact, which leaves less room for pursuing excessive
fiscal targets and implies a reduction of the trade-offs caused by strategic behavior.
55
Recent experience, however, has shown that in bad times meeting the stability criteria
may not be a very credible option for fiscal policies, especially, when the culprits judge
their own sanctions, as it has happened in the European Union. Therefore, reducing
heterogeneities and bringing fiscal policies’ targets closer to the socially optimal levels
is an essential task in achieving a longer-term stability guarantee for the EMU.
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3 The Macroeconomics of Real Estate
with Harald Uhlig
Is it possible to explain the house price to GDP ratio and the house price to stock price ratio as
being generally constant, deviating from its respective mean only because of shocks to productiv-
ity. We build a two-sector RBC model for residental and non-residental capital with adjustment
costs to capital in both sectors. We show that an anticipated future shock to trend productivity
in the non-residental sector leads to a large increase in house prices in the present. We use this
property of the model to explain the current house price behavior in the U. S., the U. K., Japan
and Germany.
3.1 Introduction
Many researchers and practitioners are puzzled by the developments in the real es-
tate market prior to the downturn in 2006. While countries such as the U.S., Spain or
the U.K. experienced high growth rates in real estate prices, real estate prices did not
grow at all or even fell in countries like Japan, Germany and Switzerland. This may ex-
plain the growing interest of researchers in understanding the real estate market in the
recent years, even before the beginning of the current recession. While European Cen-
tral Bank (2003) and International Monetary Fund (2004) report some stylized facts for
real estate prices – they co-move with GDP, but are lagging, more volatile and do have
longer cycles of more than ten years – there is rather little understanding about the
driving forces in the real estate market. This is the starting point of this paper. We lay
out our theory to simultaneously explain movements in GDP, house prices and stock
prices. We assume that all three variables feature the same balanced growth path. But
temporary shocks may lead to deviations in the house price to GDP and the house
price to stock price ratio. The main point of this paper is to show how expectations
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about the prospects of the economy can explain an immediate rise in house prices rel-
ative to stocks and GDP. We make this point by building a two-sector RBC model for
non-residential capital and housing capital. Both sectors are subject to concave ad-
justment costs, but only the real estate sector features a constant factor of production.
Because of the latter assumption, the relative price of real estate has a positive trend.
From a modeling perspective, this paper is related to Piazzesi et al. (2007), Benhabib,
Rogerson, and Wright (1991) and Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991). While all papers
have a consumption side that is comparable to our model, the first and the second
paper lack an explicit production function. The second and the third paper answer a
different question: They analyze the implications of non-market activities by house-
holds. Nonetheless, the modeling strategy is similar in its approach.
Of course, house price movements have already been addressed in many papers. A
survey article of the relevant literature can be found in Leung (2004). For this rea-
son we will only briefly mention some of the papers here. Case, Glaeser, and Parker
(2000), Campbell and Cocco (2005) and Iacoviello (2005) all explore the connections
between real estate and consumption and their possible implications for economic
(fiscal or monetary) policy. The models presented in Iacoviello (2005), Ortalo-Magné
and Rady (2002) as well as Jin and Zeng (2004) and Yang (2005) all feature household
heterogeneity with respect to borrowing constraints, homeownership or age. Lustig
and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) investigate the effect of changing house prices on the
housing wealth to human wealth ratio in a model of housing collateral.
The effect of inflation on house prices – either as an effective tax subsidy to owner oc-
cupied housing or through money illusion – is analyzed in a series of papers by Poterba
(1984, 1991, 1992) and, more recently, Brunnermeier and Julliard (2008). Piazzesi and
Schneider (2008) build a heterogeneous agent model in which next to the tax channel
heterogeneous inflation expectations increase the volume of credit and thus the price
of the collateral.
Our approach differs from most of the literature in two respects. First, we want to
explain house price movements in response to changes in the macroeconomic envi-
ronment. Second, instead of resorting to individual credit constraints or household
heterogeneities, we consider only shocks to current and future productivity as driving
forces.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 summarizes important empirical find-
ings. Section 3.3 presents our main idea in a simplified endowment economy. An elab-
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orated production economy, its solution and its results are dealt with in Section 3.4,
followed by the conclusion in Section 3.5.
3.2 Some Facts
In the second edition of his bestseller book on irrational exuberance, Shiller (2005)
especially focuses on the development of house prices. In one of his graphs, he shows
that the development in house prices over the last 120 years can be explained neither
by building costs nor by population nor by interest rates. We replicate this graph in
Figure 3.1. So he assumes a sizeable degree of irrationalism in the market for real estate.
Figure 3.1: House Prices development in the long run: Figure 2.1 from Shiller (2005)
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But is this really the only valid conclusion? In Figure 3.2 we look at the period from 1980
onwards only and compare the data Shiller kindly provides on his webpage1 to ours.2
We find it to be very similar. Furthermore, we compare it to real GDP and find that the
evolution of house prices does not look that odd once we compare it to the evolution
of real GDP. So the task seems be much simpler: Instead of attempting to explain the
dramatic increase in house prices, the question is only why house prices increased
1See http://www.econ.yale.edu/ shiller/books.htm.
2We have chosen to log the data and to index it so that the mean between 1908 and 1995 equals zero.
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of Shiller data with our data, U.S. log indexed house prices
from 1980 onwards: not too many differences, and less dramatic
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relative to GDP over the last years before the downturn. To put this into context, we
also look at the house price to stock price ratio in order to see whether or not there are
similarities.
Figures 3.3 to 3.5 present the evolution of (log) real GDP, the ratio of (log) real house
prices (HP) to real GDP and the ratio of (log) real house prices to (log) real stock prices
(SP) for the U. S., the U. K., Japan and Germany. For GDP, we use seasonally adjusted
real per capita GDP. The NYSE composite index and OFHEO house prices are used
for U.S. prices. For U.K. prices, we use the FTSE 30 ordinary share index and the na-
tionwide house price index of the Nationwide Building Society. The Nikkei 225 index
and nationwide consumer prices for “Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas and Other Fu-
els” are used for Japan, whereas German prices are the DAX 30 index and construction
prices. All series are deflated using the CPI and indexed such that the average of 1980:I
- 1995:IV equals zero. For more details, see appendix Section 5.2.1. We see that the
house price to GDP ratio seems to be relatively stationary. It is most volatile in the U. K.
and in the U. S., but much less volatile than the house price to stock price ratio. In
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the last ten years houses have become more expensive in the U. K. and Japan, but less
expensive in the U. S. and Germany relative to the own country’s stock market.
Figure 3.3: GDP, House Prices to GDP Ratio and Stock Prices to GDP Ratio for the U. S.
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Figure 3.4: GDP, House Prices to GDP Ratio and Stock Prices to GDP Ratio for the U. K.,
Japan and Germany
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Figure 3.5: Comparison between the U.S., the U.K., Japan and Germany:
GDP, House Prices to GDP and House Prices to Stock Prices Ratio
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3.3 An Endowment Economy
We start with a stripped down endowment economy to preview the gist of the main
model laid out in the following section. Time is discrete. There are two kinds of goods:
a consumption good and housing services. They are produced by “Lucas trees”: the
“consumption tree” produces zt units of consumption per tree, while the “housing
tree” produces st units of housing services. Let at and bt denote the ownership of
consumption trees and housing trees by the household. A representative agent has
preferences of the form
max
ct ,st ,at ,bt
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt (θ logct + (1−θ) log st ) (3.1)
for consumption good ct and housing services st . The housing tree may be used to a
certain percentage, as determined by st ∈ [0,1]. Consumption equals the production of
the consumption tree: ct = zt . Households trade in the ownership at of the consump-
tion tree and the ownership bt of the housing tree, the latter resulting in one unit of
housing services. The according prices are pt and qt , respectively. Given the relative
price of housing services rt , the budget constraint of the household is:
ct + rt st +pt at +qt bt = (pt + zt )at−1+ (qt + rt )bt−1 . (3.2)
Market clearing requires at = bt = st = 1 and ct = zt . For the production function this
means that ct = 1 as well as st = 1. Defining output as the sum of consumption and
housing services,
yt ≡ ct + rt st , (3.3)
in equilibrium the following equation holds:
ct + rt = zt + rt = yt . (3.4)
Optimal allocation results in the following expenditure shares:
ct = θyt and rt = (1−θ)yt . (3.5)
For the rental rate rt , this can be transformed to show the relation to productivity:
rt = 1−θ
θ
zt . (3.6)
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As further first-order necessary conditions one obtains two asset pricing equations for
stocks and real estate:
pt =βEt [ ct
ct+1
(zt+1+pt+1)] (3.7)
qt =βEt [ ct
ct+1
(rt+1+qt+1)]. (3.8)
The fundamental solution to Equation (3.7) is
pt
zt
= β
1−β (3.9)
which can be transformed by using zt = θyt to give a stock price to GDP ratio
pt
yt
= θ β
1−β . (3.10)
Equivalently, the house price to GDP ratio is given by
qt
yt
= (1−θ) β
1−β (3.11)
and the house price to stock price ratio
qt
pt
= 1−θ
θ
. (3.12)
In this setup, movements in GDP should be directly reflected in movements in stock
and real estate prices, where the size of the movement in prices depends on the size of
the utility parameter θ. If this parameter was modelled as a random variable, changes
in current GDP would have time-variant (positive) effects on stock and real estate
prices.
3.3.1 Balanced Growth Path
If real estate is constant, but the exogenous income source is assumed to grow accord-
ing to
zt = γt ,γ> 1, (3.13)
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the price of housing services rt is growing with the exogenous income source zt . Ac-
cording to equation (3.6), it is
rt = 1−θ
θ
ct
st
= 1−θ
θ
γt . (3.14)
If zt is interpreted as productivity, house prices grow proportionately with productivity.
Hence, this stylized endowment economy features constant house price to GDP and
house price to stock price ratios. Given a constant stock of real estate, trend growth
in productivity and, thus, GDP translate into trend growth of the same size in house
prices. We use this building blocks for the more elaborated production economy of the
next section. There, prices and productivity will be specified with more detail.
3.4 A Production Economy
In this model, there are two sectors: Consumption goods are produced using con-
sumption good capital and labor. Real estate is produced using real estate capital and
constant land. Both types of capital are subject to adjustment costs. The model bears
similarity to Uhlig (2004), with the extension for two sectors.
The representative agent maximizes utility over consumption ct , housing services st
and leisure 1−nt as follows:
max
ct ,st ,nt ,xc,t ,xs,t ,kc,t ,ks,t
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
u(ct , zs,t , st )− Ant
)
, (3.15)
where zs,t denotes a preference shock and nt denotes labor, subject to the budget con-
straint, two production functions and two equations for capital accumulation. The
utility function u(·) is assumed to be additively separable3 and of the form
u(ct , zs,t , st )= θ logct + (1−θ)zs,t log st . (3.16)
The agent is endowed with one unit of time per period and L units of land. The budget
constraint is given by
ct +xc,t +xs,t = yc,t , (3.17)
where xc,t is investment in the consumption good production yc,t and xs,t is invest-
3In a similar model with two different growth patterns, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997)
report that in the class of constant elasticity of substitution models, balanced growth is only permitted
in the simple case like the one considered here.
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ment in housing. These constructs are normalized so that every real quantity is mea-
sured in units of consumption.
The production technology in the consumption good sector is given by the Cobb-
Douglas function in consumption good capital and productive labor zc,t nt ,
yc,t = kαcc,t−1(zc,t nt )1−αc . (3.18)
Investment in housing increases real estate production and also housing services. For
reasons of simplicity we assume real estate production to be equal to the service flow
it generates, hence, the words housing services and real estate production are used in-
terchangeably. Real estate production has the Cobb-Douglas functional form in the
arguments real estate capital and constant stock of land,4
st = ys,t = kαss,t−1L1−αs . (3.19)
In this setting, the agent builds real estate by investing in xs,t , both measured in units
of consumption, out of the income received from producing output in the consump-
tion good industry yc,t . Once real estate is built, it provides housing services st that do
not have to be paid for additionally.5 Note that there is no such thing as “income" from
owning a house, as it is owner-occupied. Instead, the house provides utility through
housing services. One could imagine an alternative model in which the representative
household rents a house or flat from real estate firms. These firms work in a compet-
itive market with zero profits and pay the marginal product to each production fac-
tor. As both production factors are owned by the representative household, this setting
renders equivalent results. Capital accumulation in both sectors is subject to a concave
adjustment cost function g to be specified later:
ki ,t = (1−δi )ki ,t−1+ gi
(
xi ,t
ki ,t−1
)
ki ,t−1, i ∈ {c, s}. (3.20)
The exogenous process for housing preferences zs,t is assumed to be AR(1), while pro-
ductivity zc,t is a unit root process with stochastic trend growth µt and an additional
4The fixed factor in real estate production can also be excluded by setting αs = 1.
5“Selling" real estate can be done by disinvesting in xs,t .
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shock:
log zs,t = ρs log zs,t−1+²s,t (3.21)
log zc,t = logµt + log zc,t−1+²c,t , where (3.22)
logµt = ρµ logµt−1+ (1−ρµ) log µ¯+νt . (3.23)
While the shock ²c,t influences the level of productivity, νt influences the level of trend
productivity and, hence, the growth rate of productivity. Below, we will focus on the
effects of both shocks. Special attention will be put to the question of what happens to
the growth rate of productivity, νt+i after an anticipated future shock. Note that Equa-
tion (3.23) incorporates long-run risk into the analysis. This has recently been empha-
sized in particular by Bansal and Yaron (2004) as well as Hansen, Heaton, and Li (2005)
and Hansen and Scheinkman (2006). It would be interesting to study an extension of
the model to include Epstein-Zin preferences, as done by Bansal and Yaron (2004) or
Piazzesi and Schneider (2008), the latter paper even focussing on the real estate mar-
ket. We have not done so here to keep the analysis as tractable as possible. With this,
the model is closed. We are solving for the social planner solution. An equilibrium is
given by the following definition.
Definition 3. Given initial endowments kc,−1 and ks,−1, an equilibrium is an allocation
{ct , st ,nt , xc,t , xs,t , yc,t ,kc,t ,ks,t }∞t=0 such that markets clear and the allocation solves each
household’s problem.
3.4.1 Analysis
The social planning problem stated above can be decentralized by a sector of compet-
itive firms for consumption good production and for real estate production, respec-
tively, as well as a household sector. The maximization problems of the two production
sectors – both denoted in units of the consumption good – are
max
kc,t−1,nt
yc,t −dc,t kc,t−1−wt nt (3.24)
max
ks,t−1,L
pt ys,t −ds,t ks,t−1−dL,t L, (3.25)
subject to the production function given in Equation (3.18) and (3.19), respectively.
Here pt is the price of real estate in terms of the consumption good. The wage wt , the
two dividends or rental rates on capital dc,t and ds,t as well as the land dividend dL,t are
measured in units of the consumption good and taken as given by the firms. The repre-
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sentative household again maximizes the utility function given in Equations 3.15 and
3.16, subject to the capital accumulation Equations (3.20) and the budget constraint
ct +kc,t +pt ks,t =wt nt +dc,t kc,t−1+ds,t ks,t−1+dL,t L,t . (3.26)
Maximization of firm profits results in four marginal products (wage rate and three
dividends). Together with appropriate definitions of returns to investments in capital,6
we have
dc,t =αc
yc,t
kc,t−1
, (3.27)
wt = (1−αc )
yc,t
nt
(3.28)
ds,t =αs pt
ys,t
ks,t−1
, (3.29)
dL,t = (1−αs)pt
ys,t
L
, (3.30)
Ri ,t+1 = g ′i
(
xi ,t
ki ,t−1
)di ,t+1+ 1−δi + gi
(
xi ,t+1
ki ,t
)
g ′i
(
xi ,t+1
ki ,t
) − xi ,t+1
ki ,t
 , i ∈ {c, s}. (3.31)
All of these variables are measured in units of the consumption good. The marginal
products of real estate production are translated into units of the consumption good
by using the relative price
pt =
(1−θ)zs,t
θ
ct
st
, (3.32)
which is the ratio of marginal utility of housing services to marginal utility of consump-
tion.
Now consider again the social planning problem given by Equation (3.15) with (3.16),
subject to Equations (3.17), (3.19) and the two versions of equation (3.20), replacing
yc,t by Equation (3.18). If one denotes the respective Langrangean multipliers by λbc,t ,
λy s,t , (λbc,t +λkc,t ) and (λbc,t +λks,t ), one can rewrite the relative price pt as the ratio
of the Lagrange multipliers for budget constraint and real estate production,
pt =
λy s,t
λbc,t
. (3.33)
To compare the model with the stylized facts presented in Section 3.2, we have to de-
fine (overall) output, house prices and stock prices. Output is defined as the sum of
6These definitions are given in line with the household’s optimality conditions with respect to each
type of capital and investment. Details are given in the stationary model derived below.
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consumption good production and housing services (or real estate production),7 both
measured in units of the consumption good:
yt = yc,t +pt ys,t . (3.34)
Following Hayashi (1982) and Hall (2001), the value of consumption good capital is the
product of the shadow value of installed consumption good capital and the quantity
of consumption good capital. In the case of no adjustment costs, the shadow value
of installed consumption good capital qc,t is one and the value of consumption good
capital equals its quantity. For nonlinear adjustment costs, qc,t is larger than unity and
given by the ratio of the Lagrangean multiplier on capital accumulation (λbc,t +λkc,t )
to the Langrangean multiplier on the budget constraint λbc,t ,
8
Vc,t = qc,t kc,t , where qc,t =
λbc,t +λkc,t
λbc,t
. (3.35)
The shadow value of installed capital, also known as Tobin’s q, is the value of a unit of
capital in units of the consumption good. Hence, like the relative price of real estate, it
can be written in terms of the Lagrange multipliers for the capital accumulation equa-
tion λbc,t +λkc,t and the budget constraint. This value of consumption good capital
is the total market value of the non-real estate capital stock. It is equal to all stocks
and all corporate bonds outside the real estate sector. This variable will serve as the
theoretical counterpart to the stock price.
We call our theoretical counterpart to real estate prices value of housing stock. It is the
sum of the value of real estate capital (calculated as before) and the value of land,
Vs,t = qs,t ks,t +VL,t , where qs,t =
λbc,t +λks,t
λbc,t
. (3.36)
Lastly, the value of land is the sum of all expected discounted future imputed land div-
idend payments,
VL,t = E0
[ ∞∑
j=0
βt
ct
ct+ j
dL,t+ j
]
= dL,t +βEt
[
ct
ct+1
VL,t+1
]
, (3.37)
where the discounting is done in terms of marginal utility of consumption.
7To illustrate this, one may again think of a model with real estate firms that produce and sell real
estate, as mentioned above. Then, real estate production is clearly part of overall output.
8Notice that in our notation, λkc,t measures the difference between the Lagrange multiplier on the
budget constraint and the one on the capital accumulation equation.
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3.4.2 Balanced Growth Path
To obtain a solution for the model it is convenient to reformulate it in terms of sta-
tionary variables. The appropriate transformation features the same growth rate for
consumption, output of consumption goods, both types of investment and both types
of capital. However, due to the fixed factor in real estate production, housing services
grow more slowly.9 This bears an important implication. As real estate is produced
using one finite input factor, its balanced growth is smaller than balanced labor pro-
ductivity growth. Thus, the price for real estate production and accordingly the price
for housing services will rise as a result of this scarcity. Finally, land and labor feature
zero growth.
Given a conjectured growth rate for each variable, we transform the model into a sta-
tionary one. Dividing all variables except for housing services st and the already sta-
tionary variables labor n and land L by the respective labor productivity zc,t−1 and
using a tilde to denote the detrended variables, e.g. c˜t ≡ ct /zc,t−1, but s˜t ≡ st /zαsc,t−1,
p˜t ≡ pt /z1−αsc,t−1, k˜i ,t ≡ ki ,t /zc,t , i ∈ {c, s} and n˜t ≡ nt , L˜ ≡ L,10 we obtain the following
representation:
max
c˜t ,s˜t ,n˜t ,x˜c,t ,x˜s,t ,k˜c,t ,k˜s,t
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
θ log c˜t + (1−θ)zs,t log s˜t − An˜t +Zt
]
, (3.38)
where Zt = (θ+(1−θ)zs,t ) log zc,t−1 is a stochastic scaling factor.11 The maximization is
subject to
y˜c,t = c˜t + x˜c,t + x˜s,t , (3.39)
y˜c,t = k˜αcc,t−1n˜1−αct , (3.40)
y˜s,t = s˜t = k˜αss,t−1L˜1−αs , (3.41)
γ˜t k˜i ,t = (1−δi )k˜i ,t−1+ gi
(
x˜i ,t
k˜i ,t−1
)
k˜i ,t−1 , i ∈ {c, s}, (3.42)
9For a comparable model with two differing growth patterns, see Greenwood et al. (1997).
10For the detrending procedure, it has to be taken into account that ki ,t−1, i ∈ {c, s} is the capital stock
that is valid at the beginning of period t and is thus to be divided by zc,t−1 as well, while ki ,t , i ∈ {c, s} is
valid at the beginning of period t +1 and is thus to be divided by zc,t .
11Note that the discount factor β is not affected, as the utility specification is logarithmic. See King et
al. (1988; JME: Prod, Growth and BC I. The Basic Neoclassical Model; p. 203).
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where γ˜t is labor productivity growth,12
γ˜t =
zc,t
zc,t−1
.
The adjustment cost functions are specified so that for the detrended variables the
first-order behavior of the capital accumulation is the same as in the no-adjustment-
cost case:
gi
(
x˜i ,t
k˜i ,t−1
)
= δ˜
1/ξi
i
1−1/ξi
(
x˜i ,t
k˜i ,t−1
)1−1/ξi
+ δ˜i
1−ξi
, i ∈ {c, s}.
The parameter δ˜ = δ+ γ¯−1 is chosen to match the investment to capital ratio in the
steady state no-adjustment cost capital accumulation equation γ¯k¯i = (1− δ)k¯i + x¯i .
Thus, the adjustment cost function satisfies
g (δ˜)= δ˜, g ′(δ˜)= 1, ξ=− g
′(δ˜)
δ˜g ′′(δ˜)
,
and ξ> 0 is the elasticity of the investment-capital ratio with respect to Tobin’s q.13
The exogenous process for technology given in Equation (3.22) is transformed to
log γ˜t = logµt +²c,t , (3.43)
while the other exogenous processes remain the same as in Equations (3.21) and (3.23).
The household’s optimal choice of consumption, housing services, labor and the two
kinds of each investment and capital is obtained by setting up the usual Lagrange
function. For reasons of simplification, we have replaced yc,t by Equation (3.40), so
that we are left with four constraints. As before, we denote the Lagrange multipliers
λbc,t for the budget constraint, λy s,t for the constraint on production of real estate, and
(λbc,t +λkc,t ), (λbc,t +λks,t ) for the two types of capital accumulation.14 λkc,t and λks,t
measure the difference between the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint and
the one on the respective capital accumulation equation. For linear adjustment cost
functions, these multipliers are zero.
The first-order conditions for consumption, housing services, labor, the two kinds of
12Note that in order to have zero steady state adjustment costs, as measured by a non-binding La-
grange multiplier λ¯ki = 0, we have to divide all equations by the same level of productivity, i.e. zc,t−1.
Therefore, γ˜t has to show up on the left hand side in the capital accumulation equations.
13See Jermann (1998).
14In balanced growth, the Lagrange multiplier for the budget constraint λbc,t and the ones for the
two capital accumulation equations (λbc,t +λki ,t ) are trending with z−1c,t−1, while the detrending of the
Lagrange multiplier for real estate production is according to λ˜y s,t =λy s,t /z−αc,t−1.
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investment and the two kinds of capital are:15
θ
c˜t
= λ˜bc,t (3.44)
(1−θ)zs,t
s˜t
= λ˜y s,t (3.45)
A = λ˜bc,t (1−αc )
y˜c,t
n˜t
(3.46)
λ˜bc,t = (λ˜bc,t + λ˜kc,t )g ′c
(
x˜c,t
k˜c,t−1
)
(3.47)
λ˜bc,t = (λ˜bc,t + λ˜ks,t )g ′s
(
x˜s,t
k˜s,t−1
)
(3.48)
γ˜t (λ˜bc,t + λ˜kc,t )=βEt [λ˜bc,t+1αc
y˜c,t+1
k˜c,t
+ (λ˜bc,t+1+ λ˜kc,t+1)(
1−δc − g ′c
(
x˜c,t+1
k˜c,t
)
x˜c,t+1
k˜c,t
+ gc
(
x˜c,t+1
k˜c,t
))
] (3.49)
γ˜t (λ˜bc,t + λ˜ks,t )=βEt [λ˜y s,t+1αs
y˜s,t+1
k˜s,t
+ (λ˜bc,t+1+ λ˜ks,t+1)(
1−δs − g ′s
(
x˜s,t+1
k˜s,t
)
x˜s,t+1
k˜s,t
+ gs
(
x˜s,t+1
k˜s,t
))
] . (3.50)
15Note that the derivative of the adjustment cost function with respect to
x˜i ,t
k˜i ,t−1
equals g ′i
(
x˜i ,t
k˜i ,t−1
)
=
δ˜
1/ξi
i
(
x˜i ,t
k˜i ,t−1
) −1
ξi , i ∈ {c, s}.
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As additional equations we get:16
d˜c,t =αc
y˜c,t
k˜c,t−1
, (3.51)
w˜t = (1−αc )
y˜c,t
n˜t
, (3.52)
d˜s,t =αs p˜t
y˜s,t
k˜s,t−1
, (3.53)
d˜L,t = (1−αs)p˜t
y˜s,t
L˜
, (3.54)
R˜i ,t+1 = γ˜−1t g ′i
(
x˜i ,t
k˜i ,t−1
)d˜i ,t+1+ 1−δi + gi
(
x˜i ,t+1
k˜i ,t
)
g ′i
(
x˜i ,t+1
k˜i ,t
) − x˜i ,t+1
k˜i ,t
 , i ∈ {c, s}, (3.55)
p˜t =
λ˜y s,t
λ˜bc,t
, (3.56)
y˜t = y˜c,t + p˜t y˜s,t , (3.57)
V˜c,t = γ˜t q˜c,t k˜c,t , where q˜c,t =
λ˜bc,t + λ˜kc,t
λ˜bc,t
, (3.58)
V˜s,t = γ˜t q˜s,t k˜s,t + V˜L,t , where q˜s,t =
λ˜bc,t + λ˜ks,t
λ˜bc,t
, (3.59)
V˜L,t = d˜L,t +βEt
[
c˜t
c˜t+1
V˜L,t+1
]
. (3.60)
The detrended model is given by the 20 Equations (3.39) to (3.42), (3.44) to (3.60) and
the three exogenous processes (3.21), (3.23) and (3.43). After the detrending procedure,
the calculation of the unique steady state of the model is straightforward. Two issues
shall be stressed here. First, if µ¯ = 1, this implies γ¯ = 1 and, hence, no growth in pro-
ductivity. Steady state growth is given by µ¯> 1. Second, note that λ¯ki = 0, i ∈ {c, s}, i.e.,
in steady state the shadow price of adjustment costs is zero. This means that Tobin’s q
is equal to unity, and the market value equals the replacement cost of installed capital.
3.4.3 Log-linearized Model
We will approximate this system of equations around the nonstochastic steady state
of the detrended variables, using the method of log-linearization. Denoting the non-
16Wage, land dividend, overall output and the three values have to be detrended by zc,t−1. The usual
detrending procedure does not apply to the two dividends and Tobin’s q for capital, as they are a func-
tion of already detrended variables only. Returns are obtained by replacing the capital accumulation
Lagrange multipliers with the first-order conditions for investment. Obviously, returns do not trend, so
R˜i ,t+1 =Ri ,t+1; compare Talmain (2003) and Greenwood et al. (1997).
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stochastic steady state of the detrended variable by a bar and the log deviation of a
variable from its steady state by a hat, e.g. cˆt = log c˜t − log c¯, the system of equations
is given in Table 3.4.3. The equations in Table 3.4.3 have the interpretation of budget
constraint, production of consumption good and of real estate, capital accumulation
in both sectors, first order conditions for consumption, housing services, labor, two
types of investment17 and two types of capital, i.e. the Euler equations. Then follow
the equations for wage, dividends and returns, the relative price of housing services to
consumption goods and overall output. The next three equations determine the values
of consumption good capital, housing stock and land. Finally, the three stochastic pro-
cesses for productivity, trend productivity and preferences for housing services close
the system.
Notice that in log-linear terms Tobin’s q is equal to λki ,t , the Lagrangean multiplier
difference. Both sizes measure the shadow price of installed capital or the change in the
ratio of market value of installed capital and the intrinsic asset value, see Hall (2001).
3.4.4 Results
Our baseline calibration is given in Table 3.2, in most cases it is in line with the usual
values used in the real business cycle literature, see Cooley (1995). We set the steady
state labor share to one third, the capital share in consumption good production to
0.36. The capital share in real estate production is set using the balanced growth prop-
erties of the model. In the model, the relative price of housing to non-housing grows
more slowly than real GDP, so that the relative price is detrended p˜t = pt /z1−αsc,t−1. Hence,
we know that relative house price growth to the power of (1−αs) equals productivity
and real GDP growth. Using data on average real GDP growth and growth in the CPI
expenditure category housing above the growth rate of all other non-housing CPI cat-
egories, we find αs = 0.05 and thus the capital share in real estate production to be
95 percent. The depreciation rate for consumption good capital is set to 2.5 percent
per quarter, that for real estate capital to half of that, as real estate is typically more
durable. The share of consumption in the utility function determines also the share
of expenditures on consumption relative to housing services. In U.S. CPI data housing
has a relative importance of 42 percent of all expenditures, so we set θ = 0.58. For the
capital adjustment cost parameter, we follow Jermann (1998) and set ξc = 0.23 for the
consumption good sector, whereas for real estate we assume higher adjustment cost
17For these log-linear approximations, note that λˆkc and λˆks cannot be defined in the usual way, as
their steady state value equals zero. Instead, we define e.g. λˆks = λks−λ¯ksλ¯bc+λ¯ks =
λks
λ¯bc
.
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Table 3.1: The log-linearized Model
yˆc,t = c¯
y¯c
cˆt + x¯c
y¯c
xˆc,t + x¯s
y¯c
xˆs,t (3.61)
yˆc,t =αc kˆc,t−1+ (1−αc )nˆt (3.62)
yˆs,t = sˆt =αs kˆs,t−1 (3.63)
γ¯kˆc,t = (1−δc )kˆc,t−1+ δ˜c xˆc,t − γ¯γˆt (3.64)
γ¯kˆs,t = (1−δs)kˆs,t−1+ δ˜s xˆs,t − γ¯γˆt (3.65)
cˆt =−λˆbc,t (3.66)
sˆt =−λˆy s,t + zˆs,t (3.67)
nˆt = λˆbc,t + yˆc,t (3.68)
λˆkc,t = qˆc,t =
1
ξc
(xˆc,t − kˆc,t−1) (3.69)
λˆks,t = qˆs,t =
1
ξs
(xˆs,t − kˆs,t−1) (3.70)
0= Et [λˆbc,t+1− λˆbc,t − γˆt + Rˆc,t+1] (3.71)
0= Et [λˆbc,t+1− λˆbc,t − γˆt + Rˆs,t+1] (3.72)
dˆc,t = yˆc,t − kˆc,t−1 (3.73)
wˆt = yˆc,t − nˆt (3.74)
dˆs,t = pˆt + yˆs,t − kˆs,t−1 = (αs −1)kˆs,t−1 (3.75)
dˆL,t = pˆt + yˆs,t (3.76)
Rˆc,t = R¯c −1+δc
R¯c
dˆc,t − λˆkc,t−1+
γ¯
R¯c
λˆkc,t (3.77)
Rˆs,t = R¯s −1+δs
R¯s
dˆs,t )− λˆks,t−1+
γ¯
R¯s
λˆks,t (3.78)
pˆt = λˆy s,t − λˆbc,t (3.79)
yˆt = y¯c
y¯
yˆc,t + p¯ y¯s
y¯
pˆt + p¯ y¯s
y¯
sˆt (3.80)
Vˆc,t = qˆc,t + kˆc,t + γˆt (3.81)
V¯s
V¯s − V¯L
Vˆs,t = qˆs,t + kˆs,t + γˆt + V¯L
V¯s − V¯L
VˆL,t (3.82)
0= Et [−VˆL,t +βVˆL,t+1−βcˆt+1+βcˆt + (1−β)pˆt + (1−β)sˆt ] (3.83)
γˆt = µˆt +²c,t , (3.84)
µˆt = ρµµˆt−1+νt , (3.85)
zˆs,t = ρs zˆs,t−1+²s,t . (3.86)
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Table 3.2: Baseline Calibration
Parameter Value Explanation
N¯ 0.333 Steady state employment is 13 of total time endowment
αc 0.36 Capital share in consumption good production
αs 0.95 Capital share in real estate production
δc 0.025 Depreciation rate for capital
δs 0.012 Depreciation rate for real estate capital
β 1/1.01 Discount factor
θ 0.58 Share of consumption in the household’s utility
ξc 0.23 Capital adjustment cost curvature parameter (0=capital fixed, ∞=no
cost)
ξs 0.12 Real estate capital adjustment cost curvature parameter
ρs 0.95 Autocorrelation of preference shock
µ¯ 1.006 Steady state technology trend
ρµ 0.99 Autocorrelation of trend technology
σ²c 0.712 Standard deviation of technology shock in percent
σ²s 0.407 Standard deviation of housing preference shock in percent
σ²ν 0.712 Standard deviation of trend technology shock in percent
curvature of ξs = 0.12. The preference shock is assumed to have an AR(1) coefficient
of .95 and a standard deviation of 0.407, the unit root technology process has standard
deviation of 0.712 percent, like the trend technology process, which has an AR(1) coef-
ficient of 0.99. The mean of the trend technology growth is set to 1.006, which implies
a steady state real quarter to quarter growth of 0.6 percent.
The model is solved using standard algorithms, see Uhlig (1999). The results of the
model are presented in two ways: First, we show the behavior of the detrended vari-
ables. Second, we re-transform the variables to again include the specific trend that
has been removed earlier, as proposed in Uhlig (2003).
For the discussion of results we focus on impulse responses of GDP, relative prices and
the values of land, housing and consumption good capital. The impulse responses of
these variables in detrended form to preference and the various productivity shocks are
given in Figures 3.6 to 3.9. A shock in housing preferences makes housing services more
valuable. Thus, both, the relative price of housing services pt and Tobin’s q for housing
rise on impact. Accordingly, the values of land and of housing rise. As future real estate
production can be financed only by means of consumption good production, Tobin’s
q for consumption good capital and overall output rise as well, but to a lesser extent.
So both, the ratios of housing value to GDP and of housing value to the value of the
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Figure 3.6: Impulse response to a shock in housing preferences
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Figure 3.7: Impulse response to a shock in the level of technology
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Figure 3.8: Impulse response to a shock in technology growth
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Figure 3.9: Impulse response to a shock in technology growth twelve periods ahead
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capital stock in the consumption good sector rise on impact and then fall to return to
their steady state.
A shock to the level of technology leads to highly persistent responses. The market
values of both types of capital and, hence, both types of Tobin’s q increase significantly.
But as capital adjustment is costly and thus takes place only gradually, the value of non-
housing capital and output grow only slowly, slower than the trend. Consequently, the
detrended variables fall on impact. But as the adjustment costs in the real estate sector
are assumed to be bigger, Tobin’s q is higher in that sector, and the relative price as well
as the value of housing are above their steady state for a long time. For this reason, the
two ratios are again both positive, just like after the preference shock.
A shock to technology growth, i. e., a positive νt , implies a higher trend growth rate for
a long time. Hence, the positive effect on Tobin’S q is big, increasing and prolonged
compared to the level shock. After an initial period of higher trend growth, output
grows more slowly than the trend, i.e., it falls below steady state, and the value of land
is continuously growing more slowly than the trend. In contrast to this, the values of
housing and of consumption good capital are above their steady state. Note in par-
ticular that the steady-state deviation of the value of housing increases more than 25
percent. Therefore, the house price to GDP ratio and the house price to stock price ra-
tio on impact increase by more than 25 and more than 15 percent, respectively. These
numbers are close to what we have seen in the data in Section 3.2.
If a future shock to technology growth is anticipated today, the responses on impact
are nearly as big as if the shock hit today. The responses then increase until the shock
hits. As an example, Figure 3.15 depicts a technology growth shock anticipated three
years in advance. Here, the increases in the house price to GDP and the house price to
stock price ratios are between 25 and 15 percent.
Comparing the effect of a current technology growth shock to an anticipated technol-
ogy growth shock in three years on the house price to GDP and the house price to
stock price ratios, one is struck by the similarities. Looking at Figures 3.10 and 3.11,
one can see that the anticipation of a future shock has on impact nearly as big effects
as the actual shock. Of course, this result heavily depends on the assumed adjustment
cost function. The higher the curvature of this function, the bigger the intertemporal
smoothing effect and, hence, the larger the immediate increase in the the valuation of
real estate.
The impulse responses of the different types of output, the two capital stocks, the rela-
tive price of housing and the three values with the trend again added are given in Fig-
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Figure 3.10: Impulse response to a shock in technology growth
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Figure 3.11: Impulse response to a shock in technology growth twelve periods ahead
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Response to tech. growth(t+12)    
Years
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 S
S
HP/GDP ratio          
−1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
5
10
15
20
Response to tech. growth(t+12)    
Years
%
 d
ev
ia
tio
n 
fro
m
 S
S
HP/SP ratio           
84
Figure 3.12: Impulse response to a shock in housing preferences, including trend
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Figure 3.13: Impulse response to a shock in the level of technology, including trend
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Figure 3.14: Impulse response to a shock in technology growth, including trend
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Figure 3.15: Impulse response to a shock in technology growth twelve periods ahead,
including trend
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Figure 3.16: Simulated data for the house price to GDP ratio, HP-filtered, averages over
50 simulations
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ures 3.12 to 3.15. The figures show the generally positive effect of all shocks on these
trending variables.
As we have seen, in this model future productivity growth leads to an immediate boom
in the value of housing and the value of the capital stock in the consumption good sec-
tor. Using stock prices and house prices as proxies for these values, we find a stock
price boom and a house price boom today in response to an expected future technol-
ogy growth shock. Put it the other way round, a situation in which both house price to
GDP ratio and house price to stock price ratio move upward could be the result of an
increase in the expected future technology growth. In other words, positive economic
forecasts may effect house prices more than proportionately.
How do simulated time series of the house price to GDP and the house price to stock
price ratios look like? are they comparable to what we have seen in the data? Figures
3.16 and 3.17 provide a first answer. We see swings of enormous size, though their
amplitude is still smaller than in actual data, and so is the persistence of the series.
Regarding the correlation pattern, the data provided in Section 3.2 features contempo-
raneous correlation coefficients of the house price to GDP ratio with the house price to
stock price ratio between 0.17 for the U.S. and 0.87 for the U.K., with Germany (0.48)
and Japan (0.30) in between. The HP-filtered model equivalent coefficient is 0.95.18
18The results provided in the last paragraph should be seen as tentative in so far as a direct comparison
between log indexed data and HP-filtered model simulations might well be misleading.
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Figure 3.17: Simulated data for the house price to stock price ratio, HP-filtered, aver-
ages over 50 simulations
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3.5 Conclusion
A simple two sector RBC model can be used to address issues in real estate economics.
Assuming real estate production to be restricted by the finite factor land, whereas the
production of other goods is not restricted in this way, the relative price of real estate
has to increase over time as the economy grows. In particular, we have shown that in
the presence of capital adjustment costs, a shock to present or expected future pro-
ductivity growth results in a sudden and sharp increase in the value of real estate. The
result of this kind of shock is a simultaneous and big increase in the house price to
GDP ratio and in the house price to stock price ratio. The implied positive correla-
tion between the two ratios is generally confirmed by the data for aa four investigated
countries: U. S., U. K., Japan and Germany.
One might argue that the high house price to GDP ratio in the U. S. and the U. K. until
recently, as documented in the middle panel of Figure 3.5 is the result of high expected
future productivity growth rates in these countries, whereas the low ratios in Japan
and Germany come from less optimistic expectations. Seen in this light, the current
downturn in house prices in the U. S. and the U. K. is the effect of anticipated positive
shocks that did not materialize or that are no longer expected to materialize in the
future. We regard this line of research to be promising.
4 Putting up a Good Fight:
The Galí-Monacelli Model versus “The
Six Major Puzzles in International
Macroeconomics"
In this paper, the following question is posed: Can the New Keynesian Open Economy Model
by Galí and Monacelli (2005b) explain “Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeconomics”, as
documented in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b)?
The model features a small open economy with complete markets, Calvo sticky prices and mo-
nopolistic competition. As extensions, I explore the effects of an estimated Taylor rule and ad-
ditional trade costs. After translating the six puzzles into moment conditions for the model, I
estimate the five most effective parameters using simulated method of moments (SMM) to fit
the moment conditions implied by the data. Given the simplicity of the model, its fit is surpris-
ingly good: among other things, the home bias puzzles can easily be replicated, the exchange rate
volatility is formidably increased and the exchange rate correlation pattern is relatively close to
realistic values. Trade costs are one important ingredient for this finding.
4.1 Introduction
Nowadays, the New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) para-
digm is the basis for most open economy macroeconomic models.1 Since Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1995), models with a small set of shocks and frictions are widely used for the
1Instead of New Keynesian, the labels New Neoclassical Synthesis and – especially for the open econ-
omy – New Open Economy Macroeconomics are used interchangeably. A survey on New Open Economy
Models can be found in Lane (2001).
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analysis of policies, especially monetary policy. The comparative simplicity of these
models has two implications. On the one hand, the working mechanisms of these
models are easily understood. On the other hand, the connection between these styl-
ized models and real world problems can be easily questioned. Researchers have re-
acted to this in two ways. First, they have built New Keynesian DSGE models with more
shocks and frictions. Adolfson, Laséen, Lindé, and Villani (2005) and the IMF’s Global
Economy Model, as presented in Pesenti (2008) are good examples for this approach,
and more are to come. Loosing some of their simplicity and tractability, these papers
gain in terms of realism and applicability. Second, researchers have tried to assess the
actual quality of the stylized models when confronted with the data, or at least with
specific aspects of it. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) and Lubik and Schorfheide
(2007) are two examples for this approach.
In this paper, this second way is followed. A specific stylized New Keynesian DSGE
model is confronted to a specific set of first and second moments of international
macroeconomic data. The model used is the one by Galí and Monacelli (2005b). This
model is also reprinted in the textbook by Galí (2008) and can be regarded as a proto-
type of New Keynesian Open Economy Models.2 The main components of this kind of
models are a forward looking Phillips curve, a dynamic IS-curve and Calvo (1983) sticky
prices. The open economy assumptions in this model are a small open economy ver-
sus the rest of the world, modeled as the limiting case of a two country world with one
country infinitely small such that it does not influence the other, producer currency
pricing, and complete financial markets. I modify the model in three respects. First, I
disregard the multi-country framework, as is done in previous versions of that paper,
see Galí and Monacelli (2002), henceforth GM. Second, besides the four monetary pol-
icy rules analyzed in Galí and Monacelli (2005b), I include an alternative Taylor rule
monetary policy as in Clarida et al. (1998) which is more suitable for estimation issues.
Third, I allow for the possibility of costs to trade in goods, following the suggestion by
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b).3
Regarding the data, I focus on the “Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeco-
nomics" as presented in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b), henceforth OR. These are (1) the
home bias in trade puzzle, (2) the high investment-savings correlation, (3) the home
bias in equity portfolio puzzle, (4) the low international consumption correlation, (5)
the purchasing power parity puzzle and (6) the exchange rate disconnect puzzle. In ap-
2McCallum and Nelson (2001, p. 10) call this model a “standard" model that they use as a benchmark
with which to compare their own model.
3Thus, I am putting Obstfeld and Rogoff’s idea to a test “in a much richer framework featuring imper-
fect competition plus sticky prices". See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b, pp. 340f.).
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plying the GM model – extended for trade costs – to the OR puzzles this paper features
a second motivation: while Obstfeld and Rogoff only sketch their idea of the effects of
trade costs, this paper features a complete DSGE analysis of these effects.
For different sets of parameters, three different procedures are applied in order to “take
the model to the data": First, I calibrate those parameters that have agreed-upon val-
ues or that are unimportant with respect to the six puzzles. In a next step, I estimate
the Taylor rule parameters using generalized method of moments (GMM). Also, I use
estimates for the assumed exogenous processes. In this step, I follow Galí and Mona-
celli (2005b, p. 723) in using data for Canada as “a prototype small open economy".
The third and last procedure is simulated method of moments (SMM). This method is
used to set the five most important parameters such that the distance between model
moments and the data moments from the six puzzles is minimized. The parameters
are those for trade costs, degree of openness, Calvo price stickiness, the international
elasticity of substitution and relative risk aversion.
I come to the conclusion that the model can easily explain puzzles (1) and (3), thanks
to the combination of trade costs and the degree of openness parameter, the “home
bias in preferences" parameter mentioned in OR. The investment-savings puzzle is ad-
dressed only indirectly by means of a relation between net exports and the real interest
rate, where the expected negative correlation is reproduced. The biggest deficiency of
the model is that international output correlation is way too low, and the real exchange
rate volatility and its correlation pattern is not exactly in line with the data.
Compared to a case without trade costs and without degree of openness parameter, the
combination of the two elements leads to better results for all the puzzles. Very high
values for the two home bias puzzles (1) and (3) can be replicated. The result of puzzle
(2) remains stable, but it is now possible to also address the last three puzzles to some
degree. The high exchange rate volatility of the data can be achieved by a combination
of a high risk aversion as in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002), sizeable trade costs
and a low degree of openness. The “disconnectedness" of real exchange rate volatility,
i.e., the fact that real exchange rates are by far more volatile than any other macroeco-
nomic aggregate – one part of the “disconnect" puzzle – is reproduced relatively well.
But the second dimension of the “disconnect" puzzle, i.e., the low correlation between
the real exchange rate and all other macroeconomic aggregates, is not explained by the
model. Instead, the model features a positive correlation between the real exchange
rate and output. The biggest weakness of the model is with respect to the international
consumption correlations relative to the international output correlation. Output is by
far not enough correlated internationally in the model.
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The paper continues as follows. In Section 2, the model is presented. Section 3 briefly
sketches the puzzles and the implied moments for the parametrization process. Sec-
tion 4 explains the parametrization methods and choices. Results are presented in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
4.2 Model
4.2.1 Environment
There are two countries, the home country (H) and the foreign country (the “rest of the
world", F ). If not indicated differently, the following applies to both of them, whereas
foreign variables are denoted by an asterisk. There are infinitely long living households,
which experience utility from consumption of home and of foreign goods. Firms pro-
duce in monopolistic competition, and governments collect taxes, pay transfers and
conduct monetary policy with an interest rate rule. The same applies to the foreign
economy, except for the fact that foreign households’ consumption of home goods is
negligibly small for them. While international financial markets are complete, there is
a friction in the goods market: Transportation of goods from one country to another
decreases its quantity by the factor κ, which can be understood as "iceberg melting".
Preferences
A representative household decides about its expected infinite labor supply and con-
sumption to maximize its utility, which is assumed to be separable between the two
elements consumption Ct and hours of labor Nt :
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt [U (Ct )−V (Nt )] , (4.1)
where U is defined as U (Ct ) ≡ C
1−σ
t
1−σ and V as V (Nt ) ≡
N
1+ϕ
t
1+ϕ . The parameters used are
discount factorβ, constant of relative risk aversionσ and elasticity of labor supply 1/ϕ.
Consumption Ct is composed of
Ct =
[
(1−α) 1ηC
η−1
η
H ,t +α
1
ηC
η−1
η
F,t
] η
η−1
. (4.2)
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CF,t and CH ,t are indices related to the consumption of foreign and domestic products,
respectively, which are themselves integrals over all firms i ∈ [0;1]:
C j ,t =
(∫ 1
0
C j ,t (i )
ε−1
ε di
) ε
ε−1
, j ∈ {H ;F }, (4.3)
with η being the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods, and ε
the elasticity of substitution between goods of the same country.
Endowment
Each household is endowed with one unit of time per period.
Technology
Each domestic firm i ∈ [0;1] produces its output Yt (i ) with production technology
Yt (i ) = At Nt (i ), where log(At ) = at = ρa at−1 + ²t is stochastic productivity. To sim-
plify matters, production in the rest of the world is assumed to evolve exogenously
according to log(Y ∗t )− log Y¯ ∗ = y∗t = ρ∗y y∗t−1+²∗t .
Information
Households have complete information until and including the current period, and
they have rational expectations about future periods. The same applies to firms and
governments.
4.2.2 Competitive Equilibrium
Households work at firms in their own country, pay lump-sum taxes, and trade nom-
inal bonds which include shares in firms of all countries. They have access to a com-
plete set of internationally traded contingent claims. Firms hire labor, produce, and
sell their goods at home and abroad under monopolistic competition. They set prices
for all markets in domestic currency (producer currency pricing) according to the Calvo
(1983) price stickiness. Finally, they receive a wage subsidy τ. Governments receive
lump- sum taxes Tt , pay wage subsidies, and are not allowed to accumulate debt. Mon-
etary policy is made by setting the nominal interest rate.
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Competitive Equilibrium: Households
The budget constraint domestic households are faced with each period t is
∫ 1
0
[PH ,t (i )CH ,t (i )+PF,t (i )CF,t (i )]di +Et {Qt ,t+1D t+1}≤D t +Wt Nt +Tt , (4.4)
with Qt ,t+1 the stochastic discount factor for nominal payoffs, related to the gross re-
turn Rt by Et (Qt ,t+1)= 1Rt . D t+1 is the nominal payoff in period t +1 of a portfolio held
at the end of period t . This portfolio includes shares in firms, and its payoff is cum
dividend. As markets are complete, there is a complete set of state-contingent claims,
traded internationally. Wt is the nominal wage and Tt a lump-sum transfer or tax. For-
eign households similarly face
∫ 1
0
[P∗H ,t (i )C
∗
H ,t (i )+P∗F,t (i )C∗F,t (i )]di +Et
[
Qt ,t+1D t+1
Et+1
]
≤ D t
Et
+W ∗t N∗t +T ∗t , (4.5)
with an asterisk denoting a foreign variable and Et the nominal exchange rate, defined
as the price of foreign currency in terms of home currency.
Price indices are the result of expenditure minimization for a given level of consump-
tion. This minimization leads to the following outcomes: The consumer price index
(CPI) comprises all consumption goods, i.e., domestic and foreign goods, and is given
by
Pt ≡ [(1−α)P 1−ηH ,t +αP
1−η
F,t ]
1
1−η . (4.6)
PH ,t and PF,t are the price indices of domestic and foreign goods, respectively, and are
given by
P j ,t ≡
(∫ 1
0
P j ,t (i )
1−εdi
) 1
1−ε
∀ j ∈ {H ,F } . (4.7)
Here, ε measures the elasticity of substitution between firms i within each country.
The same equations hold for the rest of the world, with the slight difference that, since
the rest of the world’s imports from the small open economy are so small, their weight-
ing coefficient α∗ is assumed to be negligible. This means that P∗H ,t , the price index of
domestic products in foreign currency, has no influence on the world consumer price
index for limα∗→0. This implies P∗F,t = P∗t , where an asterisk denotes the world econ-
omy.
The first differences of the logarithms of the price levels are the CPI inflation pit ≡
log(Pt )− log(Pt−1) and the domestic goods (price index) inflation piH ,t ≡ log(PH ,t )−
log(PH ,t−1).4 For the world economy it follows from above that pi∗F,t =pi∗t .
4Throughout the paper small, Latin letters are used to denote that log-linearization around the steady
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Competitive Equilibrium: Firms
A firm’s profits are turnover minus total costs, PH ,t (i )Yt (i )− (1−τ)Wt Nt (i ), where the
employment subsidy τ lowers the costs of labor. Thus, nominal marginal costs5 are
MC nt = (1−τ)Wt /At . In the Calvo (1983) staggered price setting scheme, the possibility
to reset prices cannot be guaranteed at every period: each period, only the fraction 1−θ
of the firms can reset prices.6 Denoting a newly set price by P H ,t (i ), a representative
firm i faces the following maximization problem:7
max
P H ,t (i )
∞∑
k=0
θk Et {Qt ,t+k [Yt+k (i )(P H ,t (i )−MC nt+k )]} , (4.8)
subject to the demand function
Yt+k (i )≤
(
P H ,t
PH ,t+k
)−ε
(CH ,t+k +
1
1−κC
∗
H ,t+k )≡ Y dt+k (P H ,t ). (4.9)
Competitive Equilibrium: Governments
Domestic fiscal policy is faced with the following budget constraint:
Tt =
∫ 1
0 τWt Nt (i )di , with T lump sum taxes and τ an employment subsidy. The fiscal
authority acts solely to offset the distortion through monopolistic competition. World
fiscal policy symmetric, with variables T ∗t , τ
∗, W ∗t , N
∗
t (i ). Monetary policy in the rest
of the world is assumed to follow a Taylor-type rule that fully stabilizes its inflation
rate and the output gap. For the small open economy, I deviate from GM, who look
at the three different monetary policy regimes domestic inflation targeting (DIT), CPI
inflation targeting (CIT) and an exchange rate peg. Instead, to make the model more
realistic and to alleviate the model’s capability to match empirical data, I follow Clarida
et al. (1998) and include a Taylor rule (TR):
rt = r r t +ΦpipiH ,t +Φy (yt − y¯t ) , (4.10)
state has taken place. For the inflation rates given in the text, this steady state can be dropped, as it is
zero. More on the steady state is provided in Section 5.3.1 in the appendix.
5Observe that nominal total costs T C nt (i ) = (1− τ)Wt Nt (i ) = (1− τ)Wt Yt (i )/At , so that MC nt (i ) =
∂TC nt (i )/∂Yt (i )= (1−τ)Wt /At .
6The assumption is “that each price-setter (or firm) is allowed to change his price whenever a random
signal is ’lit up’, see Calvo (1983, p. 383).
7The maximization problem is derived and explained in Section 5.3.5 in the appendix.
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where r is a nominal short-term interest rate, r r the natural interest rate, piH the do-
mestic goods inflation rate, and y¯t the natural level of output.8
Competitive Equilibrium: Trade
There are three exchange rates in this model. The nominal exchange rate is the price of
foreign currency in terms of home currency. As in OR, I allow for “iceberg"-type costs
of trade in the goods market like transportation costs, tariffs etc. These costs affect
the economy in such a way that only a fraction 1−κ of each good exported arrives at
the destination market, whereas the other fraction κ “melts away" in the trade process.
As markets are competitive internationally, arbitrage considerations force this effect
to show up in cross-border price index relations. For the price of foreign goods, this
implies:
P∗F,tEt = (1−κ)PF,t , (4.11)
whereas for the price of home goods, these have to sell cheaper abroad:
(1−κ)P∗H ,tEt = PH ,t . (4.12)
Log-linearizing (4.11) and (4.12) around the steady state and rearranging results in
pF,t = et +p∗F,t (4.13)
pH ,t = et +p∗H ,t , (4.14)
where lower bar letters denote log-deviations of the upper bar letters around steady
state, which is described in Section 5.3.1 in the appendix. The terms of trade are the
price of foreign goods in terms of home goods. In the small open economy, this might
read S soet = PF,t /PH ,t , whereas for the world economy this is S worldt = P∗F,t /P∗H ,t . No-
tice, however, that the terms of trade in the last two equations differ by the constant
factor (1−κ)2, according to Equations (4.11) and (4.12). One could choose either the
small open economy’s price ratio or the world economy’s price ratio for the definition
of the terms of trade – or something in between. Following Samuelson (1954), I define
intermediate terms of trade:9
St ≡ (1−κ)
PF,t
PH ,t
= 1
1−κ
P∗F,t
P∗H ,t
. (4.15)
8The expression “natural" is meant to indicate a situation without nominal frictions.
9With this “intermediate" definition, I also make sure that the steady state terms of trade are equal to
unity, as it is the case in GM. See also Galí and Monacelli (2005b, Appendix A).
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For the log-linear terms of trade,
st = pF,t −pH ,t , (4.16)
since p∗F,t = p∗t as limα∗→0. The real exchange rate is the ratio of the two consumer price
indices, measured in domestic currency:
Qt ≡ Et P∗t /Pt . (4.17)
In terms of log deviations from steady state, the log real exchange rate qt ≡ log(Qt )−
log(Q) is given as follows:
qt = et +p∗t −pt . (4.18)
Because of the producer currency pricing trade costs have no influence on the firms’
decisions of price setting. The law of one price obviously holds only in the case of zero
trade costs. If domestic goods and foreign goods price indices were equal (pH ,t = pF,t ),
αwould measure the share of foreign goods’ consumption, which could be interpreted
as a degree of openness. In this model instead, Section 5.3.1 in the appendix shows
that I have a steady state where P¯H = (1−κ)P¯F . The situation around such a steady
state can be expressed through log-linearization of (4.6) as
pt = (1−α′)pH ,t +α′pF,t , (4.19)
where α′ ≡ α/[α+ (1−α)(1−κ)1−η].10 This equation, derived in Section 5.3.1 in the
appendix, can be combined with Equation (4.16) to obtain the following relationship
between domestic CPI and the terms of trade:
pt = pH ,t +α′st (4.20)
Replacing pF,t in Equation (4.16) by Equation (4.13) and plugging the result in (4.18)
gives rise to a relationship between the domestic CPI, the terms of trade and the real
exchange rate:
qt = (1−α′)st . (4.21)
Nominal net exports are given by
PH ,t N X t = PH ,t Yt −PtCt . (4.22)
10Note that α′ =α as in GM for κ= 0.
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As Section 5.3.3 of the appendix shows, log-linearizing this equation around the steady
state results in
nxt = yt − PC
PH Y
(ct +α′st ), (4.23)
where the steady state ratio PCPH Y depends on the parameters α, κ, η and σ and equals
unity in the case of zero trade costs.
Competitive Equilibrium: Market Clearing
Since there is no possibility to invest in capital, and as the small open economy is neg-
ligible for the rest of the world, the foreign country’s goods market is cleared if output
supply equals its own consumption:
Y ∗t =C∗t . (4.24)
In the small open economy, output is consumed at home or abroad. However, because
a fraction κ of the bundle exported “melts away" in the trade process, consumption
abroad is only 1−κ times the domestic bundle intended for export, C∗H ,t = (1−κ)(Yt −
CH ,t ). Hence, in the small open economy goods market clearing is given by
Yt =CH ,t + 1
1−κC
∗
H ,t . (4.25)
In the labor markets, firms set wages so that their demand of labor is supplied by the
domestic agents. The international asset market is cleared as the nominal portfolio is
in zero net supply. On the currency market, each countries’ central bank supplies the
amount of currency that is demanded.
Definition 4. Given policy rules for Rt , an equilibrium is an allocation
{D t ,Ct , (C j ,t ) j∈{H ,F }, (Ci , j ,t )i∈[0,1],Lt ,Yt , (Y j ,t ) j∈{H ,F }, (Yi , j ,t )i∈[0,1]}∞t=0 and a price system
{Wt ,Pt , (P j ,t ) j∈{H ,F }, (Pi , j ,t )i∈[0,1]}∞t=0, such that
1. given prices, the allocation maximizes the utility of the household,
2. given prices and the demand function for Yi , j ,t , the allocation maximizes the prof-
its of the firms, subject to the Calvo-sticky prices,
3. markets clear,
4. the policy rule is consistent with allocation and prices.
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4.2.3 Analysis
Analysis: Households
The expenditures of the representative household are distributed optimally between
all firms of a country as well as between home country and the rest of the world in the
aggregate. The allocations will be:
C j ,t (i )=
(
P j ,t (i )
P j ,t
)−ε
C j ,t ∀ j ∈ {H ,F } (4.26)
within each country, and for total consumption:
CH ,t = (1−α)
(
PH ,t
Pt
)−η
Ct and CF,t =α
(
PF,t
Pt
)−η
Ct . (4.27)
Maximizing the household’s utility function leads to a standard intratemporal equation
linking marginal utilities of labor and consumption to the real wage:
Cσt N
ϕ
t =
Wt
Pt
(4.28)
and a typical Euler equation:
βRt Et
((Ct+1
Ct
)−σ( Pt
Pt+1
))
= 1 . (4.29)
Log-linearization yields
wt −pt =σct +ϕnt and ct = Et {ct+1}− 1
σ
(rt −Et {pit+1}). (4.30)
As shown in the appendix Section 5.3.4, Equation (4.29) and its world analog11 can be
combined and iterated to get a relation for consumption in both economies:
Ct =ϑC∗t Q
1
σ
t , (4.31)
where the parameter ϑ depends on initial conditions regarding the relative size of the
small open economy.12 In log-deviations and using Equation (4.21), the last equation
11 Under complete markets for nominal state contingent securities (see Monacelli 2005),
βRt Et [(
C∗t+1
C∗t
)−σ( P
∗
t
P∗t+1
)( EtEt+1 )]= 1 holds.
12It is assumed that the initial distribution of wealth fulfills ϑ = α∗α , i. e. equals the ratio of the two
economies’ import valuations.
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becomes
ct = c∗t +
(
1−α′
σ
)
st . (4.32)
Analysis: Firms
Aggregation of individual firms’ production functions and log-linearizing around the
steady state yields the (log) supply of output
yt = nt +at . (4.33)
In every period, firm i has a probability of (1−θ) that it is allowed to adjust its price. If
this is the case in period t , and as each firm has market power, it sets its new price P H ,t
with a markup over marginal costs so that for the expected duration of that price the
present discounted value of its expected earnings is maximized. Given the maximiza-
tion problem of Equations (4.8) and (4.9) and as shown in appendix Section 5.3.5, the
log-linear price setting rule is
p H ,t = (1−βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k Et {m̂c
n
t+k } , (4.34)
where p H ,t is the newly set price in period t and m̂c
n
t is the log-deviation of nominal
marginal costs around the steady state. As appendix Section 5.3.6 shows, the inflation
dynamics in the small open economy and in the world economy are given by
piH ,t =βEt {piH ,t+1}+λ(m̂c t ) and pi∗t =βEt {pi∗t+1}+λ(m̂c∗t ) , (4.35)
where λ≡ (1−θ)(1−βθ)θ .
Analysis: Governments
Both fiscal policy authorities set their employment subsidy to offset monopolistic dis-
tortion. For reasons of comparability with GM I rely on their values,13 i. e. for the small
open economy
τ= 1− ε−1
(1−α)ε and τ
∗ = 1
ε
(4.36)
13GM derive these values under the special case in which σ = η = 1 holds. See Galí and Monacelli
(2002, pp. 22ff.).
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for the world economy, where the α∗-term drops as the degree of openness there is
essentially zero.
Monetary policy in the world economy leads to a fully stable world output gap and
world inflation rate, so that I can set both variables to zero:
y˜∗t =pi∗t = 0.
This drives the world interest rate to its natural level, so that I get
r ∗t =−σ(1−ρ∗a)
1+ϕ
σ+ϕa
∗
t . (4.37)
The authority for monetary policy in the small open economy follows the Taylor rule
given in Equation (4.10). Alternatively, I also analyze a strict domestic inflation target-
ing (DIT) policy, a domestic inflation targeting rule (DITR), a CPI targeting rule (CITR)
and an exchange rate peg (PEG).
Analysis: Canonical Representation
The model can be written in four equations, a Phillips curve and a dynamic IS curve
for both the small open and the world economy. Denoting a variable’s deviation from
its natural level that would pertain in a flexible price world by an upper tilde, the equa-
tions are:
piH ,t =βEt {piH ,t+1}+ΦN K PC y˜t (4.38)
pi∗t =βEt {pi∗t+1}+ΦN K PC∗ y˜∗t (4.39)
y˜t = Et {y˜t+1}− ω
σ
(rt −Et {piH ,t+1}− r r ′t ) (4.40)
y˜∗t = Et {y˜∗t+1}−
1
σ
(r ∗t −Et {pi∗t+1}− r r ∗t ) , (4.41)
where ΦN K PC ≡ λ
(
σ
ω +ϕ
)
, ω ≡ ση+ (1−ση)(1−α′)(1− α1−κΦ−1SS2) with α′ defined after
Equation (4.19) and ΦSS2 after Equation (4.23), and ΦN K PC∗ ≡ λ(σ+ϕ). The r r -terms
are the natural expected rates of interest in the small open and the world economy,
respectively, which would prevail under completely flexible prices. They are given by
r r t ≡−σ(1+ϕ)(1−ρa)
σ+ωϕ at −ϕ
σ (1−ω)
σ+ωϕ Et {∆y
∗
t+1} (4.42)
and
r r ∗t ≡−σ(1−ρ∗a)
1+ϕ
σ+ϕa
∗
t . (4.43)
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A derivation of these equations is given in appendix Section 5.3.7. Together with rules
for monetary policies and the exogenous stochastic processes, the model is complete.
4.3 Puzzles and Deduced Moments
This section briefly states the six puzzling data observations, as collected by OR. It then
focuses on the specific moments of the data that may be used to evaluate the corre-
sponding moments of the model and thereby the model’s fit. In choosing these data
moments I often allow for a wide range of values. This is the consequence of the exist-
ing variability in observation moments across time and countries.
4.3.1 Home Bias in Trade (Puzzle 1)
In an Arrow-Debreu world of complete international markets without any barriers to
trade, an equal amount of products is traded across international and intra-national
borders, so that borders do not matter for trade. In reality, we see that there is sig-
nificantly less trade across international borders, i.e., domestic products are preferred.
This is pointed out by e. g. McCallum (1995) for the example of the U.S. versus Canada.
McCallum found 22 times less trade across the border than across interstate borders in
Canada or in the U.S. In a more careful study, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) ar-
gue that borders reduce trade between industrialized countries by 29 percent or, in the
case of U.S. - Canadian trade, by 44 percent.
OR propose to use the ratio of domestic consumption expenditure on home goods to
domestic consumption expenditure on imported goods as moment for the home bias
in trade. They argue that 4.2 is a reasonable value for OECD countries. This implies a
home share in consumption of about 80 percent. Clearly, this number depends on the
size of the country considered: the smaller the country, the fewer goods are produced
domestically, and the lower the number gets. As a starting point, I take values above
unity as consistent with a home bias. To rule out too distinct a bias, I set an upper limit
of 19, implying a home share in consumption of 95 percent. Hence, my first moment
is the steady state ratio
P1= PHCH
PF CF
= 1−α
α
(1−κ)1−η ∈ [1;19], (4.44)
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depending only on home bias parameter α, trade costs κ and international substitu-
tion elasticity η, according to Equations (4.27) and (4.15), evaluated at the steady state.
4.3.2 Feldstein-Horioka (Puzzle 2)
If one supposes that capital can move freely across countries and people are free to
invest their money wherever they want, one would suspect that rising savings in one
economy do not necessarily imply rising investments in the same country. If condi-
tions for investment are temporarily better abroad, the savings should all be directed
to foreign countries, leaving investments in the home country constant or reducing
them. With this in mind one would expect a low correlation between savings and in-
vestment in open economies with free capital movements. Instead, the data shows a
high positive correlation: Feldstein and Horioka (1980) found a coefficient of 0.89 for
16 OECD countries between 1960 and 1974. A regression for a 22 OECD country sample
between 1982-91 by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, p. 162) results in a coefficient of 0.62,
while the latest regression by the same authors (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2000b, Table 1)
for the 24 OECD countries between 1990-97 yields 0.60. Although there is a decreasing
trend, the absolute value of the correlation coefficient is still large.
To evaluate where the model’s savings are invested, one has to solve for the country
portfolios. Given that I use a log-linear approximation to find the model solution,
this is not an easy task, for two reasons, as pointed out by Devereux and Sutherland
(2007, p.9): “Firstly, the equilibrium portfolio is indeterminate in a first-order approx-
imation of the model. And secondly, the equilibrium portfolio is indeterminate in
the non-stochastic steady state.” Recently, researchers have drawn their attention to
this problem and have come up with different solution approaches, e.g. Coeurdacier
and Gourinchas (2008), Coeurdacier (2009), Devereux and Sutherland (2007) and En-
gel and Matsumoto (2008).14 One finding of these papers highlighted in Coeurdacier
and Gourinchas (2008) is that in a complete markets model, “the equilibrium equity
portfolios are extremely sensitive to the values of preference parameters. Whether the
coefficient of relative risk aversion is smaller, bigger than or equal to unity, whether do-
mestic and foreign goods are substitute or complements, equity portfolios can exhibit
home, foreign, or no bias. In other words, this class of models predict delivers equity
portfolios that are unstable.” Because of this, and because of comparability between
my results and those derived in Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b), in the following I stick to
the approach OR take to address this puzzle. They built a stylized model to show that
14A lucid summary of the recent developments is given in Obstfeld (2007).
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“countries running current account surpluses should have lower real interest rates than
countries running deficits.”15 This implies a negative correlation between net exports
nxt and the domestic real interest rate rt −pit . So I take as the second moment
P2=Corr(nxt ,rt −pit ) ∈ [−1;0]. (4.45)
Of course, one may cast doubts on this correlation as adequate translation of the
Feldstein-Horioka puzzle, and indeed Jeanne (2000) has raised concerns against this
approach. But for the current study, I leave this issue unresolved and take the moment
at face value.
4.3.3 Home Bias in Equity Portfolio (Puzzle 3)
In 2005, Canadians held about 76 percent of their equity wealth in their domestic stock
market. However, the Canadian equity market capitalization accounted for less than
four percent of the world equity market capitalization. In a world of complete risk di-
versification, this pronounced home bias is difficult to explain. The average home bias
across 20 OECD countries is 70 percent, ranging from 31 percent for the Netherlands
to above 90 percent for countries like Japan, Greece or Russia.16 In my model, there is
free and costless trade in a complete set of state-contingent Arrow-Debreu securities.
Under complete markets, consumption shares are equal to shares in world wealth. Ob-
stfeld and Rogoff (1996, Section 5.3) show that (given zero trade costs) these shares are
also equal to portfolio shares. For the special case in which σ = 1/η holds, the Arrow-
Debreu allocation is identical to a world where trade is only in equity shares.17 In that
case one can thus evaluate home bias in equity portfolios directly. For the more gen-
eral case where σ 6= 1/η, OR show that consumption shares are nonetheless relatively
constant over a wide range of parameter combinations and are thus a good approxi-
mation to equity portfolio shares.18 Hence, I follow OR and rely on steady state con-
sumption shares as an indicator for equity portfolio shares. I define the small open
economy’s steady state home bias equivalently to the portfolio home bias definition
given in Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2008):19 Home bias is given as one minus the
share of foreign equities (consumption) in the small open economy’s equity holdings
15See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b, p.358) and Table 3 therein for empirical evidence.
16Data from Sercu and Vanpee (2008), as reprinted in Coeurdacier and Gourinchas (2008).
17See OR and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, Sections 5.2 and 5.3).
18See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b, pp. 363 and Table 4). Obstfeld (2007) emends an approximation
error, which nonetheless does not overturn the general picture.
19The last page shows a reprint of the 2007 version of Sercu and Vanpee (2008). The published version
avoids the term “home bias".
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(total consumption), divided by the share of foreign equities (consumption in the rest
of the world) in the total market portfolio (overall consumption). By definition the
home bias is zero in case the share of domestic equities (consumption) in the small
open economy is equal to the share of domestic equities (consumption) in the total
world portfolio (consumption). Hence, my third moment is
P3= 1−
CF
C
C∗
C+C∗
= 1− (1+ϑΦ
1
σ
PHP )αΦ
−η
PF P ∈ [0.32;0.92]. (4.46)
Notice that I have used Equations (4.31) and (4.27) at the steady state to rephrase the
equation. One can see that the moment depends on the parameters α, η, κ and α∗
only, where the last parameter is assumed to be fixed.
4.3.4 Low International Consumption Correlation (Puzzle 4)
If risks were pooled internationally, changes in consumption would be perfectly cor-
related across countries to hedge against country specific risk. However, in the real
world this is not the case. Despite the intuitive relative consumption smoothing argu-
ment, consumption is even less correlated internationally than is output: compared to
the “world" analog, the correlation of consumption growth in the OECD countries lies
somewhere between 0.27 for Italy and 0.63 for Germany, with an average of 0.43. At the
same time, output growth correlations are nearly always higher, between 0.42 for Japan
and 0.70 for Canada and Germany, with an average of 0.52.20 Backus et al. (1995, Tables
1 and 2) report correlations relative to the U.S. instead of a “world" analog. Hence, they
have slightly different numbers, but generally the same findings. Moreover, they find
productivity21 to be internationally less correlated than output. They call this puzzle
“the consumption/output/productivity anomaly, or the quantity anomaly".22 I choose
the ratio of consumption to output correlations as my fourth moment, which is be-
tween about 0.5 for Italy and about 1 for the U.K.:
P4= Corr(ct ,c
∗
t )
Corr(yt , y∗t )
∈ [0.5;1]. (4.47)
20Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, p. 291), data from Penn World Tables for the period 1973 to 1993. The
“world" analog means 35 benchmark countries.
21Productivity is measured by the Solow residual z of a standard Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = Zt K θt N 1−θt .
22Backus et al. (1995, p. 343).
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4.3.5 Purchasing Power Parity (Puzzle 5)
Rogoff (1996) phrases the purchasing power parity puzzle question as follows: “How
can one reconcile the enormous short-term volatility of real exchange rates with the
extremely slow rate at which shocks appear to damp out?"23 The standard deviation
of the real exchange rate typically amounts to about eight percent.24 The autocorre-
lation of the real exchange rate Corr(qt , qt−1) is about 0.83.25 As this puzzle has two
dimensions, I collect two data moments based on Chari et al. (2002):
P51= Std(qt )= 7.52 (4.48)
P52=Corr(qt , qt−1)= 0.83. (4.49)
4.3.6 Exchange Rate Disconnect (Puzzle 6)
Another fact concerning the real, but also to the nominal exchange rate is the missing
of a strong connection to any other macroeconomic variable. This feature can be ex-
amined from two points of view: a) a connection could be seen if the high volatility
of exchange rates would have an effect on the volatility of some other macroeconomic
variable. In this respect, the disconnect shows up in a situation in which, “while ex-
change rate volatility is ultimately tied to volatility in the fundamental shocks to the
economy, the exchange rate can display extremely high volatility without any implica-
tions for the volatility of other macroeconomic variables."26 As Flood and Rose (1995)
show, moving from floating to fixed exchange rates or into the other direction does not
influence the volatility of other macroeconomic variables. b) The disconnect is also a
question of correlations between the exchange rate and other variables such as output
or prices. Kollmann (2001, p. 254) reports correlations with domestic GDP between
-0.21 and 0.15 for Japanese, German and U.K. post-Bretton Woods data, on average -
0.07 for the nominal and -0.01 for the real exchange rate. As for the previous puzzle, I
select two moments: first, the standard deviation of the real U.S. $ exchange rate rela-
23Rogoff (1996, p. 647).
24Chari et al. (2002, Table 2) report 7.52 percent for quarterly, logged, Hodrick-Prescott (HP)-filtered
European post-Bretton Woods real exchange rates relative to the U.S. Dollar, Kollmann (2001, p. 254)
reports 8.89 percent for an average of Germany, Japan and the U.K. versus the U.S.
25Chari et al. (2002, Table 1) report values between 0.77 and 0.86 for quarterly, logged, Hodrick-Prescott
(HP)-filtered European post-Bretton Woods data relative to the U.S. Dollar, with an average of 0.83. Koll-
mann (2001, p. 254) comes to a value of 0.78 for a slightly shorter time span of data for Japan, Germany
and the U.K.
26Devereux and Engel (2002, p. 4).
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tive to that of real GDP, which is 4.36 percent, according to Chari et al. (2002).27 Second,
the contemporaneous correlation between the real U.S. $ exchange rate and real GDP,
which Chari et al. (2002) report to be 0.08.28
P61= Std(qt )/Std(yt )= 4.36 (4.50)
P62=Corr(qt , yt )= 0.08. (4.51)
While puzzles 1 and 3 follow immediately from the model’s steady state, the remaining
moments are obtained from simulations of the model. I average the moments of 500
simulations of 100 periods length.
4.4 Parametrization
For the specification of parameter values I will make use of three different procedures.
In a first step, I use calibration to obtain values for those parameters that have (a)
agreed upon values in the literature and (b) no significant effect on the model out-
come with respect to the six puzzles. In a second step, I identify a set of parameter val-
ues via estimation.This procedure is applied to parameters that have a close relation-
ship to observable data, like exogenous processes and the Taylor rule. The third step
is choosing the remaining parameter values to minimize the distance between simu-
lated moments from the model and the moments implied by the “six puzzles". This
procedure is applied in Jermann (1998) to “maximize the model’s ability to match a set
of moments of interest"29. A textbook treatment under the label Simulated Method of
Moments Estimation (SMM) is given in Canova (2007, Section 5.5.2).
I use data for Canada versus the U.S. for two reasons. First, because of its relative size
and proximity to the U.S., Canada is “a prototype small open economy".30 Not only
is Canada a relatively small country, it also trades mainly with the U.S.31 so that the
assumption of the U.S. as the rest of the world seems especially plausible. Second,
Galí and Monacelli (2005b) use Canadian data for their numerical analysis. So it seems
fair to stick to the same data when putting the model to test. The dataset used for the
analysis is the one built by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002), added by central bank
27See Table 5 in Chari et al. (2002). Kollmann (2001, Table 1) reports 8.891.52 = 5.85 percent.
28See Table 6 in Chari et al. (2002). Kollmann (2001, Table 1) reports -0.01.
29Jermann (1998, p. 264).
30Galí and Monacelli (2005b, p. 723).
31According to en.wikipedia.org, about 80 percent of Canadian exports go to and about two
thirds of Canadian imports come from the U.S.
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short term interest rates obtained from IFS. It contains quarterly macroeconomic data
for Canada and the U.S. from 1973:1 till 2000:1, obtained from the IMF’s IFS and the
OECD.32 The data are seasonally adjusted, in logs, and HP-filtered. The series contain
real GDP, consumption, net exports, CPI price level, PPI price level, nominal and real
exchange rate, terms of trade and employment. Series for technology are obtained by
use of Equation (4.33) and its world analog.33
4.4.1 Calibrated Parameter Values
Results for the first procedure (calibration) are given in column two of Table 4.1. Mostly,
the values were chosen in accordance with those of the GM model. The (quarterly)
discount factor β is set to 0.987 according to Cooley and Prescott (1995, p. 21). The net
steady state markup µ of roughly 20 percent over marginal costs is consistent with the
findings of Rotemberg and Woodford (1995, pp. 260-261) as well as Schmitt-Grohé and
Uribe (2004, p. 11). With µ fixed I have already set the elasticity of substitution between
different firms within a country ε to be six, through µ= log(ε)− log(ε−1) from Section
5.3.7 in the appendix. The labor supply elasticity 1/ϕ is fixed at 1/ϕ= 1/3, like in GM.
Benigno (2004) proposes a value of 0.67, whereas Blanchard and Fischer (1989) report
a low value between 0 and 0.45.34 Yun (1996) calibrates his model with 1/ϕ = 1/4. I
also tested values between zero and unity and found that the model’s performance is
not affected. Finally, the degree of openness parameter for the world economy α∗ has
to be fixed close to zero to maintain the small open economy assumption.
4.4.2 Estimated Parameter Values
The second procedure was applied for the Taylor rule (TR). Again, results are given
in Table 4.1, columns three and four. For t estimation of the Taylor rule for Canada I
follow the example of Clarida et al. (1998) and use the generalized method of moments
(GMM). Instruments are eight lags of inflation, output gap and interest rate (R2 = 0.82,
standard errors in parentheses).
rt = 0.90
(0.02)
∗ rt−1+ (1−0.9)∗ (2.20
(0.15)
∗pit+1+ 2.43
(0.83)
∗ (yt − y¯t ))+εMt . (4.52)
32The original dataset contains data 17 OECD countries and a longer sample period for most series,
which allows for an extended analysis in future work.
33This results in the standard correlation pattern given e.g. in Uhlig (2003).
34See Blanchard and Fischer (1989), Chapters 7 and 8, especially pp. 338-342 and 388.
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For the estimation of the stochastic processes I rely on Galí and Monacelli (2005b).
They assume AR(1) processes for log Canadian labor productivity and log U.S. GDP
and obtain
at = 0.66
(0.06)
at−1+²t , Std(²)= 0.0071 (4.53)
y∗t = 0.86
(0.04)
y∗t−1+²∗t , Std(²∗)= 0.0078 (4.54)
with a correlation between the two shocks of 0.3. Standard errors are given in paren-
theses. It is clear that the international correlation of productivity shocks will have an
influence on the puzzle outcomes. Especially the international consumption correla-
tion and the real exchange rate correlation would be significantly affected if I took this
parameter as free in my minimization procedure laid out below. Nonetheless, I abstain
from making use of this opportunity as I regard this parameter to be given by the data.
4.4.3 Simulated Method of Moments Parameter Values
Applying the third procedure, I single out five parameters that mainly influence the
model’s features relative to the six puzzles or, in the case of price stickiness, are key to
this class of models. These are the international substitution elasticity η, the constant
of relative risk aversion σ, the small open economy’s openness parameter α, the Calvo
price stickiness parameter for both economies θ = θ∗ and the trade costs parameter κ.
Let Θ1 be the vector of these five model parameters: Θ1 = [η,σ,α,θ,κ]′. I choose Θ1 in
order to minimize
ℑ= [Θ2− f (Θ1)]′Ω[Θ2− f (Θ1)], (4.55)
where Θ2 = [P1,P2,P3,P4,P51,P52,P61,P62]′ is the vector of moments to be mat-
ched, given by equations (4.44) to (4.51). f (Θ1) is a 8× 1 vector which contains the
corresponding moments generated by the model. The weighting matrixΩ is chosen as
a diagonal matrix with the inverse of each data mean as the diagonal elements. Since
many of the data moments are given in target ranges, the expression Θ2− f (Θ1) is not
trivial. Following Uhlig (2004), I allow for these ranges by combining maximum and
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minimum functions:
Θ2− f (Θ1)=

min(19 − f (Θ1)1,0)+max(1 − f (Θ1)1,0)
min(0 − f (Θ1)2,0)+max(−1 − f (Θ1)2,0)
min(0.92− f (Θ1)3,0)+max(0.32− f (Θ1)3,0)
min(1 − f (Θ1)4,0)+max(0.5 − f (Θ1)4,0)
7.52− f (Θ1)5
0.83− f (Θ1)6
4.36− f (Θ1)7
0.08− f (Θ1)8

. (4.56)
For the minimization process, the model solution has to be calculated. This is done
using standard techniques, as explained in Uhlig (1999). To minimize the criterion
functionℑ, I furthermore need to set starting values and boundaries to the parameters
inΘ1.
The elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods η typically takes val-
ues between unity, as in Galí and Monacelli (2005b) and something as high as 20, as
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b) say. In between lie η = 1.5 as in Backus et al. (1995, pp.
346-347.) and the OR benchmark of η = 6. The higher the substitutability between
domestic and foreign goods, the bigger the home biases get. But there is a theoretical
qualification to this. The elasticity of substitution between different domestic goods ε
is set to six, in order to allow for a steady state markup of 20 percent above marginal
costs. It seems unrealistic that substitutability is much higher internationally than in-
tranationally. Engel (2000) raises exactly this question at the end of his comment on
the “Six Puzzles"; he proposes the intranational elasticity to be twice as high as the in-
ternational. I follow his suggestion and restrict η to be between 1 and 12. As a a starting
value, I set η= 3.
The risk aversion parameter σ, also the inverse of the intertemporal rate of substitu-
tion, is difficult to determine: GM and Yun (1996) use σ= 1, implying log utility of con-
sumption. Erceg, Henderson, and Levine (2000, p. 299) use 1.5 for σ, Cochrane calls
values between one and two standard,35 Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) choose a
high value of σ= 5 and argue that this is needed to obtain volatile exchange rates. Like
GM, I use σ= 1 as my starting value and allow it to be between 0.2 and as much as 10,
which is also the upper bound in Anderson and van Wincoop (2004).
The degree of openness parameter α should be between zero and unity, where one
35Cochrane (1997, p. 15). The asset pricing literature yields for even higher values to explain the equity
premium puzzle.
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half implies no home bias and more than one half is a bias towards foreign goods. GM
choose α = 0.4 as their baseline value to match the import to GDP ratio for Canada.
I follow them with my starting value and set the boundaries to zero and 0.9, where
the upper boundary implies a bias towards foreign goods. This might be especially
reasonable for very small countries which produce only a restricted subset of all goods.
The Calvo sticky price parameter θ = θ∗, assumed to be identical across countries, is
typically set to 0.75, implying an average price duration of four quarters, 11−θ = 4. This
is also my starting value. In the SMM estimation, I choose θ from the interval [0.0,0.9],
implying price changes between every quarter and every 10th quarter.
Finally, the trade costs’ starting value is set to 25 percent, the value OR choose as their
“baseline". Midrigan (2007) chooses a distribution of trade costs that replicates mo-
ments of certain export shares. He comes up with trade costs between 2 percent and
48 percent, with a mean of 20 percent. Relative to the sources reported in OR, 20 or 25
percent are high, but taking into account that about a half of total output is nontraded,
the number might become more reasonable. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) report
a 170 percent tax equivalent of trade costs. This number breaks down into 21 percent
transportation costs, 44 precent border related trade barriers, and 55 percent retail and
wholesale distribution costs. Of course, “iceberg” trade costs cannot be bigger than
unity, as unit trade costs lead to autarky of the two then closed economies. Given the
degree of uncertainty about this parameter, I hardly restrict the SMM estimation using
the interval [0.0;0.9].
Boundaries and starting values for the parameters inΘ1 are given in columns four and
two of Table 4.1. The resulting estimates are given in column five of the same table.
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Table 4.1: Benchmark Parameter Values
Parameter Calibration Estimation SMM Range SMM Explanation
Preferences
β 0.987 – – – Discount factor
η 3.00 – [1.0;12] 1.0 Elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods
ε 6.00 – – Elasticity of substitution among goods within each category
σ 1.00 – [0.2;10] 3.15 Constant of relative risk aversion
ϕ 3.00 – – – Inverse of labor supply elasticity
α 0.40 – [0.0;0.9] 0.05 Degree of openness of the small open economy
α∗ 0.001 – – – Degree of openness of the world economy
Technology
θ = θ∗ 0.75 – [0.0;0.9] 0.78 Percentage of firms that cannot (re)set prices in period t
µ 0.182 – – – Log of the gross steady state markup
κ 0.25 – [0.0;0.9] 0.39 Trade costs
Monetary Policy
ρT R – 0.90 (0.02) – – Degree of interest rate smoothing
βT R – 2.20 (0.15) – – Coefficient on next period inflation
γT R – 2.43 (0.83) – – Coefficient on output gap
Processes
σ² – 0.0071(–) – – Standard deviation of domestic productivity shock
σ²∗ – 0.0078(–) – – Standard deviation of world GDP shock
ρa – 0.66 (0.06) – – Autocorrelation of domestic productivity AR(1) process
ρ∗y – 0.86 (0.04) – – Autocorrelation of world GDP AR(1) process
ρa,y∗ – 0.30 (–) – – Cross-correlation of productivity shocks
Notes: Column 2 includes calibrated values as well as the starting values for the SMM estimation, column 3 has standard errors in parentheses, column 4 shows the
allowed values for the simulated method of moments estimation and column 5 gives the SMM estimates.
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4.5 Results
As the title of this paper might suggest, the results of this model are not too bad. Table
4.2 reports how the thus parameterized model performs against the six puzzles.
Table 4.2: Baseline Results for the Taylor Rule Model
Criterion Moment Value Lower Data Upper
Puzzle 1 PHCH /(PF CF ) 19.36 1 19
Puzzle 2 Corr(nxt ,rt −pit ) -0.48 -1 0
Puzzle 3 1− CF /CC∗/(C+C∗) 0.97 0.32 0.92
Puzzle 4 Corr(ct ,c∗t )/Corr(yt , y
∗
t ) 2.83 0.5 1
Puzzle 51 Std(qt ) 1.97 7.52
Puzzle 52 Corr(qt , qt−1) 0.61 0.83
Puzzle 61 Std(qt )/Std(yt ) 3.13 4.36
Puzzle 62 Corr(qt , yt ) 0.63 0.08
Notes: The baseline results use the parametrization given in Table 4.1. In particular, κ = 0.39, θ = 0.78,
α= 0.05, η= 1 and σ= 3.15. “Data" refers to the target ranges or values discussed in Section 4.3.
We see that with sizeable trade costs of close to 40 percent and a small degree of open-
ness parameter, implying a steady state import share of only five percent, the model
is able to replicate strong home biases in consumption and in equity portfolio. These
biases are slightly above what is observed for typical small OECD countries, but not by
much. Puzzle 2 in its translated form is nicely replicated: The correlation between net
exports and the real interest rate is right in the range of what OR estimated for OECD
countries. A high relative risk aversion of more than three, low international substi-
tutability and a small degree of openness lead to volatile real exchange rates. This is
in accordance with the argument in Hau (2002) that less open economies experience a
higher exchange rate volatility. Compared to the model results with calibrated param-
eter values, the number for real exchange rate volatility is extraordinarily big: Nonethe-
less, the volatility is not as big as in the data, both per se and relative to GDP volatility.
With respect to the correlation pattern of the real exchange rate the findings are mixed:
The autocorrelation of the real exchange rate is a bit low in the model, the correlation
with GDP is too big. The perhaps worst outcome concerns the consumption correla-
tion puzzle. The ratio of correlations is 2.83, which is way above the expected value of
less than one. This ratio is the result of an international output correlation of only 0.14,
whereas the international correlation of consumption is 0.47. Though the data does
not provide a very clear pattern, this combination is not realistic.
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4.5.1 Do Trade Costs Improve the Model’s Fit?
The original model of GM does not include trade costs. On the other hand, OR argue
that “the effects of home bias in preferences [...] can be isomorphic to the effects of
trade costs".36 So a natural question is whether or not a model with zero trade costs or
a model with no home bias can fare equally well. Results to this are reported in Table
4.3.
Table 4.3: Comparison of Results:
Trade Costs and Degree of Home Bias Parameter in the Trade Costs Model
Criterion Data Baseline κ= 0 α= .5 κ=0, α=.5 κ= .9999
κ – 0.39 0 0.26 0 0.9999
θ – 0.78 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.71
α – 0.05 0.40 0.5 0.5 0.56
η – 1.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 1.30
σ – 3.15 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.73
Puzzle 1 [1;19] 19.36 1.50 1.84 1.00 13.45
Puzzle 2 [−1;0] -0.48 -0.57 -0.43 -0.33 -0.10
Puzzle 3 [.32; .92] 0.97 0.60 0.70 0.50 1.00
Puzzle 4 [0.5;1] 2.83 9.13 9.55 10.58 1.14
Puzzle 51 7.52 1.97 0.33 0.34 0.25 0.81
Puzzle 52 0.83 0.61 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.62
Puzzle 61 4.36 3.13 0.37 0.39 0.28 0.97
Puzzle 62 0.08 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.64 0.48
min ℑ – 36.10 134.09 140.76 161.49 56.71
As column three of this table shows, the zero trade costs model does not leave out a lot
in terms of the correlation between net exports and the real interest rate and in terms
of the correlation pattern of real exchange rates. Also, the home bias puzzles can be
addressed without relying on trade costs. But the volatility of the real exchange rate is
significantly smaller in a model without trade costs. This is an aspect in favor of OR’s
idea. But notice that the estimation process did not deviate from the parameters’ start-
ing values, which may indicate some estimation deficiency. Column four of Table 4.3
shows the case without the home bias in preferences or degree of openness parameter,
i.e. α = 0.5. The result here is very much comparable to the one obtained in a model
without trade costs. Hence, the isomorphic effects of the two parameters are shown
here. The case of excluding both trade costs and openness parameter is depicted in
36See OR, p. 348.
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column five. Here, exchange rate volatility is especially difficult to obtain. As the com-
parison shows, the combination of trade costs and openness parameter can do a lot in
this respect. Finally, the last column shows the estimation outcome if trade costs are
fixed to a prohibitively high number κ = 0.9999, implying that virtually nothing of an
exported good arrives at the destination market. This was done just for theoretical con-
siderations. In this case, there is an offsetting foreign bias in consumption, as well as
high intertemporal substitutability. While relative consumption correlation (P4) is de-
creased significantly, the outcome on the real exchange rate volatility dimension (P51
and P61) is worse than in the baseline model.
4.5.2 Alternative Monetary Policy Rules
In this section, I briefly check whether or not the previous results hinge on the esti-
mated monetary policy rule. My deviations from this rule are along the suggestions in
Galí and Monacelli (2005b). In particular, I investigate four different monetary policies:
1. Strict domestic inflation targeting (DIT), which GM show to be optimal from a
welfare perspective under certain parameter restrictions. This rule can be writ-
ten as follows:
rt = r r t +ΦpipiH ,t +Φy y˜t , (4.57)
where the last two summands are only added to circumvent indeterminacy, as
explained in Galí and Monacelli (2005b).
2. A domestic inflation targeting rule (DITR), which relates the domestic short-term
nominal interest rate only to the domestic inflation rate,
rt =ΦpipiH ,t . (4.58)
3. A CPI inflation targeting rule (CITR), as given by
rt =Φpipit . (4.59)
4. And finally an exchange rate peg (PEG) that fixes the domestic nominal interest
rate to its world analog,
rt = r ∗t . (4.60)
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Estimation results for these alternative monetary policy rules are given in Table 4.4.
We see that despite the differences in the level of abstraction, and despite the differ-
ences in the estimated parameter values, there are no substantial differences in terms
of the model fit. As expected, the model fit measured by the value of the minimization
problem ℑ is best for the estimated Taylor rule (TR), but it is nearly as good for strict
domestic inflation targeting (DIT).
Table 4.4: Comparison of Results for Different Monetary Policy Rules
Criterion TR DIT DITR CITR PEG
κ 0.39 0.42 0.48 0.90 0.41
θ 0.78 0.90 0.38 0.90 0.87
α 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05
η 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.10 1.03
σ 3.15 3.11 1.67 1.14 1.62
Puzzle 1 19.36 19.37 19.13 19.05 19.06
Puzzle 2 -0.48 -0.65 -0.81 -0.75 0.46
Puzzle 3 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.97
Puzzle 4 2.83 2.85 1.59 1.65 1.56
Puzzle 51 1.97 1.96 1.47 1.11 1.44
Puzzle 52 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61
Puzzle 61 3.13 3.09 1.88 1.27 1.84
Puzzle 62 0.63 0.63 0.56 0.56 0.56
Minimization ℑ 36.10 36.43 43.44 51.33 43.93
4.5.3 Results for the GM Baseline Model
We have seen that a carefully estimated model with trade costs performs very well in
the cross-validation of the puzzling data. But what about the original GM model? What
if their “special case" calibration and their then optimal DIT policy is used? In that case,
σ= η= 1, θ = 0.75, α= 0.4 and, of course, κ= 0. All other parameters are virtually the
same as here. The result of this endeavor is presented in Table 4.5. For comparison
reasons, I also add column three of Table 4.2, containing the moments of my TR pa-
rameter estimation. What we see from this is that the original GM model does very
well compared to the estimated TR model. Its only comparative weakness is the very
low exchange rate volatility.
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Table 4.5: Comparison of the TR Model with the GM DIT Model
Criterion Data TR GM DIT
Puzzle 1 [1;19] 19.36 1.50
Puzzle 2 [−1;0] -0.48 -0.63
Puzzle 3 [.32; .92] 0.97 0.60
Puzzle 4 [0.5;1] 2.83 2.74
Puzzle 51 7.52 1.97 0.65
Puzzle 52 0.83 0.61 0.62
Puzzle 61 4.36 3.13 0.82
Puzzle 62 0.08 0.63 0.48
Notes: The GM DIT model is calibrated as suggested in GM, especially σ = η = 1, θ = 0.75, α = 0.4, and
κ= 0. The TR model is parameterized as given in Table 4.1.
4.6 Conclusion
Can the Galí and Monacelli (2005b) model replicate the six major puzzles in interna-
tional macroeconomics, as collected by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000b)? At first glance,
this seems to be a challenging endeavor: This model is highly stylized, with complete
financial markets, no capital, and a minimum of shocks and frictions. Nonetheless,
some insight might be obtained. This textbook model is widely used in academics and
at central banks. It forms the way economists think about monetary policy in open
economies. If the model deviates essentially from reality along the six puzzles, its use-
fulness should be doubted. So I have put up the fight between a stylized model and the
rich and puzzling data. And it turns out to be a good one: Given the simplicity of the
model, it performs quite well. This result holds true even for the case of a very stylized,
close to optimal monetary policy in the small open economy.
Against expectance, the combination of two rather isomorphic ingredients – trade
costs and a home bias in preferences – helps a lot to bring the model close to the data.
So OR’s assumption that trade costs do help in resolving the six puzzles proves true.
There are three big deficiencies for the model: First, the international correlation pat-
tern of output and consumption, termed as quantity anomaly by Backus et al. (1995), is
not met in any of the model specifications considered. All parameter combinations in-
vestigated result in a situation where international consumption correlation is higher
than international output correlation. Given the simplicity of the model stochastics,
this might simply be an artefact of the assumed productivity correlation. Indeed,
changing the latter results in an improvement along this dimension. However, since
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this correlation is inherent in the data, its influence on the model accuracy will be ne-
glected here. The second deficiency is the volatility of the real exchange rate, which
still remains too low compared to the data. Nonetheless, compared to the original GM
calibration, my baseline choice of parameter implies a strong increase in the real ex-
change rate volatility. For further increases, the literature has shown that pricing-to-
market arrangements may help a lot, but this is left for future research. The third and
last deficiency is the high correlation between real exchange rate and output, which is
seen in all specifications of the model. As a remedy for this, one should again think
about a richer set of stochastic elements in the model. Another promising topic is the
inclusion of a more realistic fiscal policy instead of the production subsidy assumed so
far.
If these deficiencies are important for a specific research question, one should not rely
on the stylized New Keynesian small open economy model examined in this paper.
Instead, one should look for a more elaborated model. In case these deficiencies are of
minor importance, I have shown in Section 4.5.3 that even the textbook GM model is
doing reasonably well against the six puzzles.
5 Technical Appendix
5.1 Technical Appendix to Chapter 2
5.1.1 First Order Conditions and Aggregate Demand
Consumption maximization is done in two steps: first, suppose that C jA is a single good
instead of an aggregate. Then, maximization of the utility function (2.3) of agent j in
region A subject to the corresponding aggregated budget constraint (2.9) implies the
two first-order conditions
λBC =
(
C j
γ
)γ−1 (M jA/P A
1−γ
)1−γ
ν
C j
P AA C
j
A
, (5.1)
λBC =
(
C j
γ
)γ (M jA/P A
1−γ
)−γ
1
P A
. (5.2)
Equalizing the two equations by replacing the Lagrange multiplier λBC and noting that
P i C j
γ
= M
j
i
1−γ = I
j
i leads to
1
C jA = ν
(
P A
P AA
)
C j . (5.3)
Second, maximizing C jA with respect to two generic elements c
j (a) and c j (h′), subject
to
∫ n
0 P
i (a)c j (a)d a = Z , leads to
c j (a)=
(
p i (a)
p i (h′)
)−θ
c j (h′) . (5.4)
1This is a result of the Cobb-Douglas structure of the utility function.
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Then, replacing c j (a) in Equation (2.5) by the right-hand side of the previous equation
gives
C jA =
( 1
n
) 1
θ
∫ n
0
((
p i (a)
p i (h′)
)−θ
c j (h′)
) θ−1
θ
d a

θ
θ−1
= p i (h′)θc j (h′)n(P iA)−θ,
which implies
c j (a)= 1
n
(
p i (a)
P iA
)−θ
C jA. (5.5)
Adding steps one and two plus the symmetric results for the foreign good – for ease of
exposition agent j is still assumed to live in region A – results in2
c j (a)= ν
n
(
p A(a)
P AA
)−θ
P A
P AA
C j and c j (b)= 1−ν
1−n
(
p A(b)
P AB
)−θ
P A
P AB
C j . (5.6)
Using the terms of trade and the fact that C j = γI
j
i
P i
, we can rewrite the first-order con-
dition of the producer-consumers with respect to their consumption of a single good
and – in a similar manner – to their money holdings M ji as
c j (a)= ν
n
(
p A(a)
P A
)−θ γI jA
P A
, (5.7)
c j (b)= 1−ν
1−n
(
p A(b)
PB
)−θ γI jA
PB
, (5.8)
c j (a)= 1−ν
n
(
p A(a)
P A
)−θ γI jB
P A
, (5.9)
c j (b)= ν
1−n
(
pB (b)
PB
)−θ γI jB
PB
, (5.10)
M ji = (1−γ)I
j
i . (5.11)
The first two equations determine a home resident’s optimal choice of home and for-
eign goods, the next two equations determine the analog for a foreign resident, while
the last equation shows the optimality condition with respect to money holdings.
2An agent j of region B would demand c j (a)= 1−νn
(
p A (a)
P BA
)−θ
P B
P BA
C j and
c j (b)= ν1−n
(
pB (b)
P BB
)−θ
P B
P BB
C j .
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Total nominal expenditure by consumers in region A is I A =
∫ n
0 I
j
Ad j , while in region B
it is IB =
∫ 1
n I
j
B d j . The demand function for a good a is given by
Y d (a)=
∫ 1
0
c j (a)d j
=
(
p A(a)
P A
)−θ
1
n
[
γ
νI A+ (1−ν)IB
P A
]
. (5.12)
Similarly, the demand for a certain good b is given by
Y d (b)=
∫ 1
0
c j (b)d j
=
(
pB (b)
PB
)−θ
1
1−n
[
γ
(1−ν)I A+νIB
PB
]
. (5.13)
Denoting “not i " by −i and using the notation
wi =
n if i = A,1−n if i =B
for the region sizes, we define a variable proportional to “wealth":
W ≡ γ
wi
νIi + (1−ν)I−i
Pi
. (5.14)
At this point it is useful to note that this definition includes the terms of trade between
domestic and foreign goods, as Ii = P i Cγ measures the nominal consumption expendi-
tures using the level of the consumer price index (CPI), while the denominator involves
the level of the producer price index (PPI) as a reference. Using the identities from
(2.13), one can easily transform this notation into one that includes real expenditures
and the terms of trade S:
W =
ν(S A)
1−ν
(
γ
n
I A
P A
)
+ (1−ν)(S A)ν
(
γ
1−n
IB
P B
)
if i = A,
ν(S A)ν−1
(
γ IB
P B
)
+ (1−ν)(S A)−ν
(
γ I A
P A
)
if i =B.
Then, demand for a specific good j from region i amounts to
Y d ( j )=
(
p i ( j )
Pi
)−θ
W. (5.15)
Analogously to Benigno (2004), the smaller a region is (i.e. the higher the degree of
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openness), the larger the terms of trade effect will be on regional output (included in
the W term).3
5.1.2 Price Setting
When selling the product each producer is a monopolist. The producer, therefore, de-
cides upon the price of the product by maximizing the indirect utility function. The
indirect utility function is obtained by plugging C j = γI
j
i
P i
and M ji = (1−γ)I
j
i into the
utility function (2.3), replacing I ji by the right-hand side of the budget constraint, re-
placing the price ratio with the help of Equation (5.15), and simplifying:
U ji = (1−τi )W
1
θ (Y ji )
θ−1
θ −Ti +
M¯ ji
Pi
−
(
ξi
β
)
(Y ji )
β. (5.16)
The indirect utility function of agent j is maximized with respect to the price p i ( j ),
noting that the output produced by agent j is equal to its demand, i.e. Y ji = Y d ( j ).4
We obtain the optimal ratio of prices as
(
p i ( j )
Pi
)
=
( −ξiθW β−1
(1−τi )(1−θ)
) 1−θ+θβ+1
=
(
θξi
(θ−1)(1−τi )
W β−1
) 1
1+θ(β−1)
. (5.17)
Writing the last equation for each region separately, we have
(
p(a)
P A
)
=
(
θξA
(θ−1)(1−τA)
W β−1
) 1
1+θ(β−1)
and
(
p(b)
PB
)
=
(
θξB
(θ−1)(1−τB )
W β−1
) 1
1+θ(β−1)
.
(5.18)
Furthermore, we assume that some prices are fixed in advance, comparable to a static
version of the staggered price-setting introduced by Calvo (1983). A fractionΦi of pro-
ducers cannot change their prices and thus have to charge the same prices as in the
past, whereas a fraction (1−Φi ) of producers are able to set their prices freely after
the realization of the shocks in region i . The price level of goods from region A is a
3Note that our demand functions are more complicated than the ones in Benigno because of the
preference parameter ν. This destroys the identity P A = P B that holds in Benigno (2004) as long as
νA 6= n. If νA = νB = n and 1− νA = 1− νB = 1−n, the consumer price indices of both regions are
identical, and the demand functions become as simple as in Benigno.
4As the decision of a single individual has only marginal impact on terms of trade and the price in-
dices, this effect is neglected in the optimization.
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weighted sum of the average of pre-set prices E [p¯ A(a)] and the newly set prices p˜ A(a),
which due to symmetry are equal for all producers. Based on Equation (2.7), we obtain
P 1−θA =ΦA(E p¯ A(a))1−θ+ (1−ΦA)(p˜ A(a))1−θ. (5.19)
For goods produced in region B the equivalent equation is
P 1−θB =ΦB (E p¯B (b))1−θ+ (1−ΦB )(p˜B (b))1−θ. (5.20)
For convenience, the price ratio in region i may be defined to be
λi ≡Φi
(
E p¯ i ( j )
Pi
)1−θ
+ (1−Φi )
(
p˜ i ( j )
Pi
)1−θ
= 1. (5.21)
In line with Equation (2.6) the aggregate consumer price index in region i is given by
P A =
[
ΦA
(
E p¯ A(a)
)1−θ+ (1−ΦA)(p˜ A(a))1−θ] ν1−θ
×
[
ΦB
(
E p¯B (b)
)1−θ+ (1−ΦB )(p˜B (b))1−θ] 1−ν1−θ (5.22)
P B =
[
ΦB
(
E p¯B (b)
)1−θ+ (1−ΦB )(p˜B (b))1−θ] ν1−θ
×
[
ΦA
(
E p¯ A(a)
)1−θ+ (1−ΦA)(p˜ A(a))1−θ] 1−ν1−θ . (5.23)
This can be written in terms of the overall price level5
P ≡(P A)n(P B )1−n
=
[
ΦA
(
E p¯ A(a)
)1−θ+ (1−ΦA)(p˜ A(a))1−θ] nν+(1−n)(1−ν)1−θ
×
[
ΦB
(
E p¯B (b)
)1−θ+ (1−ΦB )(p˜B (b))1−θ] n(1−ν)+(1−n)ν1−θ . (5.24)
5.1.3 Aggregate Output and Fiscal Policy
Aggregate output in each region is defined by the following equations:
YA ≡
∫ n
0
p A(a)Y (a)
P A
d a and YB ≡
∫ 1
n
pB (b)Y (b)
PB
db. (5.25)
5Note that the numerators of the exponents add up exactly to one.
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Using the demand functions (5.12) and (5.13) as well as the price index definitions (2.7),
and denoting the lower and upper integral limits of each region i by l l i and uli , respec-
tively,6 aggregate output produced in region i can be rewritten as
Yi =
∫ uli
l l i
p i ( j )
Pi
(
p i ( j )
Pi
)−θ
W d j =W
∫ uli
l l i
(
p i ( j )
Pi
)1−θ
d j
=wiλi W =wi W. (5.26)
Essentially, this implies that the goods’ supply in region i is equal to its demand, which
according to Equation (5.14) originates from both regions. Total output is given as the
geometric average of output in both regions:
Y ≡ Y nA Y 1−nB . (5.27)
As fiscal policy uses per-capita taxes Ti to subsidize production, i. e., Ti > 0, τi < 0.
wealth W simplifies to
W = γ
wi
νIi + (1−ν)I−i
Pi
= γ
wi Pi
[
ν
∫ uli
l l i
I ji d j + (1−ν)
∫ ul−i
l l−i
I j−i d j
]
= γ
wi Pi
[ν
∫ uli
l l i
(
p i ( j )Y ji (1−τi )−Pi Ti + M¯
j
i
)
d j
+ (1−ν)
∫ ul−i
l l−i
(
p−i ( j )Y j−i (1−τ−i )−P−i T−i + M¯
j
−i
)
d j ]
= γ
wi Pi
[
ν
(
Pi Yi (1−τi )−Pi Ti + M¯i
)+ (1−ν)(P−i Y−i (1−τ−i )−P−i T−i + M¯−i )]
= γ
wi Pi
[
νM¯i + (1−ν)M¯−i +νPi wi W + (1−ν)P−i w−i W
]
⇔W = γ
wi
M¯
P
1
1−γ[ν+ (1−ν) w−iwi Si ]
, (5.28)
where we assume identical beginning-of-period real money holdings for all agents M¯P =
M¯
j
i
Pi
and for all i ,−i .7
Combining Equations (5.26) and (5.28), we can relate regional output to real money
6I.e., l l i =
{
0 if i = A,
n if i =B , and uli =
{
n if i = A,
1 if i =B.
7Without the assumption of internationally identical money holdings M¯/P has to be replaced by
[nM¯i + (1−n)M¯−i ]/Pi .
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balances as follows:
YA = γM¯
P
γ
1−γ[ν+ (1−ν) 1−nn S A]
and YB = γM¯
P
1
1−γ[ν+ (1−ν) n1−n SB ]
, (5.29)
which are the equations given in Section 2.2.2 in the main text.
5.1.4 Log-Linear Equilibrium Fluctuations: Price Setting
We log-linearize the model as follows: First, note that a linear approximation of Equa-
tion (2.6) around Pi = P i = P for all i results in
piA = νpiA+ (1−ν)piB and piB = νpiB + (1−ν)piA, (5.30)
where the inflation rates are defined as percentage deviations of the respective price
level from its steady-state level,8 i.e.
pii ≡ log(P i )− log(P¯ i ), given P¯ i 6= 0. (5.31)
Then, Equations (5.19) and (5.20) linearize9 to
piA =ΦAp¯iA+ (1−ΦA)p˜iA and piB =ΦB p¯iB + (1−ΦB )p˜iB . (5.32)
Combining the results gives
piA = ν(ΦAp¯iA+ (1−ΦA)p˜iA)+ (1−ν)(ΦB p¯iB + (1−ΦB )p˜iB ) (5.33)
piB = ν(ΦB p¯iB + (1−ΦB )p˜iB )+ (1−ν)(ΦAp¯iA+ (1−ΦA)p˜iA). (5.34)
Now, we turn to the optimal price a producer would set if he could choose the price
freely. According to Dixit and Lambertini (2003a), we refer to the idea of Calvo stag-
gered pricing, which reflects a dynamic setting (for details see Calvo 1983). Analo-
gously to the procedure proposed by Dixit and Lambertini, we introduce a discount
factor η with η < 1 (which means that pseudo-future period utilities have a lower
weight than present utility). We, first, assume that η equals unity to explain the “in-
8Under the assumption that P¯ i ≡ 1, one can equivalently define pii ≡ log(P i ) .
9To appreciate this, compare the following procedure undertaken with a simplified, yet similar equa-
tion:
P b =φQb + (1−φ)Rb ⇒ P¯ bebpi =φQ¯bebp¯i+ (1−φ)R¯bebp˜i, which is approximately equal to
P¯ b(1+bpi)=φQ¯b(1+bp¯i)+(1−φ)R¯b(1+bp˜i) ⇒ bpi=φ Q¯b
P¯ b
bp¯i+(1−φ) R¯b
P¯ b
bp˜i. As the fractions are equal
to unity, this simplifies to pi=φp¯i+ (1−φ)p˜i.
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tuitional proceeding”. In the case where prices are allowed to change, the optimal log
price equals
p˜iA = (1−ΦA)pi jA+ΦAp¯iA
p˜iB = (1−ΦB )pi jB +ΦB p¯iB .
where pi ji is the log steady-state deviation of the price that would be optimal if prices
could be adjusted freely. The log price set by producer j is a sum of the weighted
optimal price of producer j , if prices were fully flexible, and the weighted price that
maximizes the expected indirect utility, if prices are to be fixed in future periods. The
weights equal the probability of being able, (1−Φi ), or not being able, Φi , to change
the price in the following period(s).
Now we return to the discount factor η< 1. As already mentioned, the individuals place
lower weight on future utilities. Therefore, the fact that the producer cannot change
the price in future periods with a certain probability is expressed by a lower weight
than the pure probability of future price setting (given by ηΦi ) and a higher weight for
the present period (1−ηΦi ). Hence, we obtain
p˜iA = (1−ΦAη)pi jA+ΦAηp¯iA, (5.35)
p˜iB = (1−ΦBη)pi jB +ΦBηp¯iB . (5.36)
In the case of η = 0, this setting would be purely static: Here, the (deviation from the
steady state of the) optimal price once an individual is allowed to change price p˜ii is
identical to the price that is optimal for the current period only, as there are no future
periods to form expectations about.
Using Equations (5.35) and (5.36) to replace the optimal prices in the consumer price
indices (5.33) and (5.34) gives
piA = νΦA[1+ (1−ΦA)η]p¯iA+ν(1−ΦA)(1−ΦAη)pi jA
+ (1−ν)ΦB [1+ (1−ΦB )η]p¯iB + (1−ν)(1−ΦB )(1−ΦBη)pi jB (5.37)
piB = νΦB [1+ (1−ΦB )η]p¯iB +ν(1−ΦB )(1−ΦBη)pi jB
+ (1−ν)ΦB [1+ (1−ΦB )η]p¯iA+ (1−ν)(1−ΦB )(1−ΦBη)pi jA . (5.38)
The overall inflation rate can be calculated by using the previous equations together
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with Equation (5.24):
pi= npiA+ (1−n)piB (5.39)
= [nν+ (1−n)(1−ν)]piA+ [n(1−ν)+ (1−n)ν]piB . (5.40)
Equation (5.39) states that union-wide inflation is the sum of the regional CPI infla-
tion weighted by the size of each region. The second Equation (5.40) links union-wide
inflation to the PPI inflation rates in each region, where the influence of regional PPI
inflation depends on both the size of the region and the preference of agents for goods
from that region.
5.1.5 Proof of Proposition 1: Inflation Determination
In general, a producer sets its price by maximizing the indirect utility function which
results in Equation (5.17) above. A log-linear approximation of this equation around
the steady state, solved for the relative deviation of wealth from its steady state level,
Wˆ , is
Wˆ = 1+θ(β−1)
β−1 (pˆ
i ( j )−pii )− 1
β−1 ξˆi −
τ¯i
β−1 τˆi , (5.41)
where pii ≡ Pˆi , and a “hat” above a variable denotes percentage deviations of the vari-
able from its steady state.10 To replace Wˆ in the last expression, we log-linearize the
policy dependent wealth equation.
For the fiscal policy considered here, we use Equation (5.28), and obtain the result
Wˆ = γm¯
ωi wi
mˆ+ γ(1−ν)
ωi
w−i
wi
si , (5.42)
where ωi is given by ωi ≡ 1−γ[ν+ (1−ν) w−iwi ] and si ≡ Sˆi =pi−i −pii . mˆ is the change in
the beginning-of-period real money holdings M¯/P .
In the next step, Equation (5.42) is evaluated at both E [ ˆ¯p i ( j )]≡ p¯ii , the (log deviation of
the) price that maximizes the future indirect utility, and at pˆ ji ≡ pi
j
i , the (log deviation
of the) price that maximizes the current period indirect utility. Starting with the first
10For the approximation of the fiscal policy term, note that à(1−τi )= −τ¯i1−τ¯i τˆi .
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case p¯ii , we obtain
p¯ii = E [pii ]+ 1
1+θ(β−1)E [ξˆi ]+
τ¯i
1+θ(β−1)E [τˆi ]
+ β−1
1+θ(β−1)E
[
γm¯
ωi wi
mˆ+ γ(1−ν)
ωi
w−i
wi
si
]
= ω¯0,i +ω1E [τˆi ]+ω2E [τˆ−i ]+ω3E [pii ]+ω4E [pi−i ], (5.43)
where ω¯0,i ≡ 11+θ(β−1) E [ξˆi ]+
β−1
1+θ(β−1)
γm¯
ωi wi
E [mˆ], ω1 ≡ τ¯i1+θ(β−1) , ω2 ≡ 0,
ω3 ≡
(
1− β−11+θ(β−1)
γ(1−ν)
ωi
w−i
wi
)
and ω4 ≡ β−11+θ(β−1)
γ(1−ν)
ωi
w−i
wi
.11 Note that si has been re-
placed by terms of pii and pi−i . Accordingly, for the price that maximizes the current
period indirect utility only, we obtain
pi
j
i =
1
1+θ(β−1) ξˆi +
β−1
1+θ(β−1)
γm¯
ωi wi
mˆ+ τ¯i
1+θ(β−1) τˆi
+
(
1− β−1
1+θ(β−1)
γ(1−ν)
ωi
w−i
wi
)
pii + β−1
1+θ(β−1)
γ(1−ν)
ωi
w−i
wi
pi−i (5.44)
=ω0,i + β−1
1+θ(β−1)
γm¯
ωi wi
mˆ+ω1τˆi +ω2τˆ−i +ω3pii +ω4pi−i , (5.45)
where ω0,i = 11+θ(β−1) ξˆi captures the stochastic term in this equation. Using Equations
(5.32), (5.35) and (5.36), we obtain an equation that expresses the regional producer
inflation rate in terms of the log of the price that maximizes the future indirect utility
and the prize that maximizes the current period indirect utility only:
pii = ρi p¯ii + (1−ρi )pi ji , ρi =Φi [1+ (1−Φi )η]. (5.46)
The parameter ρi bears a similar intuition as the “Calvo” parameter Φi : a value of
zero corresponds to completely flexible prices, whereas a value of unity implies that
all prices cannot change in response to shocks.
We use (5.46) and combine the two log prices in equations (5.43) and (5.45):
pii = ρi
[
ω¯0,i +ω1E [τˆi ]+ω2E [τˆ−i ]+ω3E [pii ]+ω4E [pi−i ]
]
+ (1−ρi )
[
ω0,i + β−1
1+θ(β−1)
γm¯
ωi wi
mˆ+ω1τˆi +ω2τˆ−i +ω3pii +ω4pi−i
]
. (5.47)
11We add the termω2 to show that under alternative fiscal policies this spillover effect can be non-zero.
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For the other region, analog steps yield
pi−i = ρi
[
ω¯0,−i +ω1E [τˆ−i ]+ω2E [τˆi ]+ω3E [pi−i ]+ω4E [pii ]
]
+ (1−ρi )
[
ω0,−i + β−1
1+θ(β−1)
γm¯
ω−i w−i
mˆ+ω1τˆ−i +ω2τˆi +ω3pi−i +ω4pii
]
, (5.48)
where ω0,−i differs only from ω0,i by the respective regional stochastic productivity
variable ξˆ−i instead of ξˆi .
Combining (5.47) and (5.48) and solving this system of equations for the region-
specific inflation rates, one obtains
pii =Ωρi
[
ω¯0,i + (1−ρ
i )ω4
1− (1−ρi )ω3
ω¯0,−i
]
+Ωρi
[(
ω¯1+ (1−ρ
i )ω4
1− (1−ρi )ω3
ω2
)
E [τˆi ]+
(
ω2+ (1−ρ
i )ω4
1− (1−ρi )ω3
ω1
)
E [τˆ−i ]
]
+Ωρi
[(
ω3+ (1−ρ
i )ω4
1− (1−ρi )ω3
ω4
)
E [pii ]+
(
ω4+ (1−ρ
i )ω4
1− (1−ρi )ω3
ω3
)
E [pi−i ]
]
+Ω(1−ρi )
[
ω0,i + (1−ρ
i )ω4
1− (1−ρi )ω3
ω0,−i
]
+Ω(1−ρi )
(
β−1
1+θ(β−1)
γm¯
ωi wi
+ (1−ρ
i )ω4
1− (1−ρi )ω3
β−1
1+θ(β−1)
γm¯
ω−i w−i
)
mˆ
+Ω(1−ρi )
(
ω1+ (1−ρ
i )ω4
1− (1−ρi )ω3
ω2
)
τˆi
+Ω(1−ρi )
(
ω2+ (1−ρ
i )ω4
1− (1−ρi )ω3
ω1
)
τˆ−i (5.49)
with Ω ≡ 1−(1−ρi )ω3
[1−(1−ρi )ω3]2−[(1−ρi )ω4]2 . Under the supply-side fiscal policy introduced
above,12 we have ω2 = 0. We can rewrite the last equation in terms of policy variables
as follows:
pii = d i mˆ+ c i τˆi + c−i τˆ−i +ψi , i ∈ {A,B}, (5.50)
where the parameters are given by
c i ≡Ω(1−ρi )ω1, (5.51)
c−i ≡Ω(1−ρi ) (1−ρ
i )ω4
1− (1−ρi )ω3
ω1 and (5.52)
d i ≡Ω(1−ρi ) γm¯(β−1)
1+θ(β−1)
(
1
ωi wi
+ 1
ω−i w−i
(1−ρi )ω4
1− (1−ρi )ω3
)
, (5.53)
12Our setting could be easily enhanced for other types of fiscal policies.
132
and the variable ψi captures the expectational and stochastic terms,
ψi ≡Ωρi
[
ω¯0,i + (1−ρ
i )ω4
1− (1−ρi )ω3
ω¯0,−i
]
+Ωρi
[
ω1E [τˆi ]+ (1−ρ
i )ω4
1− (1−ρi )ω3
ω1E [τˆ−i ]
]
+Ωρi
[(
ω3+ (1−ρ
i )ω4
1− (1−ρi )ω3
ω4
)
E [pii ]+
(
ω4+ (1−ρ
i )ω4
1− (1−ρi )ω3
ω3
)
E [pi−i ]
]
+Ω(1−ρi )
[
ω0,i + (1−ρ
i )ω4
1− (1−ρi )ω3
ω0,−i
]
■
5.1.6 Proof of Proposition 2: Output Determination
To obtain the equation for regional output yi , we start with Equation (5.26) and plug in
Equation (5.17):
Yi =W
∫ uli
l l i
(
p i ( j )
Pi
)1−θ
d j
=
(
θξi
(θ−1)(1−τi )
W β−1
) 1−θ
1+θ(β−1)
W.
Log-linearizing this equation and using the notation yi ≡ Yˆi , we get
yi = 1−θ
1+θ(β−1) ξˆi +
1−θ
1+θ(β−1) τ¯i τˆi +
(β−1)(1−θ)
1+θ(β−1) Wˆ +Wˆ . (5.54)
Now we follow the procedure in Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) and apply Equation
(5.41) in two ways. First, we replace the first Wˆ in (5.41) with i indices and the sec-
ond Wˆ with −i indices. We thus obtain
yi = 1−θ
1+θ(β−1) ξˆi +
1−θ
1+θ(β−1) τ¯i τˆi
+ (β−1)(1−θ)
1+θ(β−1)
[
1+θ(β−1)
β−1 (pˆ
i ( j )−pii )− 1
β−1 ξˆi −
τ¯i
β−1 τˆi
]
+
[
1+θ(β−1)
β−1 (pˆ
−i ( j )−pi−i )− 1
β−1 ξˆ−i −
τ¯−i
β−1 τˆ−i
]
. (5.55)
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Second, we do the same thing the other way round, leading to
yi = 1−θ
1+θ(β−1) ξˆi +
1−θ
1+θ(β−1) τ¯i τˆi
+ (β−1)(1−θ)
1+θ(β−1)
[
1+θ(β−1)
β−1 (pˆ
−i ( j )−pi−i )− 1
β−1 ξˆ−i −
τ¯−i
β−1 τˆ−i
]
+
[
1+θ(β−1)
β−1 (pˆ
i ( j )−pii )− 1
β−1 ξˆi −
τ¯i
β−1 τˆi
]
. (5.56)
In the next step, we add up the two equations and divide by two. We evaluate pˆ i ( j )
in both regions for the flexible price firms, i. e. we replace pˆ i ( j ) by pi ji , the price that
maximizes current period indirect utility only. Replacing pi ji with Equation (5.46) and
simplifying leads to
yi =
(
1−θ
2[1+θ(β−1)] −
1
2(β−1)
)
τ¯i τˆi −
(
1−θ
2[1+θ(β−1)] +
1
2(β−1)
)
τ¯−i τˆ−i
+ 2βρ
i
(β−1)(1−ρi ) (pii − p¯ii )+
βρi
(β−1)(1−ρi ) (si − s¯i )
+
(
1−θ
2[1+θ(β−1)] −
1
2(β−1)
)
ξˆi −
(
1−θ
2[1+θ(β−1)] +
1
2(β−1)
)
ξˆ−i . (5.57)
The notation s¯i = E [si ] is used to denote region i ’s expected terms of trade. Given the
steady state of P¯i = P¯ i = P¯ for all i , we have s¯i ≡ 0 so that we can drop this term. For
ease of exposition, we rewrite the last equation as follows:
yi = ai τˆi +ai ,−i τˆ−i +bi (pii −piei )+κi si +φi , (5.58)
where ai ≡
(
1−θ
2[1+θ(β−1)] − 12(β−1)
)
τ¯i , ai ,−i ≡−
(
1−θ
2[1+θ(β−1)] + 12(β−1)
)
τ¯−i ,
bi ≡ 2βρi
(β−1)(1−ρi ) , with pi
e
i = p¯ii = E [pii ], κi ≡
βρi
(β−1)(1−ρi ) and
φi =
(
1−θ
2[1+θ(β−1)] −
1
2(β−1)
)
ξˆi −
(
1−θ
2[1+θ(β−1)] +
1
2(β−1)
)
ξˆ−i . ■
5.1.7 Welfare Criterion for Fiscal Policy
In this subsection, we derive the fiscal welfare criterion. The fiscal authority of region
i is assumed to maximize the utility of a representative agent in her specific region.
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Steady-State Considerations
According to Equation (2.3) the representative agent j living in region i derives utility
from consumption, real money balances, and leisure.
Assuming flexible prices in the steady state and neglecting the utility stemming from
real balances, we can rewrite the indirect utility function (5.16) as
U ji = (1−τi )Y
j
i −Ti −
ξi
β
(Y ji )
β, (5.59)
where the fiscal variables Ti (lump-sum tax or transfer) and τi (tax or subsidy on the
consumption goods) are inserted.
We consider a very simple fiscal policy, which counteracts frictions from monopolistic
competition and the regional productivity shock. Furthermore, we assume a balanced
budget which implies the following resource restricton:
Ti =−Yiτi . (5.60)
Assuming a steady state in which all stochastic terms are equal to their expected value,
i. e. ξ¯i = E [ξi ], the steady state natural level of output in the flexible price scenario
equals
Y¯ j ,ni =
(
(θ−1)(1− τ¯i )
θξ¯i
) 1
β−1
. (5.61)
We will approximate utility around this steady state given in equation (5.61), i. e. we
linearize the utility function around the flex-price scenario, where at the same time
stochastic terms are equal to their expected values. Note, however, that we do not nec-
essarily assume that fiscal policy is efficient. Thus, the overall distortion in the steady
state output level is a result of both, market power and fiscal policy.13 If taxes were set
efficiently, they would eliminate the distortions stemming from monopolistic power.
Using Equation (5.61) and the derivative of Equation (5.59) with respect to τi yields the
efficient tax rate
τeffi =
1
1−θ , θ > 1, (5.62)
which can be inserted into Equation (5.61) to calculate the corresponding level of out-
put in region i . Then,
Y j ,effi =
(
θ−1
θξi −1
) 1
β−1
. (5.63)
13See Woodford (2003, pp. 293f). His parameter Φy equals our parameter κ used later in this section,
where we keep with the notation of Dixit and Lambertini (2003a), Appendix B.
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Second-order Approximation of the Utility Function
A welfare maximizing fiscal policy in the home region optimizes the utility function
of a representative agent j living in region A, which is given by Equation (2.3). We
aggregate all agents living in region A, which simplifies the consumption part due to
the symmetry of this problem, while it leaves us with an integral in the disutility-term,
as staggered pricing implies a different behavior for different agents.
We obtain
U A = γ
(
C A
γ
)γ (
MA/P A
1−γ
)1−γ
− 1
n
∫ n
0
(
ξA
β
)
(Y jA )
βd j . (5.64)
Note that we do not consider the fraction of utility that originates from real balances, as
we focus on the cashless limit, following the seminal work of Rotemberg and Woodford
(1998). Therefore, we only consider the fraction γ stemming from the u(.)-term.
The notation ξ is used to capture all stochastics of the model. 14 We approximate
around the flexible price steady state level of consumption of households in region A,
which is denoted by C¯ , henceforth.
Approximation of the Consumption Utility Part
We begin with the approximation of the u(.)-part in the utility function (5.64) around
its steady state level under flexible prices and a given, constant fiscal policy by using a
second-order Taylor series:
u˜ = γ
(
u¯+uC C˜ +uξξ˜A+umm˜+
1
2
uCC C˜
2+ 1
2
uξξξ˜
2
A+
1
2
ummm˜
2+
uC mC˜ m˜+uCξC˜ ξ˜A+umξm˜ξ˜A
)+O (||ξA||3) , (5.65)
where a variable with a tilde (e.g. X˜ ) denotes the absolute deviation from the respec-
tive steady state level (X¯ ), i. e. for home consumption we define C˜ ≡C − C¯ . The term
O (||ξA||3) summarizes terms of third or higher order, and are thus neglected.
A subscript on u or v denotes the first derivative of u or v with respect to the argument
indicated by the subscript (uC is for example the first derivative of u with respect to
consumption C ). Correspondingly, we use two subscripts after u or v to denote second
14Placing the regional productivity shock ξA after the semicolon in the disutility-part of Equation (5.64)
indicates direct dependency of the realization of the productivity shock.
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derivatives. Furthermore, we use the notation m for domestic real money balance, i. e.
m ≡MA/P A. Then, we can rewrite Equation (5.65) as
u˜ = γ
(
u¯+uC C˜ +umm˜+ 1
2
uCC C˜
2+ 1
2
ummm˜
2+uC mC˜ m˜+uCξC˜ ξ˜A
)
+ t.i.p.+O (||ξA||3) , (5.66)
where t.i.p. summarizes the terms that are independent of policy.
Combining the first order conditions of the utility function with respect to consump-
tion and money holdings leads to
MA = (1−γ)I A = 1−γ
γ
P AC ⇔m = 1−γ
γ
C . (5.67)
After log-linearization, we apply this equation for m˜ with m˜ = 1−γ
γ
C˜ .
The representative agent consumes goods of both regions. Home consumption can be
expressed by C = γkY νA Y 1−νB , where k ≡ (1−ν)1−ννν and Yi with i = A,B denotes output
of each region i .
The long-run steady state under flexible prices within the monetary union is given by
C¯ = Y¯A (5.68)
where C is overall consumption of region A. This means that domestic output (which
corresponds to the domestic real income) equals the demand for commodities of the
representative agents living in region A in the long-run steady state. This assumption
holds, because government spending is assumed to be zero, the government budget is
balanced, and labor is completely immobile between the home and foreign region of
the currency area. The assumption that labor is strongly immobile in Europe is stated
in Proaño (2006) and by the speech of Gonzáles-Páramo (2005), to which we referred
to in the introduction.
Applying the Taylor expansion of second order as explained at the beginning of this
section, we can substitute for
C˜ = Y¯A
(
YˆA+ 1
2
Yˆ 2A +O (||ξA||3)
)
, (5.69)
where we make use of the definition YˆA ≡ log(YA/Y¯A).
In the steady state, we have the following ralations: m¯ = γ−1(1−γ)Y¯A, uC = 1, um =
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1, uCC =−(1−γ)Y¯ −1A , umm =−γm¯−1, uC m = γY¯ −1A . If we insert these steady state
expressions into (5.65), we obtain Equation (5.71) after some mathematical manipula-
tions:
u˜ = uC Y¯A
(
YˆA
(
1+γuCξξ˜A
)+ 1
2
Yˆ 2A
)
+ t.i.p.+O (||ξA||3). (5.70)
We define q1 ≡− γuCξξ˜uCC Y¯A and obtain for the u(.)-part of the loss function the approxima-
tion
u˜ = uC Y¯
(
YˆA
(
1+ (1−γ)q1
)+ 1
2
Yˆ 2A
)
+ t.i.p.+O (||ξA||3) . (5.71)
Approximation of the Disutility of Labor Part
Second order Taylor expansion of the disutility of labor part for a representative agent
j leads to
v˜ j = Y˜ jA vY +
1
2
vY Y (Y˜
j
A )
2+ vY ξY˜ jA ξ˜A+ t.i.p.+O (||ξA||3) . (5.72)
Using the Taylor-approximation
Y˜ jA = Y¯
j
A
(
Yˆ jA +
1
2
(Yˆ jA )
2+O (||ξA||3)
)
, (5.73)
we can rewrite Equation (5.72) as
v˜ j = Y¯ jA vY
[
Yˆ jA
(
1+ vY ξξ˜A
vY
)
+ (Yˆ
j
A )
2
2
(
1+ vY Y Y¯
j
A
vY
)]
+ t.i.p.+O (||ξA||3) .
(5.74)
Maximizing the utility function (5.64) and combining the first order conditions yields
vY = uC (1−κ) , (5.75)
where the marginal disutility of producing output vY is equal to
vY ≡ ∂v
∂Y jA
= dA(Y jA )β−1 . (5.76)
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Inserting the symmetric steady state output (under fully flexible prices) given by Equa-
tion (5.61) results
vY = d¯A
(
(θ−1)(1− τ¯A)
θd¯A
)
= (1− τ¯A)(θ−1)
θ
. (5.77)
Analogously to the proceedings in Woodford (2003), we define a parameter κ as a size
which “summarizes the overall distortions in the steady state output level as a result of
both taxes and market power”:
κ≡ 1− (1− τ¯A)(θ−1)
θ
. (5.78)
Equation (5.75) states that the marginal utility from consumption equals the marginal
disutility from labor. Using this condition with the disutility part (5.74) of an average
representative agent, we obtain
v˜ = 1
n
∫ n
0
v j d j
= Y¯AuC
(
(1−κ)
(
1+ vξY ξ˜A
vY
)
E(Yˆ jA )+
1
2
E((Yˆ jA )
2)(1−κ)
(
1+ vY Y Y¯A
vY
))
+ t.i.p.+O (||ξA||3) . (5.79)
Note that the expectations operator has to be used here, since agents are different from
each other with respect to their ability to reset prices. The second derivative of v with
respect to the steady state output can be expressed in terms of vY :
vY Y = (β−1)dA(Y jA )β−2 =
(β−1)vY
Y jA
. (5.80)
Solving for vY yields
vY =
Y jA
β−1 vY Y . (5.81)
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Replacing vY in Equation (5.79) yields
v˜ = Y¯AuC
([
(1−κ)+ (1−κ)(β−1) vY ξξ˜A
vY Y Y¯A
]
E(Yˆ Aj )
+E((Yˆ jA )2)(1−κ)(1+β−1)
)
+t.i.p.+O (||ξA||3) (5.82)
= Y¯AuC
([
1−κ+ (β−1) vY ξξ˜A
vY Y Y¯A
]
+ β
2
[
(EYˆ jA )
2+VarYˆ jA
])
+ t.i.p.+O (||ξA||3) . (5.83)
To obtain Equation (5.83), we refer to Dixit and Lambertini (2003a), who assume that
κ is small, meaning that it can be neglected when it enters multiplicatively. This is
possible as vY Y ξ˜A is on average considerably smaller than vY Y Y¯A. Furthermore, we
replace E [(Yˆ jA )
2] by (E [Yˆ jA ])
2+VarY jA .
A second-order Taylor approximation of the CES-aggregator YA of home goods leads
to15
YˆA = EYˆ jA +
1
2
(
1− 1
θ
)
VarYˆ jA +O (||ξA||3) . (5.84)
Solving for EYˆ jA , we have
EYˆ jA = YˆA−
1
2
(
1− 1
θ
)
VarYˆ jA +O (||ξA||3), (5.85)
and inserting into Equation (5.83) yields
v˜ = Y¯AuC
([
1−κ+ (β−1)q2
]
YˆA+ β
2
Yˆ 2A +
1
2
[
β−1+ 1
θ
]
VarYˆ jA
)
+ t.i.p.+O (||ξA||3), where q2 ≡−
vY ξξ˜A
Y¯A vY Y
. (5.86)
15See Woodford (2003, Chapter 6 and Appendix E), or Rotemberg and Woodford (1998).
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Region-Specific Welfare Function
Subtracting (5.86) from (5.71) yields social welfare
U A =−uC Y¯A
2
(
Yˆ 2A (β−1)−2YˆA
[
q1(1−γ)+q2(β−1)+κ
]
+1+θ(β−1)
θ
VarYˆ jA
)
+ t.i.p.+O (||ξA||3) . (5.87)
When log-linearizing the CES-aggregator over domestically produced differentiated
goods, we obtain16
Yˆ jA = log Y¯A−θ(log p A( j )− logP A). (5.88)
The variance of log Yˆ jA is given by
Var(Yˆ jA )=Var(log Y¯A−θ(log p A( j )− logP A))= θ2Var(log p A( j )). (5.89)
The last equation contains a very important finding of our model: As a domestic agent
j only works in the home-region to produce the domestic good Y jA , and because the
production of this good matters for his utility, he also cares only about the variability of
this output. Hence, only the price level of domestically produced goods matters for the
welfare of domestic agents. Of course, this finding is overturned, if high labor mobility
is assumed, i.e. in our case, a representative agent j is free to produce the specific
good in region B , region A, or in both regions. So far, for the EMU a high degree of
labor mobility seems not to be backed by the data.
To apply the variance of domestic prices to the welfare equation for obtaining the in-
flation target, we need first to refer to the staggered price setting: We assume that a
certain fraction ΦA of firms (=producer-consumers) is not able to adjust the prices in
response to a shock, while a fraction (1−ΦA) can freely change their prices after a shock
occurs. Then, inflation in region A is given by
piA =ΦAp¯iA+ (1−ΦA)p˜iA (5.90)
According to Dixit and Lambertini (2003a), we refer to the idea of Calvo-staggered
pricing, which however reflects a dynamic setting (for details see Calvo 1983). Anal-
ogously to the procedure proposed by Dixit and Lambertini, we introduce a virtual
discount factor η with η < 1 (which means that pseudo-future period utilities have a
16See also Woodford (2003, p.396).
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lower weight than present utility). We, first, assume that η equals unity to explain the
intuitional proceeding. In the case where prices are allowed to change, the optimal log
price equals
p˜iA = (1−ΦA)pi jA+ΦAp¯iA
where pi jA is the log steady-state deviation of the price that would be optimal if prices
could be adjusted freely. The log price set by producer j is a sum of the weighted opti-
mal price of producer j if prices were fully flexible, and the weighted price that maxi-
mizes the expected indirect utility if prices are to be fixed in future periods. The weights
equal the probability of being able, (1−ΦA), or not being able,ΦA, to change the price
in the following period(s).
Now we turn again to the discount factor η < 1: As already mentioned, the individu-
als place lower weight on future utilities. Therefore, the fact that the producer cannot
change the price in future periods with a certain probability is expressed by a lower
weight than the pure probability of future price setting (given by ηΦi ) and a higher
weight for the present period (1−ηΦi ). Hence, we obtain
p˜iA = (1−ΦAη)pi jA+ΦAηp¯iA. (5.91)
Using the overall inflation rate in region A given by Equation (5.90) as well as the
pseudo-intertemporal Equation (5.91) for the optimal inflation rate p˜iA, we can express
the inflation rate as a combination of variables that have a single period interpretation:
piA = ρAp¯iA+ (1−ρA)pi jA, ρA =ΦA[1+ (1−ΦA)η]. (5.92)
Again, p¯iA is the average inflation rate that arises when prices are set before the shocks
occur, while pi jA is the price that is optimal for the current period only, i. e. after uncer-
tainty about the stochastic processes is resolved. With this single period representation
we are able to apply the result of the first example in Woodford (2003, pp. 397f.) for our
next steps. Firms that have to set prices before the shock materializes will set them
identically according to the expected value of the optimal price for the period, i. e.
log p¯iA = E [pi jA], (5.93)
where E denotes the expectations operator. Subtracting the expectation of Equation
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(5.92) from itself and noting that E [p¯iA]= p¯iA, we obtain
piA−E [piA]= (1−ρA)(pi jA−E [pi
j
A])= (1−ρA)(pi
j
A− p¯iA). (5.94)
We, now, combine Equations (5.89) and (5.94). The relation between the variance of
log p A( j ) and the inflation goal in the representative agent’s utility function is given by
Varlog p A( j )= ρA(1−ρA)(pi jA− p¯iA)2 =
ρA(1−ρA)
(1−ρA)2 (piA−E [piA])
2 = ρ
A(piA− p¯iA)2
1−ρA .
(5.95)
Inserting relation (5.95) into (5.87) yields
U A =− Y¯ uC
2
(
Yˆ 2A (β−1)−2YˆA
[
q1(1−γ)+q2(β−1)+κ
]
+ρ
Aθ(1+θ(β−1))
1−ρA (piA− p¯iA)
)
+ t.i.p.+O (||ξA||3) . (5.96)
To obtain the output goal in the welfare function, we perform some mathematical ma-
nipulations:17
Yˆ 2A (β−1)−2YˆA
[
q1(1−γ)+q2(β−1)
]−2κYˆA
= (β−1)
(
Yˆ 2A −2YˆA
q1(1−γ)+q2(β−1)
β−1 −
2YˆA
β−1κ
)
. (5.97)
The natural rate of output in region A, Yˆ nA , which materializes under flexible prices
in the setting of monopolistic competition, is given by a log-linearization of Equation
(5.61). It can be expressed in terms of the region-specific variables q1 and q2:18
Yˆ nA =
(1−γ)q1+ (β−1)q2
β−1 . (5.98)
17Note that q1 and q2 are region specific notations, as both contain first and second derivatives of a
representative household’s utility, who lives in region A.
18To see this, note that the log-linearized version of Equation (5.61) reads Yˆ nA = −1β−1 (ξˆi + τ¯i1−τ¯i τˆi ).
Rewriting the terms in the last parentheses in absolute deviations from steady state, we obtain
Yˆ nA = −1β−1 ( ξiξ¯i −
1−τi
1−τ¯i ) =
−1
β−1 (Yi /Y¯i ). Given our assumption uC ,ξ = 0, Equation (5.98) is merely a more
general notation for the equation given in this footnote.
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Using this result and adding terms from the t.i.p.-part, we can rewrite (5.97) as
(β−1)
(
Yˆ 2A −2YˆAYˆ nA + (Yˆ nA )2−2
YˆAκ
β−1 −2
Yˆ nA κ
β−1 +
κ2
(β−1)2
)
+2 Yˆ
n
A κ
β−1 −
κ2
(β−1)2
= (β−1)((YˆA− Yˆ nA )2−2(YˆA− Yˆ nA )yˆ A+ (yˆ A)2)+ t.i.p. , (5.99)
where we define yˆ A as the log deviation of steady state level given by Equation (5.61),
from the steady state of efficient output given by Equation (5.63), evaluated at ξi = ξ¯i .
Formally,
yˆ A = log
(
Y¯A
Y¯ effA
)
= log

(
(θ−1)(1−τ¯A)
θξ¯A
) 1
β−1
(
θ−1
θξ¯A−1
) 1
β−1
= 1β−1 log
(
(θ−1)(1− τ¯A)
θ
)
≈ 1
β−1
(
(θ−1)(1− τ¯A)
θ
−1
)
=− κ
β−1, (5.100)
where ξ¯A = 1, the approximation holds only for values of (θ−1)(1−τ¯A)θ−1 close to one,
and the last equation uses the notation of Equation (5.78). The variable yˆ A summarizes
the overall distortions in steady state output. Inserting (5.99) into (5.96) yields
U A =− Y¯ uC
2
(
ρA
1−ρA θ
[
1+θ(β−1)] (piA− p¯iA)2+ (β−1)(YˆA− Yˆ nA − yˆ A)2)
+ t.i.p.+O (||ξA||3) . (5.101)
Rearranging terms, and replacing Yˆi by yi and Yˆ nA + yˆ A by ¯¯y A yields the welfare function
for home region A:
L A = 1
2
(
(piA− p¯iA)2+θA(y A− ¯¯y A)2
)+ t.i.p.+O (||ξA||3) , (5.102)
where θA ≡ (1−ρA)(β−1)[ρAθ(1+θ(β−1))]−1 is the relative weight of the output goal.
Analogously, the welfare function for region B equals
LB = 1
2
(
(piB − p¯iB )2+θB (yB − ¯¯yB )2
)+ t.i.p.+O (||ξA||3) . (5.103)
Remark that our notation in terms of percentage changes in output differs slightly from
the one with an “output gap" typically used in the literature. The reason for this is
twofold. First, we want to express the variables in our policy analysis throughout in
terms of inflation and output. Second, we prefer the explicit notation of observables
rather than using the empirically less precise concept of an output gap.
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5.1.8 Welfare Criterion for Monetary Policy
In this subsection, we pose the target function for a welfare-optimizing monetary au-
thority, by taking up the solution of the previous subsection. The common central bank
maximizes the utility for all agents living in the monetary union, i.e.
U (C , M/P,Y )=
∫ n
0
U j (C Aj , M j ,A/P A,Y j ,A)d j +
∫ 1
n
U j (C Bj , M j ,B /PB ,Y j ,B )d j . (5.104)
Due to the assumption of the immobility of labor between the two regions, the welfare
maximization follows the same principle as for the single fiscal policies. Hence, we can
write the monetary welfare function as
LM = 1
2
[
n
(
(piA− p¯iA)2+θMA (y A− ¯¯y A)2
)
+ (1−n)((piB − p¯iB )2+θMB (yB − ¯¯yB )2)]+ t.i.p.+O (||ξA||3) . (5.105)
A monetary welfare-function of this type is used in e.g. Pappa (2004).
145
5.2 Technical Appendix to Chapter 3
5.2.1 Data Appendix
In our empirical analysis, we use quarterly data from 1980:1 to 2004:4 for the U.S., U.K.,
Japan and Germany. The series are, with name, source and mnemonic in EcoWin:
• For the U.S.:
– United States, House Prices, NATIONAL, Index; The Office for Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight; ew:usa11750
– United States, National Income Account, Gross Domestic Product, Overall,
Total, Current Prices, USD; U.S. Department of Commerce; ew:usa01151
– United States, NYSE, Composite Index, End of Period, USD; EcoWin AB;
ew:usa15755
– United States, Consumer Price Index, All items, Total; OECD;
oecd:usa_cpaltt01_ixobq
– United States, Working-age population; OECD; oe:usa_poptq
• For the U.K.:
– United Kingdom, House Prices, Nationwide, United Kingdom, all proper-
ties, Index; Nationwide(?); ew:gbr03621
– United Kingdom, Expenditure Approach, Gross Domestic Product, Total,
Current Prices, GBP; Office for National Statistics (ONS);
ew:gbr01022
– United Kingdom, FTSE, 30, Ordinary Share Index, Average, GBP; FTID;
ew:gbr15105
– United Kingdom, Consumer Price Index, All items, Total; OECD;
oecd:gbr_cpaltt01_ixobq
– United Kingdom, Working-age population; OECD; oe:gbr_poptq
• For Japan:
– Japan, Consumer Prices, Nationwide, subgroup, housing excluding impu-
ted rent, Index; Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications;
ew:jpn11802
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– Japan, Expenditure Approach, Gross Domestic Product, Total, Current
Prices, JPY; Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI);
ew:jpn01320
– Japan, Nikkei, 225, Index, End of Period, JPY; EcoWin AB; ew:jpn15005
– Japan, Consumer Price Index, All items, Total; OECD;
oecd:jpn_cpaltt01_ixobq
– Japan, Working-age population; OECD; oe:jpn_poptq
• For Germany:
– Germany, House Prices, Total, excl. cellar; Federal Statistical Office Ger-
many; ew:deu11500
– Germany, Expenditure Approach, Gross Domestic Product, Total (linked),
Current Prices, EUR; EcoWin AB; ew:deu01994
– Germany, Deutsche Boerse, DAX 30, Index, Total Return, End of Period,
EUR; EcoWin AB; ew:deu15005
– Germany, Consumer Price Index, All items, Total; OECD;
oecd:deu_cpaltt01_ixobq
– Germany, Working-age population; OECD; oe:deu_poptq, together with the
semiannual series oe:deu_popts for pre-1991 data, averaged to quarterly
frequency
The series are - if necessary - transformed to quarterly frequency, deseasonalized and
deflated using the CPI. The real GDP is divided by the working age population to ob-
tain the appropriate measure for real GDP per capita. We then index the series so that
the average of 1980-1995 equals zero, and take (natural) logarithms. Because of the ob-
served long cycles in house prices, other detrending methods like the Hodrick-Prescott
filter lead to different results, especially for the correlations between house prices and
stock prices.19
19See European Central Bank (2003) and International Monetary Fund (2004) for discussions on pos-
sible detrending procedures for house prices, and Canova (1998) for a detailed analysis of the effects of
different detrending methods.
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5.3 Technical Appendix to Chapter 4
5.3.1 Steady State
For the derivation of the nonstochastic perfect foresight steady state, I assume without
loss of generality that steady state domestic technology A = 1. For notational simplic-
ity, I omit a variable’s time subscript to denote its steady state. In the steady state,
prices are flexible and markups are constant. In connection with firms’ pricing derived
in Section 5.3.5, this implies
MC = MC
n
PH
= (1−τ)W
PH
= ε−1
ε
. (5.106)
Plugging this result in the household’s intratemporal first-order condition gives
CσNϕ = W
P
(5.107)
⇔ CσY ϕ = ε−1
ε
1
1−τ
PH
P
, (5.108)
where the latter equation used the steady state relationship Y = AN =N . From the risk
sharing condition (4.31) we obtain
C =ϑY ∗Q 1σ , (5.109)
using C∗ = Y ∗. Replacing C in (5.107) by equation (5.109) leads to
Y =
(
ε−1
ε
PH
P
(1−τ)(ϑY ∗)σQ
) 1
ϕ
(5.110)
=
(
1− 1
ε
1−τ
) 1
ϕ
S
− 1ϕ (ϑY ∗)−
σ
ϕ , (5.111)
where the second line replaced the price ratio and the real exchange rate by the terms
of trade, along
Q = EP
∗
P
=S PH
P
, as S = (1−κ)PF
PH
= EP
∗
F
PH
= EP
∗
PH
, (5.112)
see Equations (4.11), (4.12), (4.15) and (4.17).
Furthermore, transforming the market clearing condition (4.25) gives rise to a second
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equation linking domestic output to foreign output and the terms of trade:
Y =CH + 1
1−κC
∗
H (5.113)
= (1−α)
(
PH
P
)−η
C + α
∗
1−κ
(
PH
EP∗
)−η
C∗ (5.114)
= (1−α)
(
PH
P
)−η
C + α
∗
1−κS
ηY ∗ (5.115)
=
[
(1−α)
(
PH
P
) 1
σ−η
S
1
σ + α
1−κS
η
]
ϑY ∗, (5.116)
where α∗ is replaced by αϑ, where ϑ = C0C∗0 denotes initial conditions of the model.
Equations (5.111) and (5.116) together determine the terms of trade and domestic out-
put as functions of world output. The unique solution for the terms of trade is given by
S = (1−κ)PFPH = 1. This result can be used to simplify the CPI Equation (4.6)
P¯ 1−η = (1−α)P¯ 1−ηH +αP¯
1−η
F (5.117)
= [1−α+α(1−κ)η−1]P¯ 1−ηH (5.118)
= [α+ (1−α)(1−κ)1−η]P¯ 1−ηF (5.119)
and to solve it for the steady state ratios:
PH
P
= [1−α+α(1−κ)η−1] 1η−1 ≡ΦPHP (5.120)
PF
P
= [α+ (1−α)(1−κ)1−η] 1η−1 ≡ΦPF P . (5.121)
Notice that these ratios are equal to unity if trade costs are zero, κ = 0, or if the sub-
stitution elasticity is η = 1. With this in mind, Equations (5.111) and (5.116) simplify
to
Y =
(
1− 1ε
1−τ
) 1
ϕ
(ϑY ∗)−
σ
ϕ =ΦSS1(ϑY ∗)−
σ
ϕ (5.122)
and
Y =
[
(1−α)Φ
1
σ−η
PHP +
α
1−κ
]
ϑY ∗ =ΦSS2ϑY ∗. (5.123)
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The solution to this system is given by
Y ∗ = 1
ϑ
(
ΦSS1
Φ
ϕ
SS2
) 1
1+σ
(5.124)
and
Y =ΦSS2ϑY ∗. (5.125)
Some remarks are in order. First, in the case of zero trade costs,ΦSS2 = 1 and Y =ϑY ∗,
as in GM. For positive trade costs (and η > 1), the relative size of domestic output in-
creases, as ΦSS2 > 1. Trade costs decrease the demand for imports and increase do-
mestic production. As the small open economy is by definition more open, this effect
is more pronounced for the small open economy. Hence, the size effect on the output
ratio Y /Y ∗.
Second, for positive trade costs, ΦPF P > 1 > ΦPHP , i. e., the price index of imports is
higher than the average price index, reflecting transport costs.
Third, the steady state real exchange rateQ =ΦPHPS is unity under zero trade costs,
but smaller than unity for κ> 0.
Fourth, inspecting Equation (5.109), steady state consumption in the small open econ-
omy equals domestic output for zero trade costs. For positive trade costs, steady state
consumption becomes smaller than steady state output. At first glance, this might
seem unreasonable, as it suggests that the small open economy does not spend all its
income. However, this is not the case, as “some portion of the traded good dissipates
in transit".20
Fifth, trade costs also influence steady state net exports. Nominal net exports are given
by Equation (4.22). In steady state, this reads
N X = Y −PC /PH = Y −C /ΦPHP . (5.126)
As in GM steady state net exports are zero for κ = 0, but they are negative for positive
trade costs, whereΦPHP < 1.
20See Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996, p. 251).
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5.3.2 Log-Linearization of the CPI Equation
I linearly approximate the domestic CPI, as given by Equation (4.6) around the steady
state, where P¯H = (1−κ)P¯F . Rewriting the CPI equation as
P 1−ηt = (1−α)P 1−ηH ,t +αP
1−η
F,t , (5.127)
it is straightforward to log-linearize this equation to get
pt = (1−α)
(
P¯H
P¯
)1−η
pH ,t +α
(
P¯F
P¯
)1−η
pF,t , (5.128)
where small letters denote log deviations from the steady state. The constant steady
state ratios PH /P and PF /P are derived in Section 5.3.1 of the appendix, they are given
in Equations (5.120) and (5.121). Plugging them in Equation (5.128) yields
pt = 1−α
1−α+α(1−κ)η−1 pH ,t +
α
α+ (1−α)(1−κ)1−ηpF,t
=
(
1− α
α+ (1−α)(1−κ)1−η
)
pH ,t + α
α+ (1−α)(1−κ)1−ηpF,t
= (1−α′)pH ,t +α′pF,t . (5.129)
The last equation is Equation (4.19) in the text. Notice that the coefficients 1−α′ and
α′ sum up to one like 1−α and α in GM, they actually coincide with them in the case
of zero trade costs κ= 0. These coefficients show the relative importance of changes in
domestic producer prices and import prices for changes in the CPI. In GM, the baseline
value α = 0.4 implies that import prices affect the CPI by 40 percent. In my baseline
calibration with substitution elasticity η = 1.5 and trade costs κ = 0.25, this effect is
reduced to 36.6 percent as a result of the trade reducing costs. Notice, however, that
trade costs only influence the CPI if the international substitution elasticity is non-
unitary. Using the same value for this elasticity as for the intranational substitution
elasticity, i.e., setting η= ε= 6, the effect of imports on the CPI is reduced by more than
one half, to 13.7 percent. The higher the substitutability between domestic and foreign
goods, the easier it is to replace trade cost affected imports by domestically produced
goods. Finally, in the OR baseline of η = 6, κ = 0.25 and α = 0.5 (no home bias), the
effect of imports is again strongly reduced to 19.2 percent.
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5.3.3 Log-Linearization of Net Exports Equation
Nominal net exports are given by
PH ,t N X t = PH ,t Yt −PtCt . (5.130)
As Section 5.3.1 shows, the steady state implies N X = Y −PC /PH = Y −C /ΦPHP , which
could be zero. Hence, log deviations of net exports around steady state cannot be de-
fined in the usual way. Instead, define
nxt ≡ N X t −N X
Y
(5.131)
to be the percentage deviation of net exports from steady state in terms of domestic
steady state GDP. Rewriting Equation (5.130), we have
N X t = Yt − Pt
PH ,t
Ct (5.132)
⇔ Y nxt +N X = Y (1+ yt )− PC
PH
(1+pt −pH ,t + ct ) (5.133)
⇔ nxt = yt − PC
PH Y
(pt −pH ,t + ct ) (5.134)
= yt − PC
PH Y
(ct +α′st ), (5.135)
where the last equation, obtained using Equation (4.20), is Equation (4.23) in the main
text. The steady state ratio PCPH Y can be solved for parameters using equations (5.109),
(5.125) and Q = ΦPHPS . One then gets PCPH Y = Φ
1
σ−1
PHPΦ
−1
SS2. Notice that in the case of
zero trade costs, steady state nominal net exports are zero, and hence PH Y = PC , or
ΦPHP =ΦSS2 = 1, so that one obtains the GM result
nxt = yt − ct −α′st .
5.3.4 Derivation of the Risk Sharing Condition Equation
Equating the domestic Euler Equation (4.29) and its foreign analog given in footnote
11, we have
Ct =C∗t
(
Et P∗t
Pt
) 1
σ
Et
[
Ct+1
C∗t+1
(
Pt+1
Et+1P∗t+1
) 1
σ
]
. (5.136)
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Using the definition of the real exchange rate,Qt ≡ Et P
∗
t
Pt
, this may be rewritten as
Ct
C∗t Q
1
σ
t
= Et
 Ct+1
C∗t+1Q
1
σ
t+1
 . (5.137)
Iterating this equation backwards and assuming that the period zero real exchange rate
is at its steady state,Qt = 1, and denoting initial conditions C0C∗0 =ϑ, we get
Ct
C∗t Q
1
σ
t
=ϑ, (5.138)
which, multiplied by the denominator, is Equation (4.31) in the text.
5.3.5 Derivation of the Price Setting Rule Equation
A representative firm i faces the following maximization problem:
max
P H ,t
∞∑
k=0
θk Et {Qt ,t+k [Yt+k (P H ,t −MC nt+k )]} , (5.139)
subject to the demand function. Demand for domestic good i is the sum of demand
from the small open economy and the world economy. But as a fraction κ of the good
melts away in the trade process, consumption abroad is only 1−κ of what was meant
for export of good i . From the market clearing Equation (4.25), we obtain for good i
C∗H ,t (i )= (1−κ)[Yt (i )−CH ,t (i )]. (5.140)
Hence, demand can be written as
Y dt (i )=CH ,t (i )+
1
1−κC
∗
H ,t (i ) (5.141)
=
(
PH ,t (i )
PH ,t
)−ε
CH ,t +
(
P∗H ,t (i )
P∗H ,t
)−ε
1
1−κC
∗
H ,t (5.142)
=
(
PH ,t (i )
PH ,t
)−ε (
CH ,t + 1
1−κC
∗
H ,t
)
, (5.143)
where I have made use of Equation (4.26) in the second line and of the nominal ex-
change rate definition in the third line, where trade costs cancel each other out in the
numerator and in the denominator. At date t +k, good i production is not bigger than
its demand. Replacing the individual price PH ,t (i ) by the newly set price P H ,t , the con-
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straint to the maximization problem reads
Yt+k (i )≤
(
P H ,t
PH ,t+k
)−ε
(CH ,t+k +
1
1−κC
∗
H ,t+k )≡ Y dt+k (P H ,t ). (5.144)
Each firm sets the same price in equilibrium, so the index i can be dropped. As equality
holds in the optimum, one can replace Yt+k in the maximization problem by the con-
straint given in Equation (5.144). Multiplying by P¯H ,t , dividing by 1−ε and reinserting
Yt+k , the according first order condition looks as follows:
∞∑
k=0
θk Et
{
Qt ,t+k Yt+k (P H ,t −
ε
ε−1 MC
n
t+k )
}
= 0 . (5.145)
Using the household’s Euler Equation (4.29) and the fact that Et (Qt ,t+1) = 1Rt , one can
replace Et (Qt ,t++k ) by βk
(
Ct
Ct+k
)σ Pt
Pt+k . Dividing by the period t terms results in
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k Et
{
1
Pt+kCσt+k
Yt+k (P H ,t −
ε
ε−1 MC
n
t+k )
}
= 0 . (5.146)
In preparation for log-linearization, split up the difference and notice that MCt+k ≡
MC nt+k
PH ,t+k :
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k Et
{
P¯H ,t Yt+k
Pt+kCσt+k
}
=
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k Et
{
εYt+k MCt+k PH ,t+k
(ε−1)Pt+kCσt+k
}
. (5.147)
Next I log-linearize around the zero inflation, perfect foresight, balanced trade steady
state. For this, notice that at the steady state, P¯H ,t = PH ,t+k ,and MCt+k = ε−1ε . Using
small letters to denote percentage deviations around steady state, we get
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k Et
{
p¯H ,t + yt+k −pt+k −σct+k
}
=
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k Et
{
yt+k +m̂c t+k +pH ,t+k −pt+k −σct+k
}
, (5.148)
where I have already factored out and divided by the steady state values. Notice that
I have written m̂c t instead of mct , to keep notation consistent with GM and Galí and
Monacelli (2005b), who use mct ≡ log MCt , mcnt ≡ log MC nt and m̂c t ≡mct−mc, where
mc = log MC = log ε−1
ε
≡ −µ is the steady state real marginal cost. Simplifying the last
equation using
∑∞
k=0(βθ)
k = 1/(1−βθ) results in
p¯H ,t = (1−βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k Et
{
m̂c t+k +pH ,t+k
}
. (5.149)
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Rewriting m̂cnt = m̂cnt +pH ,t , this can be transformed to
p H ,t = (1−βθ)
∞∑
k=0
(βθ)k Et {m̂c
n
t+k } , (5.150)
which is Equation (4.34) in Section 4.2.3.
5.3.6 Derivation of the Inflation Dynamics Equation
In the Calvo pricing scheme, the domestic price level given in equation (4.7) can be
rewritten as the combination of previous period’s price and the newly set price:
PH ,t = [θP 1−εH ,t−1+ (1−θ)P
1−ε
H ,t ]
1
1−ε . (5.151)
Log-linearizing this equation around a zero inflation steady state results in
pH ,t = θpH ,t−1+ (1−θ)p¯H ,t . (5.152)
From the previous paragraph, notice that Equation (5.150) can be rewritten as a first-
order difference equation in pH ,t . Leading the equation by one, taking conditional
expectations and multiplying by βθ and subtracting this from the original equation
gives
p¯H ,t = (1−βθ)(m̂cnt )+βθEt {p¯H ,t+1}. (5.153)
Now, multiply this equation by (1−θ). Then, replace (1−θ)p¯H ,t by making use of Equa-
tion (5.152), both at date t and date t +1. This results in
pH ,t −θpH ,t−1 = (1−θ)(1−βθ)(m̂cnt )+βθEt {pH ,t+1−θpH ,t }. (5.154)
Using m̂cnt = m̂c t +pH ,t and simplifying, we obtain
piH ,t =βEt {piH ,t+1}+λ(m̂c t ), λ≡ (1−θ)(1−βθ)
θ
, (5.155)
which is the small open economy part of Equation (4.35) in Section 4.2.3. The world
inflation is determined analogously.
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5.3.7 Derivation of the Canonical Representation
In this section, I derive the dynamic IS equation and the New Keynesian Phillips Curve
(NKPC) for the world economy and the small open economy.
Writing the foreign analog of the household’s log-linear Euler Equation (4.30) in terms
of foreign currency, using the market clearing condition (4.24), one obtains a difference
equation for world output:
y∗t = Et {y∗t+1}−
1
σ
(r ∗t −Et {pi∗t+1}) . (5.156)
For the small open economy, an analog can be achieved in eight steps: First, I write
down the market clearing condition (4.25) for a domestically produced good i . Then,
I use the demand functions (4.26) and (4.27) as well as its world analogs. Here, no-
tice that under producer currency pricing the substitution elasticity for domestically
produced goods has to be considered. Third, I replace total consumption in the small
open economy by world output, following Equation (4.31):
Yt (i )=CH ,t (i )+ 1
1−κC
∗
H ,t (i ) (5.157)
=
(
PH ,t (i )
PH ,t
)−ε[(PH ,t
Pt
)−η
(1−α)Ct +
(
PH ,t
Et P∗t
)−η α∗
1−κY
∗
t
]
(5.158)
=
(
PH ,t (i )
PH ,t
)−ε
ϑY ∗t
[(
PH ,t
Pt
)−η
(1−α)Q
1
σ
t +
(
PH ,t
Et P∗t
)−η α
1−κ
]
. (5.159)
In the fourth step, define domestic output like consumption as in Equation (4.3) to be
Yt ≡
(∫ 1
0
Yt (i )
1− 1ε di
) ε
ε−1
(5.160)
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and plug Equation (5.159) into this definition:
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Yt (i )
1− 1² di
] ²
²−1
=
[∫ 1
0
{(
PH ,t (i )
PH ,t
)−²
ϑY ∗t
[(
PH ,t
Pt
)−η
(1−α)Q
1
σ
t +
(
PH ,t
Et P∗t
)−η α
1−κ
] ²−1
²
}
di
] ²
²−1
=
[[
ϑY ∗t
{(
PH ,t
Pt
)−η
(1−α)Q
1
σ
t +S η
α
1−κ
}] ²−1
²
P ²−1H ,t
∫ 1
0
PH ,t (i )
1−²di
] ²
²−1
=
[[
ϑY ∗t
{(
PH ,tQt
Et P∗t
)−η
(1−α)Q
1
σ
t +S η
α
1−κ
}] ²−1
²
P ²−1H ,t
∫ 1
0
PH ,t (i )
1−²di
] ²
²−1
=
[[
ϑY ∗t
{
S ηQ
−η
t (1−α)Q
1
σ
t +S η
α
1−κ
}] ²−1
²
P ²−1H ,t
∫ 1
0
PH ,t (i )
1−²di
] ²
²−1
=ϑY ∗t S η
[
(1−α)Q
1
σ−η
t +
α
1−κ
]
P ²H ,t
[∫ 1
0
PH ,t (i )
1−²di
] ²
²−1
=ϑY ∗t S η
[
(1−α)Q
1
σ−η
t +
α
1−κ
]
P ²H ,t (P
1−²
H ,t )
²
²−1
=ϑY ∗t S η
[
(1−α)Q
1
σ−η
t +
α
1−κ
]
. (5.161)
Notice that I have made use of
PH ,t
Pt
= PH ,tQt
Et P∗t
and
PH ,t
Et P∗t
=S −1t during the calculations.
Step five is log-linearization around the steady state, following the principle Yt =
Y e yt ≈ Y (1+ yt ). Simplifying,
Yt =ϑY ∗t S ηt (1−α)Q
1
σ−η
t +
αϑ
1−κY
∗
t S
η
t , (5.162)
this is well approximated by
Y (1+ yt )=ϑY ∗S η(1−α)Q
1
σ−η[1+ y∗t +ηst + (
1
σ
−η)qt ]
+ αϑ
1−κY
∗S η(1+ y∗t +ηst ). (5.163)
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After subtracting the steady state Y =ΦSS2ϑY ∗ given in Equation (5.123), this becomes
yt =Φ−1SS2Φ
1
σ−η
PHP (1−α)[y∗t +ηst + (
1
σ
−η)qt ]+Φ−1SS2
α
1−κ (y
∗
t +ηst )
= y∗t +ηst +
(
1− α
(1−κ)ΦSS2
)
(
1
σ
−η)qt
= y∗t +
[
η+ ( 1
σ
−η)(1−α′)
(
1− α
1−κΦ
−1
SS2
)]
st (5.164)
= y∗t +
ω
σ
st , (5.165)
whereω≡ση+(1−ση)(1−α′)(1− α1−κΦ−1SS2). Notice that in the case of zero trade costs,
ω equals the parameter ωα in GM, and the last equation simplifies to
yt = y∗t +
ωα
σ
st , ωα ≡ 1+α(2−α)(ση−1) > 0 .
As a sixth step, one can use the consumption ratio given in Equation (4.32), substitute
out st and get an equation that relates ct to domestic and world output:
ct =Φc yt + (1−Φc )y∗t , (5.166)
where the parameterΦc ≡ 1−α′ω . In the seventh step, Equation (5.166) is used to replace
consumption in the household’s Euler Equation (4.30), and first differences of Equation
(4.20) is used to replace CPI inflation by domestic goods inflation:
Φc yt + (1−Φc )y∗t = Et
{
Φc yt+1+ (1−Φc )y∗t+1
}− 1
σ
(rt −Et {piH ,t+1+α′∆st+1}) . (5.167)
Finally, the eighth and last step is to substitute out ∆st+1 using equation (5.165) and to
solve for yt . One then obtains a dynamic IS equation for the small open economy:
yt = Et {yt+1}− ω
σ
(rt −Et {piH ,t+1})+ (ω−1)Et {∆y∗t+1} . (5.168)
To derive the New Keynesian Phillips Curves, I start from Equation (4.35) derived in
this appendix Section 5.3.6. The marginal costs in these equations shall be replaced by
output. Remember from Section 4.2.2, that MC nt =MCt PH ,t = (1−τ)Wt /At , so the log
deviation of the real marginal costs of the small open and the world economy are
m̂c t =wt −at −pH ,t and m̂c∗t =w∗t −a∗t −p∗t . (5.169)
For the world economy, the household’s intratemporal first-order condition w∗t −p∗t =
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σc∗t +ϕn∗t and aggregate production y∗t = n∗t +a∗t , analogously to Equations (4.30) and
(4.33), can be used to rewrite
m̂c∗t = (σ+ϕ)y∗t − (1+ϕ)a∗t . (5.170)
For the small open economy, the same steps and additionally Equation (4.20) result in
m̂c t =σct +ϕyt +α′st − (1+ϕ)at . (5.171)
Now, using Equation (4.32) allows for replacing consumption by world output and
terms of trade,
m̂c t =σy∗t +ϕyt + st − (1+ϕ)at . (5.172)
Finally, Equation (5.165) enables us to substitute out st . So marginal costs can be
rewritten just in terms of both types of output and domestic productivity:
m̂c t =
(σ
ω
+ϕ
)
yt +σ
(
1− 1
ω
)
y∗t − (1+ϕ)at . (5.173)
To use the conventional notation in terms of gaps, the output gap shall be defined as
the deviation of the log-linearized variable from its natural level, which would occur
under flexible prices and thereby constant marginal costs log MCt =mct = log MC∗t =
mc∗t = −µ. This implies that the log deviations of marginal costs from this flex-price
steady state are always zero, m̂c t = m̂c∗t = 0. Thus, I have y˜t ≡ yt − y t and analogously
y˜∗t ≡ y∗t − y∗t , where bars above variables with time index are used to denote their nat-
ural levels. To obtain these natural levels of output, solve Equations (5.173) and (5.170)
in the flex-price situation for the respective output:
y t =
ω(1+ϕ)
σ+ωϕ at +
σ (1−ω)
σ+ωϕ y
∗
t and y
∗
t =
1+ϕ
σ+ϕa
∗
t . (5.174)
Subtracting the flex-price version of Equation (5.170) from the sticky price version
yields
m̂c∗t = (σ+ϕ)(y∗t − y¯∗t )
= (σ+ϕ)y˜∗t . (5.175)
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Similarly, for the small open economy we obtain
m̂c t =
(σ
ω
+ϕ
)
(yt − y¯t )
=
(
σ
ωξ
+ϕ
)
y˜t . (5.176)
Notice that foreign output does not show up, as for the calculation of the domestic
output gap world output is assumed to be exogenous, both in the flex-price and in the
sticky price world.
After inserting the results for marginal costs from Equations (5.175) and (5.176) in
the inflation dynamics equations given in (4.35), I obtain the New Keynesian Phillips
curves (NKPC) for the small open economy and for the world economy, linking infla-
tion to its expected future value and to the output gap:
piH ,t =βEt {piH ,t+1}+ΦN K PC y˜t , (5.177)
pi∗t =βEt {pi∗t+1}+ΦN K PC∗ y˜∗t , (5.178)
whereΦN K PC ≡λ
(
σ
ω
+ϕ) andΦN K PC∗ ≡λ(σ+ϕ).
For the dynamic IS equations, start with the difference equation for world output given
in equation (5.156). Evaluate it twice, once for sticky prices and once for flexible prices.
In doing so, notice that
r¯ ∗t −Et {p¯i∗t+1}=−σ(1−ρ∗a)Γ0a∗t ≡ r r ∗t . (5.179)
is the natural expected real rate of interest in the world economy, which would pre-
vail under completely flexible prices. It can be derived by solving Equation (5.156) for
the flexible price situation characterized by equation (5.174). Subtract the flex-price
outcome from the sticky price outcome to obtain
y˜∗t = Et {y˜∗t+1}−
1
σ
(r ∗t −Et {pi∗t+1}− r r ∗t ) . (5.180)
Analogously, the small open economy’s dynamic IS equation is obtained by subtracting
Equation (5.174) from Equation (5.168) and simplifying:
y˜t = Et {y˜t+1}− ω
σ
(rt −Et {piH ,t+1}− r r t ) (5.181)
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with the domestic natural expected real rate of interest
r r t ≡−σ(1+ϕ)(1−ρa)
σ+ωϕ at −ϕ
σ (1−ω)
σ+ωϕ Et {∆y
∗
t+1}, (5.182)
again derived evaluating Equation (5.168) at the flexible price situation described by
equation (5.174). Equations (5.177), (5.178), (5.181) and (5.180) are equations (4.38),
(4.39), (4.40) and (4.41) in Section 4.2.3.
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